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Introduction 
Public attitudes can make or break the successful adoption of technological and 
scientific innovations. Following the failed introduction of controversial innovations 
in society – genetic modification (GM) being one of the most prominent examples – 
public programmes aimed at preventing unfavourable attitudes have become an 
integral part of many technological and scientific developments. Such public 
programmes often try to inform or – more ambitiously – educate the public, and 
some of them even offer opportunities to participate in shaping the innovations. 
During such public reach-outs, technical experts and scientists1 find themselves in a 
variety of situations where they talk with the public about their technological 
innovations. Often, they use their own ‘expert language’, or, at the very least, the 
(technical) name of the innovation on which they are working. And once an 
innovation is introduced into society, the name continues to represent it. 
For the uninitiated, a scientific name can be hard to understand. A good 
example, used as a case throughout the current dissertation, is the name ‘genomics’. 
It is difficult to explain the meaning of genomics to people who do not have much 
related expertise. Ever since I started working on this dissertation that you are about 
to read, when people asked me what my research was about, their first reaction to 
my answer was “Genomics? What is that?” And in the vast majority of cases, at one 
point or another, people would present their own answer, which would be something 
similar to “… is it some kind of genetic modification?” My own experience is 
similar to that of Van Dam and De Vriend (2002), who noticed that people gave 
their opinion about GM when they were asked about their feelings towards 
genomics, and they were of the impression that people believed them to be one and 
the same thing. Truth to tell, when I read the advertisement for the position that I 
shall hold until shortly after the publication of this dissertation, I had no idea what 
genomics was. My first guess was the same as that of most other people; that is was 
                                                          
1 To avoid confusion between technical scientists working on innovations and social 
scientists studying public perceptions of innovations, both are henceforth referred to 
as experts. 
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a form of GM, and I remember that the information I found did not convince me 
otherwise.  
In the case of genomics, reaching out to the public achieved the opposite to 
preventing unfavourable attitudes because of the name genomics and the 
associations it triggers. Genomics is explained in more detail later, but at this point it 
suffices to say that, contrary to GM, it does not entail the controversial artificial 
recombination of genes (or ‘messing around with genes’) to breed new cultivars of 
fruits and vegetables. Rather, genomics can be, and has been, applied as an 
alternative to GM to try to accelerate the breeding of new plant cultivars. An 
institution with this objective is the Centre for Biosystems Genomics (CBSG), 
which has the explicit goal of creating new food cultivars that would meet the 
approval of people rejecting GM by using genomics instead. When the centre sought 
partners among those who rejected GM, such as organic farmers, the initial 
responses were hostile rather than welcoming (Hall, 2010), despite having shared 
goals in avoiding GM. Why? The potential partners thought that genomics was GM 
and some were already put off by the name of the CBSG. In the case of the organic 
farmers, elaborate talking and explaining did remove the confusion, and this group 
became supportive of the approach. However, explaining the differences took a long 
time and personal attention, and a meeting to discuss possible cooperation was 
completely taken up with explaining the scientific concept (Hall, 2010). Similar 
confusion by others caused damage that was practically impossible to correct. 
Writing about the formation of the CBSG, a journalist in a nationwide newspaper 
wrote that the aim of the CBSG was to work on “… genetic modification of both the 
tomato and the potato…” (Janssen, 2002, p. 10). Confusion due the name caused the 
exact opposite of what was desired, and it spread by mass media, potentially 
alienating those who might be most supportive. 
The name of a technology is always present when people communicate 
about it, and so is its influence on perceptions of the technology. For experts 
developing new technologies that are initially shared among the science community 
only, it often makes sense to choose names that describe the technical nature of the 
innovation and that are meaningful to their peers. Subsequently, however, these 
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‘expert names’ trickle down to society and reach laypeople. At this stage, the initial 
technical names are not changed, and the effects of these names on people without 
related expertise are not examined. However, the abovementioned effects of the 
name genomics suggest that a scientific name can influence the development of 
initial understandings and attitudes. Instead of refraining from forming an opinion 
and awaiting further information, the potential partners had already formed 
unfavourable attitudes that were difficult to correct because of associations activated 
by the name.  
If a name does indeed play such an important role, understanding how it 
influences perceptions will aid science communication. Not only might it be 
possible to avoid inappropriate beliefs and attitudes, but also more correct 
understandings and favourable attitudes could similarly be promoted. The term lab 
meat having run into the same issues as genomics, Friedrich (2016) argued after 
proposing a new name: 
 
‘First impressions are critical. We don’t want to start a discussion by having 
to disabuse people of negative associations and inaccurate assumptions; we 
want to start with a discussion of one of the key advantages.’ 
 
Looking at a name as a prime (as Friedrich does) offers a possible 
explanation for its effects on understandings and attitudes. When a name is acting as 
a prime, it asserts an influence over cognitive processes that follow exposure to it, 
including noticing further provided information or remembering information learned 
previously, the interpretation and processing of that information, and the subsequent 
evaluation and attitude formation (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). This might 
sound like common sense; however, the negative consequences of names such as 
genomics, genetic manipulation, and nanotechnology show that it is often noticed 
only in retrospect that the name has a powerful influence in shaping public 
perception. When new technologies are introduced into society, the focus is on 
informing or educating the public. It is not anticipated that names will influence the 
formation of understanding and evaluations. Once associations are in the process of 
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formation, it might be easy to recognize them, but even then many questions remain. 
How universally do the associations occur? Do people rely on them to draw 
conclusions, or do they refrain from making any until they have more information? 
And, very important, are the inappropriate associations and inaccurate assumptions 
easily corrected by providing information, or will the interpretation of the 
information be transformed because of the associations?  
A deeper understanding of how a name influences perception and 
evaluations can have significant practical relevance for communicating about 
science. Thinking about the potential of a particular name before engaging in contact 
with the public could be a beneficial first step in public communication efforts. To 
better anticipate the effects of a name however, it is important to understand why a 
name carries such weight and what its relations are with both understandings and 
attitudes.  
The aim of the current dissertation is to systematically investigate the 
influence of a name on the interpretation and evaluation of a science or technology. 
It focuses on how people make sense of what a name means and on the subsequent 
formation of attitudes that occurs when people are confronted with a scientific 
concept unfamiliar to them. The development of genomics applied to plant breeding 
provides an excellent case to study the effects of a name on emerging attitudes and 
understandings. First of all, people are still widely unfamiliar with genomics and 
have therefore not yet formed an opinion about it (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, & Fife-
Schaw, 2010; Pin & Gutteling, 2008). In addition, as the aforementioned sources 
show (Hall, 2010; Van Dam & De Vriend, 2002; Janssen, 2002), people quickly 
draw conclusions after hearing the name genomics and before learning more about 
it. The research is designed to have practical relevance in situations that experts and 
members of the public can encounter. To achieve this, the individual studies draw on 
the experiences of researches from the CBSG. 
In the remainder of the introduction, topics central to this dissertation are 
discussed in more depth. First, the effects of a name are explored with a short 
overview of names that are believed to be either problematic or well-chosen, with 
their (suspected) effects on public perception and attitudes. In addition, the review 
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explores how experts deal with scientific names. Second, (the lack of) attention on 
the influence of a name on interpretation and evaluation in science communication 
research2 is further explored. In several ways, the basic assumptions behind the 
current research diverge from dominant views currently found in science 
communication. Therefore, special attention is given to how the current work relates 
to, and differs from, those views, followed by an outline of the current research. In 
addition, genomics itself and the differences between it and GM are discussed in 
more detail. At the end of the introduction, the structure of the dissertation is 
presented more broadly, with a short description of the studies and the relation 
between them. 
 
Names influencing perceptions: An overview 
Within the field of science communication research, reports about the 
effects of a name on understanding and attitude formation are difficult to find. A 
strong focus on education and participation offers a possible explanation: in the view 
of well-informed experts, making assumptions about the nature of a science or 
technology based on just a name borders on prejudice and bias, which should be 
corrected by education or participation. And with the goal-oriented view on these 
interventions, even reporting interferences of a name is not a priority (see section 
Science communication, later in this chapter). However, although sparse and 
scattered, reports on the effects of names can be found. Some of the reports show 
how a name can cause confusion, whereas other reports give examples of 
successfully getting a message across by changing technical names to ones more 
meaningful to the public. Although the majority of these sources do not report the 
                                                          
2 In many ways, the current research is inspired by the sub-discipline, public 
understanding of science, which focuses especially on changing attitudes towards 
science by enhancing understanding through providing information. Because of the 
interest in the effects of names used during (not necessarily educational) 
communication on understanding and attitudes, the current research fits in both the 
(broader) theme of science communication and that of public understanding of 
science. For clarity, the term science communication is henceforth used exclusively 
and can refer to each one or to a combination of both.  
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result of systematic research, they do shed light on how a name can cause confusion 
or promote understanding. In addition, some also show how experts approach issues 
arising from names and why more attention on the subject is needed. The overview 
begins with a further exploration of three names that have been suspected of causing 
unfavourable attitudes among the public; these are genetic manipulation, 
nanotechnology, and genomics itself, which is discussed first. 
 
Confusing names 
As already mentioned, Hall (2010) and Van Dam and De Vriend (2002) 
report that, in their experience, people confuse and even replace genomics with GM. 
To test the influence of the word more directly, people were asked what they 
thought the word genomics meant (Nap, Jacobs, Gremmen, & Stiekema, 2002). The 
majority of respondents believed it to be “… a difficult word for genetic 
manipulation” (Nap et al., 2002, Appendix 1).  
It can be argued that people consciously treat genomics and GM as 
synonymous because of the technical similarities between genomics and GM, and 
the fact that knowledge derived from genomics can be used for GM. However, both 
Hall (2010) and Van Dam and De Vriend (2002) note that people lack any clear 
knowledge about either genomics or GM; this is in line with earlier findings that 
people have very little knowledge about GM (Frewer, Shepherd, & Sparks, 1994) 
and that the public are (still) unfamiliar with genomics (Sturgis et al., 2010). So, 
although genomics and GM share technical aspects and can be used to complement 
each other, people do not have, and therefore do not use, this knowledge to link the 
two. Rather, people treat genomics and GM as similar solely because of similar 
sounding names. The lack of technical knowledge also explains why it is so hard to 
correct misunderstandings, as reported by Hall (2010); it is next to impossible to 
illustrate the technical differences between GM and genomics briefly when someone 
has very little knowledge about either. To fully appreciate the differences, one needs 
to have relatively extensive knowledge of the theoretical basis, in this case genetics. 
Much like the name genomics, nanotechnology is reported to trigger 
incorrect beliefs. Kampers (2009) reports that people, when confronted about 
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nanotechnology applied to food production, believe that “nanotechnology equals 
nanoparticles”. According to Kampers, nanoparticles are considered dangerous by 
most people because of well-known hazardous nanoparticles (such as asbestos), and 
therefore nanotechnology is equally considered dangerous. In reality, only a small 
subset of nanoparticles is dangerous, and those applied to food are harmless 
according to Kampers.3 In addition, nanotechnology does not necessarily result in 
nanoparticles (Kampers, 2009). Similar to the case of genomics, the public have 
only little knowledge about the science involved. In Kampers’ (2009) experience: 
“…the general public lacks the technical ability and the information to make a good 
risk assessment” – a statement supported by findings from research on the public 
knowledge of nanotechnology (Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004; Lee, Scheufele, & 
Lewenstein, 2005) 
Another similarity between genomics and nanotechnology is that the names 
have not fully reached the public domain, and experiences with effects of the names 
are therefore still limited. The name genetic manipulation is suspected of having 
done considerable damage already after the technology, its products, and its name 
were introduced into society. After the technology attracted widespread criticism 
and controversies started to mount, the name came under suspicion of being partly 
responsible because of negative associations triggered by (social acts of) 
manipulation. As a form of damage control, it was replaced with the nicer sounding 
alternatives, engineering and modification (Bauer, Durant, & Gaskell, 1998; Hansen, 
2010).  
                                                          
3 Not everyone agrees with this notion. Calls for more research and more caution in 
applying nanotechnology (Maynard, 2008) have been made (Faunce, Murray, Nasu, 
& Bowman, 2008). In an article discussing the differences between laypeople’s and 
experts’ perception of nanotechnology hazards, Siegrist, Keller, Kastenholz, Frey, 
and Wiek (2007) pay special attention to the remarks of reviewers who question the 
ability of experts to judge the risks of nanotechnology (see Siegrist et al., 2007, p. 
60). These authors conclude (like Kampers, 2009) that experts use their 
technological knowledge, but they explicitly state that they “…do not make any 
claims about the accuracy of the experts' assessments” (Siegrist et al., 2007, p. 67). 
For the current dissertation, the main point is that the expert notices how people use 
associations to transfer mainly risk perceptions from familiar nanotechnology 
applications to new ones. 
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A few interesting commonalties can be found between the cases of 
genomics, nanotechnology, and genetic manipulation. First of all, the public have 
little technical knowledge about the subjects. Second, in the cases of genomics and 
nanotechnology, people give meaning to these constructs by comparing them with, 
or even replacing them by, concepts with which they are familiar. In the case of GM, 
it is believed that the act of manipulation causes a link with the act of social 
manipulation. People therefore appear to try to understand concepts with which they 
are dealing by finding concepts similar in appearance with which they are already 
familiar.4 This behaviour appears to follow patterns described in categorization 
theory, as discussed next. 
 
Categorization theory 
According to categorization theory, human knowledge is organized in categories of 
similar concepts (Rosch, 1975, 1978). By grouping similar concepts together, one 
does not have to remember every detail about each member belonging to the 
category, resulting in cognitive efficiency. It also helps to deal with new concepts. 
Inferences about the new concept can be made by placing the unfamiliar in an 
existing category (Moreau, Markman, & Lehmann, 2001), an act called 
categorization. If someone proverbially concludes that something is a duck because 
of its looks, the same person will be able to make inferences quickly and efficiently 
without direct observation or testing, such as that it can swim. Categorization theory 
has been developed mainly by studying the way people mentally organize natural 
objects (Dutton & Jackson, 1987) or physical products that appear similar in shape, 
dimension, or function (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975, 1978; Rosch, 
Simpson, & Miller, 1976). The similarity between how people link technologies by 
name alone and the way people categorize objects suggests that categorization also 
applies to making sense of scientific names, even though a name lacks the rich set of 
stimuli objects that can be used to justify a categorization. 
 
                                                          
4 Familiarity in the current sense does not imply having technical knowledge. 
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Names avoiding confusion 
The examples of names that act confusingly consist of cases where the 
expert names continued to be used during the (emerging) public interactions. In a 
number of cases, experts have altered the name of a technology or science to avoid 
inferences. A recently introduced example is the current attempt to come up with an 
alternative name for lab meat, and its synonyms synthetic meat, in-vitro meat, and 
culture meat. There are concerns that the names lab meat or in-vitro meat bring a 
‘yuck factor’ to impressions about the meat (Rousseau, 2016). In addition, it is 
feared that the names might lead to confusion about the production methods 
(Mammoser, 2016), and that the term culture meat could lead to confusion (or mis-
categorization) with otherwise treated meat (Friedrich, 2016). Changing the name to 
clean meat serves two purposes (Friedrich, 2016): it is supposed not only to avoid 
confusion, but also to trigger associations stressing its benefits.  
For a similar reason, the name nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) was 
changed to magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The renaming occurred when use of 
the technology was extended from chemistry and physics to medicine. At this point, 
not only would laypeople come in contact with, and communicate about, the subject, 
but also would be placed inside the scanners. This raised physicians’ concerns that 
the name nuclear would lead to people falsely assuming that they would be 
bombarded with dangerous nuclear radiation. To prevent people from becoming 
anxious over (non-present) ionizing radiation, nuclear was dropped in favour of 
imaging, which emphasizes the function rather than its technological foundation 
(Meaney, 1984). 
A name that is considered highly successful in communicating a complex 
idea is ozone hole. Rowland, a pioneer in ozone depletion, came up with the name to 
communicate effectively about the phenomenon (Grundmann, 2002, p. 102). 
Scientifically, the term hole is incorrect and too simplistic to describe the process 
theoretically; depletion is used instead. However, ozone hole served as an effective 
metaphor to illustrate the problem on a popular level and is regarded as largely 
responsible for focusing public attention on the problem of ozone depletion because 
it created an easy-to-grasp picture of the problem (Grundmann, 2002). 
Chapter 1 
18 
 
 
The relation between a name and understanding: Empirical research 
The lack of empirical research means that the extent to which 
communication benefited from changing the names remains uncertain. The term 
ozone hole was successful in attracting the public’s attention (Ungar, 2000). 
However, the effects of names compared to their alternatives remains somewhat 
speculative due to the lack of direct empirical attention. In a notable exception, 
Whitmarsh (2009) compared perceptions triggered by global warming and climate 
change. In good scientific practice, global warming and climate change refer to 
different consequences of increased carbon dioxide concentrations (Conway, 2008). 
They are, however, used interchangeably (Conway, 2008; Corbett & Durfee, 2004), 
and journalists tend to use global warming rather than climate change (Corbett & 
Durfee, 2004). Whitmarsh (2009) shows that global warming is more often 
associated with, among other things, melting glaciers and human activity. Thus, 
Whitmarsh (2009, p. 416) provides direct evidence that, in her own words, “the 
terminology used determines the way people understand and evaluate the issue”. 
The research thereby shows that explaining scientific ideas can be easier with some 
names than with others. 
 
Science and ‘public names’ 
As stated, the unexpected effects noticed by experts when attempting to 
communicate with the public using terms like genetic manipulation, genomics, and 
others show that it is not just common sense that a name can have such a powerful 
influence. The name is not a priority, creating a blind spot as illustrated by the name 
genomics. During the preparation phase in which the CBSG was formed, there were 
already warning signs pointing to the name being problematic (see the 
abovementioned confusion reported by Van Dam & De Vriend, 2002; Janssen, 
2002; Nap et al., 2002; see also Gremmen, 2007). In addition to the blind spot, the 
scientific community shows an unwillingness to adopt alternative names that are 
proving themselves useful. In the case of relabelling NMR as MRI, a group of 
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experts argued for rejection of the new name. Instead of agreeing with the advantage 
of effective and clear communication and avoiding unnecessary confusion and fears, 
they argued that confusion caused by the name NMR should be resolved with 
education (Pohost, Elgavish, & Evanochko, 1986). In a similar vein, the name ozone 
hole was initially rejected and banned from use in journals because of its inaccuracy 
(Christie, 2001; Grundmann, 2002). Even though both public names became the 
standard, the reaction shows an interesting dichotomy in experts’ approach to the 
public. On the one hand, public communication has become an important part of 
science; on the other, experts typically tend not to think about the interference a 
name can have. When some do, others criticize potentially effective names for not 
being scientifically correct. By doing so, they place more importance on traditional 
scientific labels than on efficient and effective public communication.  
 
Conclusion  
Although limited in number, the above cases show some interesting 
patterns. The first and most certain observation that can be made is that the attention 
on a name in science communication literature is rather slim. This might be 
considered surprising, as the name of a topic plays a very important part in 
communicating about it. When the subject of naming does receive attention, it is 
often related to directly experienced, practical issues and lacks an interest in theory 
development. The lack of a theoretical interest is even illustrated in the case of the 
research about the different beliefs triggered by global warming versus climate 
change: although it is one of the very few direct tests of the effects of a name, the 
theoretical outline of the research deals not with theories about why the differences 
arise, but rather with theories about the (ecological) importance of climate change. 
Second, the interferences from a name appear to result from people 
believing that they are dealing with another technology. Thus, it appears that people 
draw conclusions from a particular categorization, with the categorization being 
determined by the name of the technology rather than by its technical attributes. In 
addition, those who have changed names, do so with a clear focus on how to get a 
point across to the public. They aim to choose a name that prevents incorrect 
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categorization by those with limited technical knowledge while simultaneously 
illustrating the technology’s benefits. 
The findings also point to an important influence of the domain of 
application of a technology. In all the cases where experts are confronted with 
unfavourable responses, the technologies, genomics, GM, nanotechnology, and lab 
meat, are applied to food production. It has been speculated that, because of the 
intimate connection between people and food, technologies that modify food might 
be especially prone to scrutiny (Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1997; 
Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & Weldon, 2001; Pardo, Midden, & Miller, 2002; Bánáti, 
2011; Simons et al., 2009). The pattern of topics leading to issues appears to confirm 
this. 
Finally, the public’s knowledge level is a recurrent theme. In several cases, 
the experts conclude that the public are not knowledgeable enough to draw the right 
conclusion. A lack of technical knowledge about what to use to form an 
understanding can explain much of why people would fall back on a name to reach 
conclusions. However, statements about the public lacking knowledge are often met 
with suspicion (especially within science communication research) because of the 
way these have been used by experts to maintain control over science. Because of 
the central role of understanding and a lack thereof in current research, special 
attention is given in the current dissertation to how a lack of understanding and 
ignorance is approached and how this approach differs from dominant views in 
science communication research. 
 
Science communication 
Evolution and limitation of the dominant approach in science communication  
In recent decades, a public that initially celebrated science are now 
becoming more critical (Gregory & Lock, 2008). Fuelled by controversial 
technologies such as nuclear energy and GM (Gregory & Lock, 2008), people have 
started to fear and reject scientific developments and to mistrust experts (see also 
Löfstedt, 2005). The lack of public support put pressure on the funding of research 
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(Gregory & Miller, 1998; Yearley, 2000). One of the scientific community’s most 
influential responses was the publication of the report titled The public 
understanding of science (Bodmer, 1985). The report presented what has become 
known as the deficit model; it postulated that people feared and objected to scientific 
developments because they lacked the knowledge required to understand things 
properly. The solution presented was public education, which would solve the 
resistance by imparting a proper understanding. In attempts to prevent further 
unfavourable opinions, public educational programmes started to spread, and 
science communication became an integral part of scientific developments. Related 
research reached the point of itself becoming a subtheme of science communication, 
called public understanding of science after the report. 
The deficit model continues to influence science communication, even 
though it has proved unsuccessful in changing and preventing unfavourable attitudes 
(Bauer, 2016). One reason is that alternatives to the deficit model closely resemble it 
(Wynne, 2006). The deficit model’s educational approach, in which the public are 
more or less passive receivers of ‘correct facts’, has been replaced with approaches 
in which members of the public play a more active role (Gregory & Lock, 2008). 
According to supporters of public participation in scientific developments, the 
public in their active role become co-creators of science through changing the course 
of science by voicing wishes and objections. According to Wynne (2006) however, 
the deficit mode of thinking remains; although education is replaced with 
participation, the aim is still to prevent unfavourable attitudes rather than truly give 
control to the public. Second, the deficit model continues to remain popular among 
technical experts and policymakers (Kerschner & Ehlers, 2016). Consequently, 
much current science communication is still influenced by the deficit model (Miller, 
2001; Bauer, Allum, & Miller, 2007; Durant, 1999; Bauer, 2016). 
The deficit model has become very controversial (Bauer et al., 2007; 
Durant, 1999; see also Bauer, 2016). Those who object believe that it is 
undemocratic not to accept people’s opinions but rather to call for education when 
the public hold different beliefs. To make matters worse, opponents of the model 
believe that the idea that people are ignorant is used derogatively with the aim of 
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disqualifying people from the debate and retaining control of scientific agendas 
(Wynne, 1993; Durant, 1999). Experts are indeed known to express themselves in 
accordance with these suspicions, including calling people lazy for not becoming 
educated and being too quick to draw conclusions (Bucchi, 2008), and saying that 
important scientific decisions should not be left to the ignorant public. Behaviours 
like these cause suspicion around remarks such as that of Kampers (2009) that the 
public lack the technical ability to make a good risk assessment about 
nanotechnology. In science communication research, the dominant view is that 
science should be more democratic. To counter the lack-of-knowledge argument, a 
dominant view is that the public do understand, just not in the way experts do. 
Instead, people form what is known as lay expertise. 
Regarding understanding itself, the argument that the public understand 
differently makes a valid contribution to bridging the gap between the public and 
experts. However, the fact that understandings can take a different form does not 
take away from the fact that people can misunderstand (Davies, 2008) and that 
ignorance does exist. As illustrated by the case of organic farmers confronted with 
the word genomics, the difference in understanding (the public drawing conclusions 
based on the name versus experts’ deep theoretical understanding) leads to a belief 
that genomics equals GM; a different but also an inappropriate conclusion.5 This 
also shows that the concept of lay understanding does not suffice to reject ignorance. 
Putting a moratorium on misunderstandings and ignorance can create a blind spot 
not only on how misunderstandings arise or the effects of ignorance, but also on 
offering solutions to them. It prevents the development of insights about how people 
reach the wrong conclusion, why they draw conclusions so quickly, and what the 
                                                          
5 The conclusion that non-experts reach ‘inappropriate’ or ‘wrong conclusions’ has 
often been used by experts to disqualify public opinion, while claiming that they 
themselves are ‘right’ (Hansen, Holm, Frewer, Robinson, & Sandøe, 2003). Thus, 
claims that non-experts are wrong can be highly political (Maranta, Guggenheim, 
Gisler, & Pohl, 2003) and met with suspicion. However, this of course does not 
mean that non-experts cannot be wrong. Within the current confusion between 
genomics and GM, it can be argued that the farmers concluded themselves that they 
had drawn an inappropriate conclusion when they changed their mind after 
developing a deeper understanding. 
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effects of the initial misunderstanding are on further knowledge development, if it 
does take place. Despite the good intentions, denying that misunderstandings and 
ignorance exist actually damages the potential for recognizing that people can 
understand differently. 
The above opposing views between experts and social scientists can offer a 
second possible reason for the lack of attention on the effects of a scientific name. In 
a situation where social scientists are focusing on promoting the idea of a general 
(lay) understanding by the public, recognizing misunderstandings caused by a name 
or focusing on its role in enhancing the efficiency of educational efforts might come 
across as agreeing (or even siding) with experts. Experts, on the other hand, tend to 
be surprised that a name can cause misunderstandings at all. As experts judge 
scientific developments on their theoretical content, jumping to conclusions after 
reading a name might come across to them as silly. Experts might especially not 
expect it because of their own analytical nature. Consequently, a name as a research 
topic seems to be lost between social scientists’ sensitivity to recognizing 
misunderstandings and ignorance and experts’ surprise at the fact that it can have 
such an impact. 
To pay proper attention to how the public respond to a name, an explicit 
attempt is made not to be caught in the rival views of a derogative ‘ignorant lazy 
public’ view versus a ‘lay understanding’ stance. The approach taken in the current 
dissertation is that people can misunderstand and that they can be, and very often 
are, ignorant.6 However, this is done in a non-derogative way, and ignorance is not 
regarded as the result of laziness (or as stupidity). The best way to illustrate the 
current approach is to consider ignorance as a form of bounded rationality (Simon, 
1979). According to Simon, it is impossible to know everything and the cost of 
searching for all related information is too high for it to be practical. This view that 
it is too costly is strengthened by research on expertise, which states that it takes 
about 10 years to reach the level of being an expert (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-
Römer, 1993), and that, in the case of science communication, it would take a lot of 
                                                          
6 In fact, everyone is (relatively) ignorant about any subject about which they are not 
an expert, constituting the vast majority of subjects. 
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study to really grasp information being provided in the way intended by experts 
about even only one subject.  
The sheer amount of information that people have to process to gain a basic 
understanding brings forth another difference between the current dissertation and 
dominant views in science communication. Science communication research often 
focuses on how people respond to information provided. Consequently, it often 
deviates from daily life situations where no information is present. Science 
communication (which reaches only a small subset of the population) is therefore 
often an intervention itself that causes participants to be more informed than the 
public they are supposed to represent. Because of the intervention, science 
communication studies mostly the psychology of the informed. In daily life 
situations, we often make decisions and form attitudes and understandings with 
many questions unanswered, because we have to. Externally provided (technical) 
information is often an exception to the rule.7 Reasoning from the perspective of the 
development of knowledge about a particular subject, ignorance is often the basis on 
which attitudes and understandings begin to take form, on which we base many 
decisions in life. To understand related behaviours and opinions, a psychology of the 
uninformed and barely informed is needed. 
The current research is based on the view that people will often not develop 
well-founded insights. It is reasoned that ignorance is most often the default state of 
knowledge, which will most likely not alter significantly because of a lack of 
personal urgency and high cost. Therefore, in daily life situations, people often have 
to deal with complex technologies without the related technical knowledge that 
experts have. For some technologies, they have only the name and the associations it 
triggers to go on when making decisions, making the name a very important factor 
in shaping people’s understandings. To understand these processes, it is important to 
research not only how people respond to information, but also how they respond 
without it. Therefore, the current dissertation differentiates itself from the dominant 
                                                          
7 Many people might be targeted by marketing. However, the information provided 
is aimed at enhancing consumption rather than understanding, and therefore 
marketing is not considered externally provided information in the current context. 
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tradition in science communication research with the aim of understanding the 
formation of attitudes and understandings, without any other information than the 
name. 
 
This research 
The aim of the current research is to gain insight into the role of the name 
of a technology in shaping attitudes and understandings about it. The research draws 
its inspiration from the observation that perceptions and subsequent attitudes about a 
technology can be influenced strongly by its name. The current research goal is to 
systematically investigate the effects of the name of a technology on its emerging 
understandings and attitudes. It is argued that most people will form opinions not 
based on publicly provided knowledge or education, but on emerging 
understandings and attitudes that can be strongly influenced by a name.  
At the centre of the research is the initial phase of how people form their 
understandings and attitudes. Therefore, it explores people’s reactions to an 
innovation before information has reached them. In this approach, the hypothesis is 
that the name can play a central role in shaping the public’s understanding and 
responses through the associations it triggers. In the research, this is investigated by 
looking at whether people universally show a pattern between the evaluation of an 
unfamiliar technology and that of a familiar one based on the name. Such a pattern 
would confirm the tendency to categorize an unfamiliar technology with a familiar 
one to reach an evaluation. The lack of such an outcome would indicate people 
restraining their evaluations, which would be closer to the expectations of experts. 
In addition to just the influence of a name, the context in which a science or 
technology is presented can have an important impact in activating cognitions. It is 
often argued that controversies are more hotly debated when innovations are applied 
to enhance food production. For example, it is argued that GM is especially 
controversial because it is often applied to food production systems (Frewer et al., 
1997; Marris et al., 2001; Pardo et al., 2002). Supporting this notion is the fact that 
debates about GM and restrictions on applying it often occur in an agriculture-for-
food context. Applications and restrictions in relation to medical or industrial 
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applications are far less common, and public awareness of these applications is low 
(Marris et al., 2001). Thus, it can be hypothesized that applying a technology to food 
production appears to increase the sense of risk. Research has shown that people 
tend to use broader categorizations when they have a high risk perception; this can 
result in more associations and categorizations with other technologies that are 
perceived as risky when people are trying to make sense of a concept (Shook, Fazio, 
& Eiser, 2007). To test the influence directly, the current research also investigates 
the interaction between the name of a technology and the presented application. It is 
hypothesized that there are more associations activated with other familiar 
technologies that are perceived as risky for (the name of) a new technology in a 
food-production context compared to other applications of it. 
Further, the current research also pays attention to what happens if 
information is provided, as is often done in science communication. However, the 
current assumption is that, when information is provided, the name still plays a 
crucial role in the ‘sense making’ of the information through activated mental 
categories, which can determine which information is noticed and remembered. It is 
therefore expected that the effects of the information can be influenced by 
cognitions activated by the name. Put differently, the extent to which the effects of 
providing information are the result of the interaction between information and the 
expectations triggered by the name is investigated. 
In the current dissertation, the role of a name is explored using the name 
genomics as an example. It follows up on the aforementioned experiences of the 
CBSG experts that people universally respond as if genomics is GM and that it is 
difficult to explain the differences. It is important to note that the term genomics can 
refer to other technologies and practices outside plant breeding. However, genomics 
is the standard term used by experts to describe genomics applied to plant breeding8 
to communicate both among themselves and to the public (as illustrated by the name 
Centre for Biosystems Genomics). The current research aims to approximate the 
                                                          
8 Two full names for genomics are applied to plant breeding; these are genomics 
accelerated breeding and genomics assisted breeding, see the section Research 
environment: Plant breeding, later in this chapter. These are, however, not used 
much and mostly abbreviated to just genomics. 
General introduction 
 
27 
 
situation as encountered by these experts. Therefore, the name genomics refers to 
genomics accelerated breeding, and the effects of the name are studied in the context 
of plant breeding for food. 
The effects of the name genomics are investigated by comparing them to 
the effects of an alternative (fictional) name for genomics. The alternative name is 
chosen on the same logic behind the names clean meat and MRI; clean meat is a 
name that emphasizes the advantage of the technology, whereas MRI avoids 
unnecessary fears or controversies. In the case of plant genomics, the main 
advantage concerning public opinion consists of circumventing the controversial 
artificial recombination of genes. Instead, the crossing of favourable traits is 
accomplished through natural, sexual recombination. On this basis, the fictional 
name natural crossing is chosen as an alternative to the name genomics. 
 
Approach 
The research is experimental in nature and in the tradition of cognitive 
psychology, a sub-discipline of social psychology. Cognitive psychology research 
predominantly entails experiments that attempt to discover what happens in people’s 
minds when they process information, making it a suitable approach to investigate 
how people deal with scientific concepts with which they are unfamiliar. Cognitive 
psychology research can be distinguished from other social psychology research as 
it focuses on how people process and apply information in social situations, and not 
merely on behavioural outcomes (Anderson, 2009). Before modern cognitive 
approaches emerged, psychology was dominated by behaviourism (Schultz & 
Schultz, 2015), which describes human behaviour as largely determined by a 
stimulus–responses mechanism (Skinner, 2011). Central to cognitive approaches is 
the notion that people actively process information and that differences in 
processing can result in differences in outcomes (Wyer, 2014). Differences in 
processing can be caused by almost anything present in a given situation, including 
elements both in the environment and internally in the evaluator. These elements 
include alternatives presented to which to compare a stimulus, an opportunity to 
process, knowledge about the subject, and motivation. 
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An important aspect of the cognitive approach is that even small differences 
can cause different – and sometimes even opposing – evaluations. The following 
two examples show how people interpret and use information in processing 
information to reach different evaluations. First, life satisfaction is rated higher if a 
person is asked about life satisfaction first and then about marriage satisfaction, than 
the other way around (because when someone is asked about marriage first, the joy 
it brings will most likely not be excluded spontaneously in the evaluation of life 
satisfaction; Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Another powerful example is an experiment 
presenting a child custody battle. Respondents were presented with two candidates 
for custody: a very successful but busy parent and an averagely successful but often 
available parent. One half of respondents were asked which candidate should get 
custody, the other half which one should not get it. Both groups predominantly 
picked the same candidate: the successful, hard-working one. The first question 
made respondents focus on success, whereas the second made them focus on lack of 
availability (Shafir, 1993). 
Science communication research interested in public perceptions often 
consists of interviewing people about their opinions and analysing debates. The 
answers and opinions stated form the basis of the conclusions about how people 
currently judge the scientific developments of interest. The above examples of 
cognitive research, however, show that opinions and evaluations might be different 
depending on the information presented in the debate or associations triggered by 
situational factors that people use to arrive at an evaluation by comparing. To be 
able to illustrate these differences, research in the cognitive psychology tradition 
primarily takes the form of tightly controlled experiments using different 
experimental conditions, of which the results can be compared. The different 
outcomes between experimental conditions provide information about the mental 
processes that take place during the processing of the information. In the current 
research, this experimental approach is used to shed light on these mental processes. 
Thus, the current research aims to contribute to science communication by learning 
more about how people form an opinion rather than to establish what their exact 
opinion is.  
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Research environment: Plant breeding 
In order to study emerging understandings and attitudes, the current focus is 
on plant genomics applied to food purposes. Plant genomics is a relatively new 
development in the history of plant breeding. Plant breeding has been practiced for 
thousands of years and is described by the Journal of Plant Physiology & Pathology 
(n.d.) as “the art and science of changing the traits of plants in order to produce 
desired characteristics”. Frequently cited examples of such desired traits are the 
ability to sustain harsh conditions, tolerance to pests, and improved yield (see for 
example Boyer, 1982; Dalal, Dani, & Kumar, 2006). A powerful example of the 
immersive effects that plant breeding can have is Borlaug’s work. By crossing 
different cereal grains, he was able to vastly increase yields of the crop (see Borlaug, 
1968). The impact of this work alone on food security has been so enormous that he 
is often credited with having saved over a billion people from starvation. 
The purpose of plant breeding is to create a cultivar. A cultivar, a 
portmanteau word from ‘cultivated’ and ‘variety’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Current English, 1990, p. 282) is a new variety that has characteristics that can be 
maintained by propagation. Although a plant variety in the wild can be used as a 
cultivar when it has desired characteristics that can be maintained, the majority of 
cultivars are purposely created by breeders with the aim of creating a new 
combination of characteristics that did not exist previously. In the remainder of the 
dissertation, the term cultivar is used to refer to purposely created varieties. 
An important way to create new cultivars is classical breeding, also called 
traditional breeding (Acquaah, 2007). Traditional breeding involves the inbreeding 
of plants that are related to each other to achieve a combination of the unique 
characteristics of the plants used (Poehlman, 2013). For example, a plant with many 
tomatoes can be bred with a plant having tasty tomatoes in an attempt to create a 
plant with many tasty tomatoes. Traditional breeding is a form of sexual 
reproduction. From this perspective, the goal is to try to create a seed that has both 
the genes causing many tomatoes from the first and the genes causing the tasty 
tomatoes from the second.  
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However, traditional breeding has several disadvantages that impact its 
usability. A breeder does not know which genes are going to be transferred under 
traditional breeding; undesirable traits will be transferred just as often as desirable 
ones. Therefore, trying to weave desirable traits together will require many 
generations of plants (Allard, 1999). With each generation, plants showing 
predominantly desirable traits are used for propagation, and an attempt is made to 
eliminate undesirable traits by disposing of those plants predominantly showing 
them. Not only do the generations have to grow to the point of reaching fertility, but 
also in some cases it can take a long time before traits such as taste stabilize; this, 
however, is necessary to make the proper selection for further breeding. Another 
disadvantage is that the selection of plants used in traditional breeding depends on 
observable traits such as taste, because a gene itself is undetectable. However, genes 
can be present without being detectable. Therefore, a plant can be disregarded for 
further breeding even though it could be a very appropriate candidate for further 
breeding because it actually does have the desired gene (Breseghello & Coelho, 
2013). 
An alternative to traditional breeding is GM. When GM is applied, the gene 
responsible for a desired trait is introduced into the DNA of a plant having other 
desirable traits. So, with GM, the gene causing many tomatoes can be introduced 
into the DNA of a plant bearing tasty tomatoes. The breeder now knows that both 
the (introduced) gene causing many tomatoes and the gene(s) causing the tasty 
tomatoes are there, eliminating a lot of the guess works. According to proponents, 
this makes GM more precise and faster than traditional breeding (Gepts, 2002). 
Another advantage of GM is that it enables breeders to introduce characteristics into 
cultivars that are normally found in other species and that are naturally alien to the 
varieties used. For example, Bt corn has the characteristic of creating an insecticide 
that protects the crop. This characteristic is not naturally present in corn and is 
created by introducing genes from bacteria that naturally create the toxin in the DNA 
of the corn (Saxena, Flores, & Stotzky, 1999). Whereas the recombination of DNA 
follows the natural process of sexual reproduction, the recombination is artificial 
when GM is applied. 
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The artificial recombination of genes is the main reason for the 
unsuccessful commercial adoption of GM. Many people object to the idea of 
reorganizing DNA in an artificial (or ‘unnatural’) way, as illustrated poignantly by 
the term ‘Frankenstein foods’ for GM food products (Cook, 2004). The public’s 
aversion not only causes consumers to ignore the products, but also has resulted in 
strict laws concerning production, labelling, and/or import in many countries 
(Davison, 2010; Federici, 2010; Gruère & Rao, 2007). As a result, breeders take a 
great risk employing GM when creating new cultivars, especially when they are 
attempting to make a new food product. 
Genomics assisted breeding, a relatively new way of breeding that has 
emerged with the development of plant genomics, provides some of the advantages 
of GM without artificially modifying genetic structures. The term genomics refers to 
both knowledge about the genome, which is the entire set of DNA in an organism, 
and the technology of applying the knowledge for different purposes such as 
genomics assisted breeding (Barnes & Dupré, 2009). Genomics assisted breeding 
can be regarded as a sort of middle-way between traditional breeding and GM, as it 
shares characteristics with both practices. As with GM, genomics assisted breeding 
uses knowledge about genes to enhance the speed of development of new cultivars. 
However, contrary to GM, genomics assisted breeding does not use the highly 
controversial artificial recombination of genes. Instead, similar to traditional 
breeding, new plants are created using sexual reproduction. The knowledge about 
genes and how they function is used after reproduction to check which of the new 
hybrids are suitable for further propagation. Instead of selecting plants on the basis 
of traits, such as number of tomatoes and taste, breeders look for the presence of the 
genes responsible in the newly formed DNA; this can be done at a very early stage 
and before the traits stabilize (Collard & Mackill, 2008). Although it is still left to 
chance whether the desired genes are transferred, looking at the DNA directly is a 
more reliable and faster way of determining whether the desired genes are present 
(Edmeades, McMaster, White, & Campos, 2004; Collard & Mackill, 2008). 
When used by plant breeding experts, the term genomics assisted breeding 
is often abbreviated to simply genomics. For example, the Centre for Biosystems 
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Genomics, which focuses on creating new cultivars using genomics assisted 
breeding, has omitted assisted breeding and uses only genomics in its name and its 
logo. Genomics is also the mainly used reference to genomics assisted breeding in 
communication. Following this pattern, genomics is used to refer to genomics 
assisted breeding in the current dissertation.  
 
Present dissertation 
The present dissertation focuses on studying the effects of the name of an 
unfamiliar technology. The aim is to gain understanding of how a name can 
influence emerging understandings and evaluations of an unfamiliar technology. An 
understanding of the influence of a name can be utilized to avoid unnecessary 
confusions and misunderstandings and to promote communication that fosters 
understanding. In addition to the effects of a name alone, it is investigated whether 
the influence of a name is related to other elements of communication. Because 
technologies appear to achieve a controversial status especially when applied to food 
purposes, it is investigated whether the influence of the name of a technology is 
different when it is applied to food compared to another application. It is also 
investigated whether the provision of additional information influences the effects a 
name can have. Figure 1.1 provides a representation of the researched mechanism 
for reaching an evaluation. 
 
Figure 1.1: Schema of research. For proposed relation 1 see Chapter 3; for relation 2 
see Chapter 5; for relation 3 see Chapters 3, 4, and 5; for relation 4 see Chapter 4. 
 
Name Categorization  Evaluations 
Information Risk 
1  3 
2 
4 
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In Chapter 2, the aim is to investigate why and how a name can shape 
impressions and evaluations about a technology. Using literature sources from 
psychology, consumer behaviour, and other social sciences, the chapter provides on 
overview of relevant factors, such as time pressure and lack of information, and 
mechanisms, such as categorization and attitude extension, in the formation of 
evaluations and attitudes after exposure to a name. The literature review is carried 
out from the perspective of the formation of (a personal) understanding of a 
technology. The chapter presents a view that challenges the deficit model, especially 
from the perspective of the feasibility of searching for external information in daily 
life situations. 
In Chapter 3, the aim is to investigate whether the name of a technology can 
determine its categorization. In addition, it is investigated whether the categorization 
will determine the resulting evaluation. In particular, the aim is to investigate 
whether the name alone is enough to trigger the process of categorization and 
evaluation. It is hypothesized that the name genomics will encourage categorization 
with GM and cause similar evaluations. To investigate the effect of the association, 
the results are compared to those following exposure to natural crossing, stressing 
naturalness. It is hypothesized that the alternative name will cause categorization 
with traditional breeding. 
In Chapter 4, the influence of the field of application is investigated. It is 
believed that GM is especially controversial in the context of food. In addition, 
people use broader categorizations when confronted with risk. Therefore, it is tested 
whether people categorize Genomics more readily with GM when it is presented in a 
food production context compared to a biofuel production context. In addition, it is 
investigated whether a food production context will lead to more uniform 
evaluations between genomics and GM. To account for possible cultural effects, the 
research is carried out in a national context where evaluations about GM are known 
to be moderate (The Netherlands) and in a culture where they are known to be more 
unfavourable (Ukraine). 
Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of the interaction between the name of a 
technology and the information given about the technology on the resulting 
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evaluations. The research in the chapter follows the methodology in Chapter 2, 
except that in this chapter an explanation of what genomics entails is presented. The 
chapter consists of a series of experiments to investigate the extent to which the 
order of presentation of the name of a technology and its description causes 
differences in evaluations.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, the findings presented in the previous chapters are 
summarized and discussed. Theoretical and practical implications are provided. In 
addition, limitations are presented, as are directions for future research. 
 
  
The effects of a technological name on inferences, prejudice 
and public understanding 
 
This chapter is based on: Boersma, R., & Gremmen, B. (2018). Genomics? That is 
probably GM! The impact a name can have on the interpretation of a technology. 
Life sciences, society and policy, 14(1), 8. 
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Abstract 
We investigate how people form attitudes and make decisions without having 
extensive knowledge about a technology. We argue that it is impossible for people 
to carefully study all technologies they encounter and that they are forced to use 
inferences to make decisions. When people are confronted with an intangible 
abstract technology, the only visible attribute is the name. This name can determine 
which inferences a person will use. Considering these inferences is important: first, a 
name will reach consumers before detailed information, if any, will. Second, if 
detailed information reaches consumers, the hard-to-comprehend information is 
processed using pre-activated attitudes and beliefs. Using the available literature, we 
explore the impact a name can have on the interpretation of a technology. We argue 
that science communication can benefit from trying to develop a name for a 
technology that activates proper beliefs to guide non-experts to a more meaningful 
understanding of it.  
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Introduction 
People often come in contact with a new technology in situations where they have 
hardly any relevant knowledge or information. In situations like these, a name can 
be very influential. For example, imagine yourself going shopping for your favourite 
food. When you arrive at the place where your favourite dish is sold, you suddenly 
notice that, besides the regular food you are used to buying, there is a new option. 
This option is produced using a technology called next gen-radiation. How will you 
give meaning to this new technology, in the middle of the supermarket, without 
books, internet or experts on the matter to explain to you what it is? What 
information will you use? Without anything else, you only have the name to go on. 
Genetic manipulation is a good example of a technology name that 
influences perceptions. To manipulate means to control, and so from a technological 
perspective the term gives a good representation of what the technology entails from 
an expert perspective. Unfortunately, when the term reached the public, people 
became suspicious of it, and so the term itself contributed to the negative 
perceptions towards the technology because of the negative connotation of 
manipulation (Hansen, 2010). In an attempt to reverse the damage, the name genetic 
manipulation was changed to genetic modification (Hansen, 2010). This shows that 
the term used is regarded as an important factor in the interpretation and acceptance 
of the technology.  
Currently, a new approach to genetics is being developed under the name 
genomics. The term genomics can refer both to the science of genomics, which is the 
study of the genome, and to the application of the science, for example genomics-
assisted breeding.  Applied in plant breeding, genomics-assisted breeding can be 
used to create new crops more efficiently by using knowledge on the relation 
between genomes and traits. Genomics is similar to traditional breeding in the sense 
that crops are combined through sexual reproduction to create a new variety. 
Genomics enables plant breeders to check whether the genome of the new variety 
contains the parts that can cause the desired traits without having to wait until the 
parts come to expression, thus accelerating the process significantly. It differs from 
genetic manipulation, where traits are introduced artificially. Therefore, genomics 
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can serve as an alternative to this controversial technology and is even being 
promoted as such by Greenpeace (van Aken, 2009), one of the major opponents of 
genetic manipulation. 
Unfortunately, even though genomics circumvents the main objection 
against genetic manipulation, people react very similarly to the technology (van 
Dam & de Vriend, 2002). It appears that the similarity of the names is affecting the 
perception of genomics negatively. In a Dutch study on perceptions about genomics, 
the authors conclude that the respondents do not know what genomics is and that 
they have difficulty understanding all the information they receive (van Dam & de 
Vriend, 2002). Nevertheless, they answer the question posed to them as if they do 
understand. The authors speculate that the respondents are actually using knowledge 
about genetic manipulation to formulate answers. In fact, they observe that different 
respondents automatically use the term genetic manipulation, especially when 
genomics is mentioned in the context of plant breeding. 
The essence of the problem in the case of both genetic manipulation and 
genomics is that people who do not know much about the related scientific or 
technological concepts react in a way that is unexpected by experts, i.e., as if they do 
have knowledge about the concepts. When conflicts arise, scientists tend to believe 
that these unexpected reactions are caused by a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
public and that the conflicts can be countered through education (Ahteensuu, 2012). 
In situations where conflict has appeared, the public have been called passive (see 
Bucchi, 2008) or indifferent (Bodmer, 1985) for not informing themselves about the 
relevant technology. We argue that this does not do justice to the public. People 
simply do not have the time to study all the innovations they may encounter, as we 
argue in more detail later. 
In the current article, we investigate how people give meaning to an 
unfamiliar technology about which they have no knowledge other than the name, 
and the way this process is influenced by the name of the technology. We argue that 
different names can cause different inferences to be created, influencing the way 
people interpret a technology. Whereas one name might assist useful interpretation, 
another name might cause interpretations using concepts that are irrelevant. 
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Although there will be some attention to the effects of a name on the possible 
processing of information when it is available, the main focus of this article will be 
on responses triggered by just the name of a technology. As such, we depart from 
the dominant approach in science communication where the effects of provided 
information are investigated (Bos, Koolstra, & Willems, 2009) and influences of 
cognitive mechanisms such as framing, (re)coding and the elaboration likelihood 
model on the interpretation of information is investigated. 
We want to stress that it is not the aim of this article to promote merely 
choosing a nicer sounding name. The aim is to investigate the development of 
knowledge and its effects on attitudes and the way this is influenced by a name, so 
that we can have a deeper understanding of the process – an understanding which 
can help narrow the communication gap between experts and the public. We 
conclude that science communication can benefit from an approach in which the 
development of a name becomes a process of co-creation between science and 
society. We begin by presenting a reflection on science communication from a 
cognitive perspective, to highlight where we believe a lacuna exists. 
 
History of understanding and attitudes from a cognitive perspective 
In 1985, the report entitled The Public Understanding of Science was 
published (Bodmer, 1985). The report was initiated because of the increasing public 
scepticism about science and technology (Gregory & Lock, 2008). According to the 
authors, the negative attitudes towards science and technology were the result of a 
lack of understanding. Providing people with knowledge through education would 
solve the problem. 
The idea that education solves negative attitudes is now largely rejected in 
the field of science communication (Ahteensuu, 2012). From the current 
perspective, we identify two groups of issues with the educational model. The first 
group relates to the role of information in decision making. The second group relates 
to the political motives behind the report. Both groups have led to developments 
which still influence the research agenda today and have caused and maintained a 
void in studying public understanding that we are now trying to fill. 
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With respect to the first group of issues, the model reasons from the 
classical economic ‘rational man’ perspective, in which it was presumed that people 
carefully use all information available to them. A problem with this perspective is 
that it is not equipped to explain much of human behaviour, and this inspired the 
development of new insights. In communication, dual process theories on attitude 
formation (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) have been developed to explain 
behaviours that could not be explained by the rational man paradigm. According to 
these models, there are two ways to process information. The first is a systematic 
way, where all information is elaborated on carefully and which fits the rational man 
paradigm. The other is a heuristic way, where information is processed quickly and 
without too much effort. People use the heuristic way for different reasons, among 
other things because they are not able to devote enough attention to the information 
– a common event in noisy daily life. 
Dual process theories make an important contribution to understanding 
human decision making. However, they are still about processing externally 
provided information (Bargh, 2002). Much of the attitude formation that takes place 
in daily life happens without the processing of externally provided information, 
either because the information is not available on the spot or because daily life offers 
too much distraction for a person to pay any attention. In conclusion, dual process 
theories do not account for all possible ways of evaluating. They cannot be applied 
to explaining attitude formation without external information. 
The idea that people form their behaviours without information was 
successfully advocated by Simon (1979) when he introduced the notion of bounded 
rationality. According to Simon, when they have to make a decision in daily life, 
people do not search extensively for all available information. Rather, they use the 
information currently available to them to make the decision. Whereas dual process 
theories are about information processing, bounded rationality is about information 
searching. 
With respect to the second set of issues, the political issues, it can be argued 
that the educational model has given rise to a type of reasoning by technical experts 
that has led to more conflict with the public. According to Bucchi (2008), members 
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of the public have been called ignorant and lazy for not getting the knowledge that 
would make them change their opinion, in an attempt to disqualify them from the 
debate. 
Unfortunately, excluding the public because they are ignorant blocks the 
development of insights into the role that ignorance plays in decision making and 
attitude formation. From the example where respondents were asked to react to the 
relatively unfamiliar concept of genomics (van Dam & de Vriend, 2002), we can 
learn that people often do decide and evaluate without knowledge, being ignorant. 
Within the interaction between the researcher asking about genomics and the 
respondents, there was no information on genomics available for processing, nor 
was there familiarity with the concept. Nevertheless, people reacted to the questions. 
These kinds of behaviours take place in an absence of understanding (or an absence 
of information, other than the name, to be processed to reach understanding). 
Although people are often forced to make decisions without, or before they 
have, any knowledge about a technology, most research investigates people’s 
reaction to information about a technology rather than tests behaviours without 
knowledge. A notable exception is provided in a study of the ecogenomics construct 
(Bos, Koolstra, & Willems, 2009). The goal of the study was to ascertain the amount 
of information people were planning to try to obtain. Although the respondents 
reported that they planned to search for information, the amount of this information 
was very little and far from enough to reach a deeper understanding.  
In defence of the Bodmer report, it should be noted that the report argues 
that public misunderstanding or ignorance can lead to issues in daily life. Even 
though this may be motivated by political goals, the authors do have a point when 
they argue that little or no knowledge can lead to misunderstanding. Many technical 
experts still adhere to the educational model (Ahteensuu 2012), and a possible 
contributory factor is that they notice that people really do not understand. Given the 
results in Bos et al.’s (2009) study, it actually would be surprising if the respondents 
were able to form a proper understanding with the small amount of planned 
information search. 
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The respondents’ behaviour becomes understandable when we place it in 
the greater context of daily life. If people always searched for enough information to 
reach understanding when they encounter new concepts, they would spend all their 
time being educated. People have no choice but to act on little information. Rather 
than try to correct people’s knowledge level, an attempt can be made to account for 
the way people form their daily understanding. If the process is understood, people 
could be influenced not to draw inappropriate conclusions and be steered to more 
appropriate impressions.  
A good example of how this might work is provided by the effects of the 
expressions global warming and climate change. Some technical experts use the 
term climate change because it is more appropriate from a technical perspective 
(Conway, 2008). However, with the aim of changing people’s behaviour in daily 
life, the term global warming might be more efficient. Research has shown that 
people link global warming more to melting icebergs and glaciers, and the melting is 
more often believed to be the result of human behaviour (Whitmarsh, 2009). 
Without people fully understanding the complexities of the global climate, global 
warming triggers the right ideas. 
We argue that a better understanding of attitude formation and decision 
making without information can lead to a more effective way of communicating. 
Instead of trying to educate the public, technical experts should recognize that daily 
understanding is a different form of understanding. By explaining how public 
understanding differs from expert understanding, certain interpretations can be 
prevented and other interpretations can be enhanced by steering people in the right 
direction. To be able to do this, we have to understand the differences in the way 
people and technical experts organize their knowledge, and the way a name 
representing a technology activates knowledge. 
 
Understanding new concepts 
To understand how human decision making functions, we have to 
understand how knowledge is organized. A theory that describes this is 
categorization theory. According to categorization theory, concepts are organized in 
The effects of a technological name 
 
43 
 
categories. For example, we have a category for cars, doors and cats, respectively. A 
category is structured based on the common features of its members (Rosch, 1978), 
and therefore a category contains concepts that are similar in some ways (Loken, 
Barsalou, & Joiner, 2008). Schemata are interconnected categories. A schema of 
categories is a taxonomic description of the way someone’s knowledge is organized. 
Categories enable us to use our knowledge efficiently. For example, instead of 
remembering for each and every cat that it has four paws and a tail, it is enough to 
remember that, in principle, cats have four paws and a tail. 
The usage of categories can in addition help us to understand new 
unfamiliar concepts (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997; Loken et al., 2008). The notion 
is that, when people are confronted with new concepts with which they are 
completely unfamiliar, they study the concept and try to match it with similar 
concepts they already know. This process is called categorization, which can be 
defined as placing a new concept in an existing category. Through this act, 
knowledge about the known category members can be used to interpret the 
unfamiliar concept. 
With categorization, people learn about new concepts through an internal 
transfer of knowledge. Knowledge about known concepts is transferred to the new 
concepts. In this respect, it can be considered as an alternative to education, where 
information is provided externally. When confronted with new concepts, people will 
first try internal transfer to understand the new concepts (Michaut, 2004). The 
process enables people to quickly form an understanding without the use of any 
external resources, and therefore with no information search. 
Related to the transference of knowledge is the process of attitude extension 
(Muthukrishnan & Weitz, 1991). When attitude extension takes places, the existing 
attitudes of the known category members are extended to the new concept. In a way, 
this process serves as a shortcut to forming attitudes without getting knowledge or 
education. Because of attitude extension, people can project their existing attitudes 
about familiar concepts onto concepts about which they have no knowledge. It 
enables them to make quick decisions without knowledge and carry on with their 
everyday tasks.  
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The process of attitude extension provides an explanation about where 
initial attitudes towards science and technology originate. For example, it has been 
found that a lack of knowledge does not block the formation of attitudes towards 
genetic modification (Frewer, Shepherd, & Sparks, 1994). Attitude extension can 
account for this process. Attitudes from other, known agricultural technologies, or 
even other acts of manipulation, can be used to form an attitude about the new 
technology. Instead of evaluating the new technology using its own attributes, 
attitudes are copied from other concepts.  
A proper way to describe these attitudes is prejudice. Nowadays, the term 
prejudice is virtually exclusively linked to social prejudice; however, prejudice can 
also relate to concepts. When social prejudice occurs, members of a social category 
are judged on the attitudes relating to the category to which they belong. When 
genomics is judged by applying attitudes about genetic manipulation because they 
are believed to belong to a shared conceptual category, conceptual prejudice occurs. 
One problem with prejudice is that it is very hard to eradicate. An important reason 
is that it steers interpretations of new information towards a person’s existing 
preconceptions. 
To prevent inappropriate attitudes from being copied and related prejudice 
from being formed, the challenge is to anticipate which attitudes will be used for the 
process. To achieve this, a focus on the activation of categories that are linked to the 
attitudes is needed, and a focus on how the public’s category structures are different 
from those of technical experts. It is necessary to understand the difference between 
technical experts and the public because the difference in structures may lead to 
unexpected activation of categories and related attitudes on both sides in 
communication. 
Categories can be divided into subcategories containing more detailed 
information or combined into super categories containing more abstract information 
(Rosch, 1978). In addition, categories can be linked to other categories or concepts. 
As already discussed, schemata are the resulting networks of categories. For many 
of these categories or schemata, we have a name or term to represent them (Rosch, 
1978). When communicating with others, we try to activate these schemata in the 
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mind of the receiver by using the name or term. What the name activates depends to 
a very large extent on the knowledge present in the receiver. To illustrate, the term 
gen will not mean anything to someone who has absolutely no knowledge about it. 
On the other hand, it might activate knowledge relating to genetic manipulation for 
someone who has encountered the term in public debates on genetic manipulation. 
For an expert, it could mean activation of an extensive schema about heredity. For 
this expert, genetic manipulation might not be activated directly, because it is 
regarded by this person as a separate construct. Clearly, expertise is an important 
factor which determines the sources of knowledge that are activated. To investigate 
this more precisely, we turn to the topic of how schemata are influenced by 
expertise. 
 
Expertise 
Expertise is regarded as an important factor in categorization (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987). As already stated, different categories can be linked to one 
another directly or through super categories, and can be divided into subcategories. 
Compared to non-experts, experts have more elaborate and flexible cognitive 
structures (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Therefore, the categorization process can 
differ greatly between experts and people with less knowledge. To understand how 
these differences may act out, we discuss the main differences. 
Compared to non-experts, experts know more attributes (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987). This enables an expert to create a greater number of 
subcategories than non-experts. Whereas experts and non-experts might both see a 
laptop when confronted with a MacBook, only the expert will know the attributes 
that set the MacBook apart from prototypical laptops. In essence, the expert has 
access to a subcategory that contains extra information. Because they know more, 
experts can categorize not only more accurately, but also more appropriately. For 
example, a non-expert might inappropriately categorize a computer screen in the 
category televisions. To understand the difference between a computer screen and a 
television, a person has to know what a tuner is and use the invisible attribute to 
divide the concepts into different groups.  
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Within categorization theory, a differentiation exists between natural 
categories and abstract categories. Natural categories are categories that people form 
automatically (Rosch, 1978). Abstract categories are transferred through education 
(Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). A good example might be the category night shade, to 
which both the tomato and the potato belong. It requires a certain amount of 
education to know the category night shade, and why its members are combined the 
way they are. A non-expert might group a tomato with oranges (in a category called 
fruit) instead of with potatoes, on the basis of everyday experience. 
In addition, there are ad hoc categories (Barsalou, 1985). These are created 
with a particular goal in mind and are formed by focusing on functions or attributes 
that are relevant within a particular context or with a particular goal in mind. 
Concepts from different categories that share relevant attributes might end up in an 
ad hoc category that revolves around these attributes (Barsalou, 1985). For example, 
in certain cases, petrol can remove paint. It shares this attribute with specialized 
paint removers. The two concepts might end up together in a category constructed 
with the goal of finding something to remove paint. 
Whereas concepts have only one place in the natural categorization 
classification, they can be simultaneously part of a number of ad hoc categories. For 
example, although petrol will be by default a member of the category fuel, it can end 
up in several ad hoc categories because of the different attributes of the concept. 
Another important thing to note is that ad hoc categories can turn into more 
permanent goal-related categories when they are used more often (Barsalou, 1991). 
Goal-related categories have a similar influence in the processing of information as 
natural classification structures (Barsalou, 1991).  
To summarize, experts have both more elaborate structures and a greater 
number of alternatives to natural categories than non-experts; this enables them to 
comprehend similarities between different concepts that to non-experts appear 
unrelated. In consumer behaviour, it has been found that experts tend to use 
functional attributes for understanding (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997), whereas non-
experts use more superficial cues like shape or appearance. Experts can process 
information about attributes and relate them to other concepts using commonalities 
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between the concepts. In contrast to experts, not having any knowledge about the 
attributes that can be used to connect the concepts, non-experts are not able to do 
this.  
If a non-expert will have a harder time making proper connections for 
categorization, falsifying a categorization will be equally or even more difficult. 
Imagine a person who does not know the technical and functional aspects of a CD. 
When this person encounters a DVD for the first time, there is a very good chance 
that the DVD will be categorized with CDs because they are similar in appearance. 
When a person knows only the superficial features, it is impossible to realize that the 
categorization is incorrect from a functional perspective. Only knowledge about 
their respective functional attributes will give the ability to separate the two 
concepts. 
These differences in cognitive structures cause experts to understand more 
precisely the way new concepts relate to known concepts. An expert with an 
elaborate understanding of genetic modification, first of all, knows the attributes of 
the concepts involved. The expert is familiar with attributes like DNA, alleles and 
genes, and understands how they are related. In addition, the person can separate 
different approaches such as genetics and genomics. The expert will have the ability 
to understand that the technology is a new form of reproduction. This realization 
will enable the expert to position it vis-à-vis other types of reproduction, like sexual 
reproduction, which in turn is linked to traditional breeding. The reality of 
genomics-assisted breeding can only be understood using different kinds of 
schemata. 
Whereas experts use functional attributes for understanding, non-experts 
who do not have the appropriate knowledge about attributes use superficial features 
for categorization and rely on similarity (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). Although 
experts might need the appearance to sense the object, it is the functional attributes 
that will be used for categorization. For example, an expert will see the same 
ignition key of a car as the non-expert but consequently know that it will turn the 
engine on. Therefore, using the functional attribute, the expert might categorize the 
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concept with switches. A non-expert might look for an object that is similar in 
appearance, for example a lock, in an attempt to understand the new concept.  
An important superficial feature of a technology is the name given to it. 
When a name is given to a technology, any name can be given. However, when a 
name is chosen to have meaning, the effect of a name on categorization can be 
similar to that of other superficial features. A meaningful name acts as a conceptual 
label (Gregan-Paxton, Hoeffler, & Zhao, 2005). For example, the function of the 
attribute door handle is captured in the name, but will only be noticed by English-
speaking people who, in addition, already know about doors and the way they 
function. So, for people with related knowledge, the name can be a guide to the 
functional aspects of the attribute (see Rosch, 1978). Without the related knowledge, 
it can guide people to concepts that are similar in name. When a person is 
confronted with the, for this person, meaningless term genomics, the nearest concept 
to use to give meaning is genetic manipulation. Whereas tangible concepts can also 
steer interpretation by their shape (a door handle ‘invites’ its use), the only 
detectable feature of an invisible technology is the name. People prefer to give 
meaning using appearance rather than the conceptual label (Gregan-Paxton et al., 
2005), but this is impossible when dealing with abstract technologies. Therefore, a 
name can be very influential in what people believe a technology to be and in the 
attitudes that are activated. With this in mind, we can answer the question about the 
way people give meaning to a technology about which they know nothing. 
 
The effects of a name 
Imagine yourself back in the supermarket confronted with the new 
technology, next gen-radiation. The question is what knowledge you will use to 
explain to yourself what the technology is. Will the gen part of the name cause you 
to believe that it has something to do with genetic manipulation, or that it is the next 
generation of radiation? And what does the term radiation remind you of, sunlight, 
radio waves or ionizing nuclear radiation?  
When people try to give meaning to a concept which is communicated by 
its name, they only have the name to process. The name can determine 
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categorization. By calling a new technology genomics, the name activates 
meaningful categories for experts. They are given a label that they can use to 
position the technology vis-à-vis other related technologies, and related knowledge 
is activated. However, to be able to do this, they need knowledge of these 
technologies. For non-experts, on the other hand, the term is relatively meaningless 
and does not guide to a proper categorization. For them, the only effect will be that 
the genomics concept sounds related to the genetic modification concept. From a 
learning perspective, the name is unintentionally activating genetic modification as 
the only available association.   
A name can activate knowledge or attitudes other than those intended. 
Although experts might argue that these are not the right knowledge or attitudes, this 
knowledge and these attitudes will not be without consequences. People can still 
make decisions about buying products or supporting a technology using their 
activated knowledge and attitudes, even if these are linked to irrelevant concepts.  
Scientific notions and technologies that are distinctively different according 
to experts might therefore be experienced as similar by non-experts. This can cause 
the public to react in a way that is not expected by experts. Attitude extension from 
genetic manipulation to genomics leads to a negative reaction that might be 
surprising for experts. Whereas experts feel that they are doing something 
fundamentally different, or even trying to find a solution for the objections against 
genetic manipulation by pursuing an alternative which provides similar advantages, 
the public experience the two as the same thing because they lack the knowledge 
about the attributes that set the two apart.  
Using inappropriate knowledge does not necessarily mean that people will 
quickly become stuck during processing and understand what is wrong even when 
additional information is provided. Even though people have activated inappropriate 
knowledge, the processing of the information can go a long way without the error 
being noticed. A nice illustration of this is a journalist who reported on the 
preparation to form the Dutch genomics centre. In his newspaper article, he noted – 
presumably after having studied the subject – that the centre for genomics was 
investigating ‘… genetic modification of both the tomato and the potato…’ (Janssen, 
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2002: 10). In the case of genomics and genetic modification, both technologies 
claim to produce more crops, reduce pesticide use, provide opportunities to produce 
food in harsh conditions, etc. When more affective attitudes, rather than knowledge, 
are used to make decisions, it is even harder to notice that they are based on 
inappropriate information.  
An important contributor to not realizing the differences between a new and 
a familiar concept is selective attention. A name acts as a label guiding people to a 
particular schema, which in turn acts as a frame when processing information 
(Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Herr, 1986; Higgins, 1996). Once this schema becomes 
activated, people pay more attention to the attributes that are part of the schema, 
disregarding those that are not (Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009), which also 
determines what people will remember (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Ironically, 
these might be the distinguishing attributes that define the newness of the concept. 
Therefore, even in the few cases where members of the public receive education, the 
effect of the name can influence the development of the knowledge. In particular, 
when a new concept is placed close to a related and very similar concept, for 
example by name, there is an increased chance that people will not notice the 
difference (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). Instead of building a new schema, all 
new information might be connected to the one that has been activated. In the case 
of genomics, very little applies to genetic manipulation that does not also apply to 
genomics, and vice versa.  
Because experts rely more on functional attributes when they give meaning 
to a new concept, they more quickly realize the uniqueness of a new concept. For 
example, genomics can be understood by noticing that the technology shares 
attributes with both genetic manipulation and traditional breeding. To be able to 
position the technology within existing knowledge, an expert will create a new 
schema. Non-experts do not combine knowledge from different sources using 
attributes the way experts do. Therefore, they do not notice the differences between 
the new concept and the concept used to give meaning, and consequently do not 
notice that a single known concept is not enough to understand the new concept. The 
result is that non-experts learn from single examples (Gregan-Paxton, 2001), leading 
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to exemplar learning (Barsalou, 1991) and single category beliefs (Rajagopal & 
Burnkrant, 2009). The meaning given to the new concept is basically a copy of what 
is already known. 
To be able to understand what makes genomics a unique concept, a person 
has to use attributes from different sources. Because of their extensive networks and 
ability to use attributes to create connections between schemata, experts are able to 
combine these sources. For non-experts, the problem is that these different sources 
of relevant knowledge and attitudes are disconnected. A way to combine this 
knowledge from different sources is described in an approach called learning by 
analogy (Gentner, 1983; Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997), which we discuss next. This 
approach argues that consumer learning can be guided by activating categories that 
might not be appropriate for categorization but nevertheless contain information that 
can be useful for understanding. 
 
Learning by analogy 
Learning by analogy argues that, to understand new concepts, we often 
need more knowledge than is stored in the category used for categorization (Gregan-
Paxton & John, 1997). Many new concepts that we encounter, especially concepts 
relating to advanced technologies, can only be fully understood by using knowledge 
from different categories. For example, smartphones might be categorized in the 
category phone. However, trying to understand a smartphone by categorizing it as a 
phone will only activate a subset of relevant knowledge and attitudes. Nowadays, 
smartphones are best understood as being very small portable computers that, in 
addition to making calls, can run software and be used to connect to the internet. 
Activating knowledge and attitudes about computers when a person is trying to 
understand a smartphone might result in a very different understanding and 
evaluation. 
Essentially, learning by analogy proposes a mechanism to circumvent the 
limitation of learning using single category inferences. The way to achieve this is to 
single out attributes that are important to understand the concept and to connect 
these with attributes of known concepts from different categories. According to the 
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theory, communicators should try to achieve understanding by explaining in what 
ways a new concept relates to others concepts. This can be achieved by illustrating 
that a smartphone is like a phone, you can make calls, and it is like a computer, you 
can run software.  
Although leaning by analogy can be used to explain new concepts 
efficiently, it also provides valuable information about situations in which an 
explanation cannot be provided and where people are forced to act on a name alone. 
Basically, learning by analogy focuses on unlocking and activating different 
knowledge than that which might be activated by categorization to enable 
understanding. Learning by analogy shares with goal-directed categories the idea 
that there are alternative structures to natural categories to organize knowledge. 
When experts search for a name to describe their new technology, they tend 
to use a taxonomic classification that emphasizes its position relative to other 
technologies. The name genomics is no exception. It illustrates the relation to other 
gene technologies. On the other hand, the main attribute of genomics, applied to 
plant breeding, is that reproduction is not artificial but natural. Genomics shares this 
attribute with other ways of breeding, for example traditional breeding where crops 
are produced using natural sexual reproduction. Choosing a name that emphasizes 
this important attribute, which distinguishes it from other gene technology, provides 
an alternative that might be more meaningful to non-experts. To exemplify (without 
suggesting a change of name), genomics could have been called natural crossing 
instead, to promote the main attribute differentiating it from genetic manipulation. 
Whereas learning by analogy emphasizes the notion that there are 
alternatives to learning through categorization, we emphasize that there is an 
alternative to naming a new technology from the perspective of category relations. 
In situations where people do not have schemata based on relations between abstract 
concepts, a name that stresses an important attribute might contain more information 
than a name that illustrates the position of a new technology vis-à-vis related 
technologies.  
The meaning of a scientific name can only be clarified on the basis of a 
dialogue with a broad range of societal actors. Experts have to focus more on the 
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social, cultural and moral (re)presentation of scientific knowledge and the social 
structure of technology (Hamlett, 2003, Decker & Ladikas, 2004, Sarewitz, 2004).  
By acknowledging these, experts and social actors can together co-create a name 
which is both meaningful to the public through the associations. This also provides 
the opportunity go beyond the associations being meaningful from a theoretical 
scientific point of view, but to include more normative or moral associations as well 
In her comparative political study of biotechnology in the United Kingdom, Europe 
and North America, Jasanoff (2005) showed, that where public involvement is 
insufficiently available formally, it will occur informally, through public protest; 
market choices, such as consumer rejection of genetically modified foods; or new 
political structures, such as environmental movements. By also including normative 
or moral associations, the risk escalating mistrust as a result of believing a name is 
misleading or unjust marketing can be diminished. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Nowadays, we are continuously confronted with new scientific and 
technological developments. It is impossible to get to know all of them. The vast 
majority of technologies will reach people before they become educated about them, 
if they ever will. That does not mean that people do not respond when they are 
confronted with concepts with which they are unfamiliar. By using knowledge and 
attitudes about what they believe to be similar concepts, people nevertheless judge 
and make decisions.  
It is important to realize that, in situations like these, people do not just act 
at random or irrationally, even though it might appear this way from the perspective 
of experts. People are guided by using existing knowledge and attitudes, even 
though these might be linked to irrelevant concepts. They try to act rationally in a 
situation where they do not have the appropriate knowledge to do so. To be more 
precise, non-experts use less extensive schemata to process the information. The 
important differences between new and familiar concepts can be so subtle that they 
are not noticed or comprehended; and, even if people notice errors or imperfections 
in their logic, they still have no alternative. 
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For invisible technologies in particular, a name can have a severe impact on 
the interpretation of what it entails and the development of attitudes. Realizing this 
has several consequences for the development of a proper name. To avoid 
unnecessary controversies, it is beneficial for experts to anticipate the way non-
experts give meaning when confronted with technical names. First, it is important to 
know that non-experts try to form understanding through internal transfer of 
knowledge and attitudes. When people are confronted with a new technology, the 
knowledge and attitudes that they use to assess it will probably come from a single 
familiar category or example. Experts names should try to guide the consumer to a 
particular source that holds valuable information. This guidance can be achieved by 
selecting a name that has value for the public. 
Second, it is important to realize that what a name means for experts may 
not be the same as its meaning for the public. For example, the word gen might be 
understood completely differently because, in public debates, it is often linked to 
genetic manipulation. The real scientific meaning might therefore not exist in the 
minds of many non-experts. From a cognitive perspective, a name might activate 
unexpected schemata. In order to prevent instant misunderstanding, it is important to 
test whether or not the name actually activates information that is meaningful for 
understanding the concept or the main attribute.  
When education does take place, people will pay more attention to 
information that is in line with expectations based on the activated schemata. In a 
study on the effects of providing information, Scholderer and Frewer (2003) found 
that providing information about biotechnology did not lead to attitude change, 
merely to the activation of pre-existing attitudes. The pre-existing attitudes form a 
judgement without knowledge, or a prejudiced judgement. In a way, people are 
prejudiced in favour of information that confirms activated beliefs. Activating the 
proper beliefs by a well-chosen name might enhance the success of an education 
programme. 
A complicating aspect unmentioned so far is that categories and their 
association with names are not necessarily the same between cultures or stable over 
time. In some cases, it might be wise to select different names for different 
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languages or cultures. This does not take away the fact that well-chosen names can 
provide an important advantage. It does mean, however, that deliberate attention to 
the context can enhance the benefits of selecting a name. In some cases such 
attention might even be crucial. 
Overall, in order to reach the public, it is important not to try to achieve 
perfect understanding, but rather choose to achieve a good enough understanding. 
Instead of trying to enforce their own complex schemata on members of the public, 
scientists should focus on a category that is useful. Many technological names 
emphasize the relation of a technology to other technologies. The name is given with 
the extensive organization of other technologies in mind, and the name has meaning 
within this structure. Without this extensive schema, the name has no meaning. 
Trying to completely explicate the schema to a non-expert is probably a lost cause. 
In the current article, we explored the way people without knowledge give 
meaning to genomics, with the gen part of the name being the central concept. We 
believe that the principle can be applied to other fields where people do not have the 
correct knowledge to differentiate between concepts, and where scientific names 
might have a different meaning in daily life. For example, nuclear is more associated 
with radiation than with atom cores, synthetic biology might cause people to believe 
that this is related to synthetic materials, and the extent to which people can tell the 
difference between harmful nanoparticles and the broader field of nanotechnology is 
highly questionable. In situations like these, negative attitudes might appear for 
invalid reasons and harm the technology purely due to misunderstanding. Wrong 
interpretations can cause unnecessary confusion and even cloud ethical debates.  
It should be noted that we are in no way trying to argue that people in 
general are ignorant and that their opinions should not be respected, or that 
providing education is necessarily a bad thing. We do say that it is impossible to be 
educated and knowledgeable on everything. It is therefore, in our opinion, neither 
fair nor realistic to expect people to know everything, and not to accept public 
opinions based on imperfections of understanding. We have to accept that people are 
forced to use inferences and that, when education does take place, the development 
of knowledge can be influenced by the inferences made. When new technologies are 
Chapter 2 
56 
 
being introduced, it is necessary to keep in mind everyone’s cognitive limitations. 
Instead of using a lack of knowledge against the public, experts should try to prevent 
incorrect understandings and try to guide people to meaningful knowledge. We want 
to stress that we do not suggest that experts should just pick a nicer sounding name. 
The suggestion that experts should investigate what kind of name creates 
meaningful inferences is meant to enhance understanding and prevent confusion. 
It should also be noted that, of course, not all objections towards new 
technologies are the result of misunderstandings. It is true that it was expected by 
experts that due to genomics sharing key features of traditional breeding, it would be 
evaluated more favourably in comparison to GM (Hall, 2010). It is also true that, as 
stated previously, GM and genomics share features. The current article is, however, 
based on observations by experts that people confuse technologies due to an 
(common) absence of knowledge (Nap, Jacobs, Gremmen, & Stiekema, 2002; van 
Dam & de Vriend, 2002), rather than not accept them. In the case of genomics, the 
technology that can have far-fetching consequences and people that have related 
knowledge can have well-reasoned arguments. These arguments and the people that 
have them do deserve attention. We do not wish to argue that genomics is –or should 
be- regarded as safe, acceptable or ethical. The problem we are addressing is the fact 
that people automatically assume that genomics is GM., which is neither correct nor 
a normative issue. Our interest in ignorance is in no way support for dismissing 
genuine concerns as resulting from a lack of knowledge. 
In clouded debates, it is especially easy to see that there is a logic behind 
the idea that the public need to be educated, even though this idea is often 
disregarded due to the false belief that education equals persuasion. It should be 
noted that the idea of educating the public has not been developed only from the 
observation that people disagree; another important part is the observation that 
people, on occasion, do have misconceptions. The introduction of new technologies 
in society can definitely be harmed by a lack of understanding. Education could 
possible reverse this. Unfortunately, it would require too much education, on too 
many occasions and in unsuitable situations. Instead of trying to reach the public 
with external information, experts should try to utilize existing internal knowledge 
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of members of the public. It is our advice to select names through a process of co-
creation, in which not only public associations can be explored, but that give the 
opportunity to select associations which are deemed important by the public. To 
increase understanding, the right name can be a powerful tool. 
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Abstract 
In this article, we follow up on food scientists’ findings that people have adverse 
reactions to foods produced with a new technology after hearing about the new 
technology. From the reactions, it appears that people use their attitudes to 
technologies they know to evaluate new technologies and foods produced therewith. 
Using categorization theory, in this study we have found that the name of the new 
technology determines which familiar technology is used to evaluate it. Comparison 
between the technology used for categorization and another familiar technology had 
a slight influence on the attitude formation process. The influence of attitude 
formation because of the name of the technology was independent of the level of 
participants’ need for cognitive closure. The results of the experiment show that the 
name of a food technology can play a very important role in the development of an 
attitude towards the technology and in the acceptance of foods produced with the 
technology. 
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Introduction 
Communication about food production entails the risk of creating the wrong 
impression, and impressions can have a large influence on the acceptance of food. In 
communicating food science and technology, this risk is particularly apparent, as 
communication is often one-directional and scientists tend to use technical terms 
that are difficult for the general public to understand. In modern society, where 
people do not have time to become engaged with all scientific advancements they 
encounter, science communication oftentimes does not imply much more than a 
name. When a name is all the public has, the associations attached to this name 
might have far-reaching consequences; research focusing on the impact of scientific 
names is, however, largely lacking. In the current paper, we focus on the 
consequences of the chosen name of a new food production technology on the 
public’s attitudes towards this technology and the food produced with the 
technology. 
Both technical experts and the science communication community pay only 
little attention to the way a name of a food production technology can influence the 
public’s acceptance of food products. When a new technology is developed, the 
name of the technology is hardly ever questioned. Yet, there are expert reports about 
the public rejecting genomics-assisted breeding and future food products after 
hearing the name genomics. For example, scientists involved in genomics-
accelerated breeding report that, when confronted with the name ‘genomics,’ people 
who do not have any knowledge about genomics reject related developments and 
foods for reasons that apply to genetic manipulation (GM) rather than genomics 
(Hall, 2010). In van Dam and de Vriend’s (2002) report about the public perception 
of genomics, the researchers believe that people use their knowledge about GM to 
answer questions about genomics. Scientists involved in nanotechnology believe 
that people tend to reject nanotechnology in general and foods produced with 
nanotechnology because the public are especially familiar with harmful 
nanoparticles and therefore believe that all nanotechnologies are dangerous 
(Kampers, 2009). Unrelated to food, it similarly has been found that people try to 
give meaning to a term they do not understand by using a related concept. For 
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example, Ingold and Kurtilla (2000) report about a research project that came close 
to failing because participants responded to questions relating to climate by talking 
about the weather.  
From the above reports, a pattern emerges where people use a technology 
they know, and which appears related in name, to respond to an unfamiliar food 
production technology. By using the knowledge and attitudes relating to the familiar 
concepts, people can in turn respond to the unfamiliar concepts. If this proposed 
mechanism is correct, it can explain the above experienced patterns in reactions, and 
particularly the idea that people use their knowledge about GM to answer question 
about the relatively unfamiliar genomics. 
If people use their knowledge about GM to respond to genomics, this may 
lead to misconstrued expectations. Genomics (accelerated breeding) can be used to 
create new food products through natural sexual reproduction. GM applies artificial 
recombination of genes, which makes the technology highly controversial. When we 
compare genomics with other technologies, genomics actually applies traditional 
breeding (TB), i.e. sexual reproduction, when creating new crops. The difference 
between genomics and TB is that genomics is applied after reproduction to check 
whether particulate genes are present. From the perspective of reproduction, 
genomics is better understood when people apply their feelings and beliefs about TB 
rather than about GM. Ironically, it appears that, because of the name, people 
actually link genomics with GM when evaluating the technology. It is clear that, 
with all the controversies surrounding GM, the link that people make between GM 
and genomics can potentially harm the development of the technology and the 
acceptance of foods when they reach the consumers.   
In the current paper, we test the idea that people use a familiar food 
production technology that appears related by name to give meaning to a technology 
with which they are unfamiliar. Using an experiment, we systematically investigate 
whether or not the process takes place and what the consequences are for emerging 
attitudes about the unfamiliar concept. We build on the observation that people 
possibly use knowledge about GM to respond to questions about genomics, and we 
use genomics as an example of the transfer of meaning from one concept to another.  
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Three theories in social and cognitive psychology relate in particular to the 
expected process. Using these theories, we formulate and test hypotheses about how 
they influence the perception of a technology and related foods. The first theory we 
investigate is categorization theory (Rosch, 1978), which describes the way people 
use knowledge about familiar concepts to give meaning to unfamiliar concepts. The 
theory thus offers an explanation as to why people use their knowledge about GM to 
evaluate genomics. Second, we turn our attention to comparison effects. Comparison 
effects relate to categorization theory because knowledge about familiar concepts 
can be used in different ways to give meaning to unfamiliar concepts (Herr, 1986; 
Higgins, 1989). The last theory we discuss is the theory of need for cognitive closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), which has the potential to explain individual 
differences between respondents in how they use categorization to give meaning to 
new concepts. We apply the theory because of the notion held by some technical 
experts that ‘the public,’ who are treated as very uniform, are not putting enough 
effort into searching for information, and that lack of interest is the cause of the 
wrong interpretation (Bucchi, 2008). According to this theory, the behaviour of 
searching for more information is a personal trait. It is possible that the theory does 
apply to some members of the public, those who are high in need for cognitive 
closure, whereas people who experience more need for extra information refrain 
from drawing conclusions on categorization alone.  
 
Categorization theory 
A theory widely applied in consumer behaviour to predict the way people 
react to new products is categorization theory (Loken, Barsalou & Joiner, 2008). 
According to the theory, people organize their knowledge about the world in clusters 
of related concepts. For example, a person might have a mental category of cats, 
computers and tomatoes. Knowledge about these concepts is linked not so much to 
the members of the category as to the category itself. For example, instead of 
remembering that each tomato we encounter is red, we remember that tomatoes are 
usually red. 
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Although categorization theory mainly describes the way we store and 
organize knowledge, it can also provide insight into the way we try to give meaning 
to new concepts (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). According to the theory, we try to 
understand new concepts by finding familiar concepts that are, in some way, similar. 
For example, when a person encounters a cherry tomato for the first time, this 
person might judge it to be a special kind of tomato and store the new concept in the 
category tomatoes. This process is called categorization. After categorization, the 
person can use knowledge about tomatoes to give meaning to, and make decisions 
about, the new cherry tomato without being fully educated on the subject. 
Additionally, attitudes might be activated. These attitudes might be applied 
to the new category member alongside knowledge. For example, if a person has 
negative feelings towards tomatoes, the new cherry tomato will probably be 
evaluated negatively. This is called attitude extension (Muthukrishnan & Weitz, 
1991) and can be described as the extension of an existing attitude about familiar 
concepts towards a new category member. 
It is important to note that attitude extension does not require any 
knowledge about the new concept itself. Therefore, attitude extension provides a 
quick way to reach an evaluation without getting to know the new construct. The 
emerging attitudes are the result of what people believe the new concept is related 
to, rather than an evaluation of the concept itself. 
It has been found that, when people have little knowledge about a subject, 
the categorization of new, related concepts is strongly influenced by superficial, 
non-functional attributes of the new concept rather than functional attributes 
(Gregan-Paxton, 2001; Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). An important superficial 
attribute of an unknown concept is the name. A name can act as a conceptual label 
that guides people to known concepts that can be used to give meaning to the new 
concept (Gregan-Paxton, Hoeffler & Zhao, 2005). Therefore, it can be very 
determinant in the selection of the category which will be used for categorization. 
When people are confronted with the name of an invisible technology of which they 
have no further knowledge, the only attribute available to them for categorization is 
the name. For example, when people are confronted with the genomics concept, 
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there is nothing to be studied except for the name. Therefore, especially when 
people have little knowledge about gen-technologies, the name genomics might 
quickly be associated with genetic manipulation. 
Categorization theory can provide an explanation for the way people make 
decisions and form initial attitudes about genomics and foods produced with 
genomics. In the current study, we test the hypothesis that, when people do not have 
any information about genomics, they use attitude extension from genetic 
manipulation to form an attitude about genomics because of the similarity in name. 
Hypothesis 1a: People use their knowledge and attitudes about genetic 
manipulation to form a response about genomics. 
If the name genomics leads to categorization with genetic manipulation, 
than another name would have the potential to lead to categorization with other 
technologies. As mentioned earlier, in genomics, the step in which traits are 
combined entails natural sexual reproduction. A name stressing this particular 
component of genomics, for example the (fictional) name ‘natural crossing’ could, 
with respect to activating related knowledge, lead to a more appropriate 
categorization from a technical perspective and consequently a more favourable 
evaluation of foods produced with the technology. Therefore, we study the response 
of respondents to the fictional name, natural crossing. 
Hypotheses 1b: People use their knowledge and attitudes about TB to form 
a response towards natural crossing. 
 
Comparison effects 
Categorization plays an important role in the way attitudes are influenced 
by the context, not only through the categorization itself, but also by the way 
activated categories are used for evaluation (Herr, 1986). Especially when people 
experience ambiguity towards a concept, attitudes can be influenced by the context 
in which it is reported (Higgins, 1989). Therefore, attitudes formed and reported can 
be influenced by the context, particularly in a situation where people try to give 
meaning to an abstract technology, making the interpretation of genomics 
susceptible to comparison effects. 
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When a concept under evaluation is placed within a category, information 
linked to the category can act as an interpretation frame that can be used to give 
meaning to the unfamiliar concept (Higgins, 1989). When the presentation context 
in which the new concept is presented is used for categorization, then the evaluation 
shifts towards the evaluation of the presentation context. This process is called 
assimilation. For example, if genomics is presented in a context with GM, and 
people believe the two are the same, the evaluation of genomics will shift towards 
the evaluation of GM because the context reminds people of GM attributes, which 
can, in turn, be used to evaluate genomics. 
When a concept is presented in a presentation context which is not regarded 
as suitable to give meaning to an unfamiliar concept, the presentation context can act 
as a standard for comparison (Herr, 1986). For example, when genomics is 
presented in a context with traditional breeding and it is believed that genomics is a 
form of GM because of categorization by name, people will be inclined to compare 
genomics with the context. Rather than using the context to give meaning by 
focusing on (what are believed to be) shared attributes, the person will focus on the 
presumed differences. Consequently, genomics might be evaluated even more 
negatively because the evaluator focuses on favourable attributes of TB, which 
genomics is believed not to have. In addition, when the presentation context is 
experienced as potentially inappropriate, people might correct their evaluation away 
from the context to compensate for the influence.  
Judged on its technical attributes, genomics might be explained best by 
comparing it with traditional breeding. Unfortunately, when people already believe 
that genomics is GM, comparison effects might result in even more unfavourable 
attitudes if people make this comparison. In the current experiment, we test the 
hypotheses that the name genomics will lead to an even more negative evaluation 
when it is combined with the TB concept. 
Hypotheses 2a: The name genomics will lead to a more negative evaluation 
when presented in combination with traditional breeding than when it is presented 
with GM. 
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In the current line of reasoning, the name natural crossing can be expected 
to have an alternative effect. If natural crossing makes people believe that the new 
technology is related to TB, then it can be expected that the evaluation will 
assimilate towards TB and contrast away from the evaluation of GM. 
Hypotheses 2b: The name natural crossing will lead to a more favourable 
evaluation when presented in combination with GM than when it is presented with 
TB. 
 
Need for cognitive closure 
An important question in studying public perceptions is the extent to which 
there are individual differences in relying on categorization when people evaluate a 
concept or answering questions. It is very possible that some people will rely on 
categorization and report extreme evaluations, whereas others will refrain from 
reporting extreme attitudes until they have more certainty that their presumptions are 
correct. 
A theory which describes the process of reaching conclusions through 
(among other things) categorization and the way this is influenced by individual 
differences is the theory of need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). According to this theory, people try to understand concepts in two steps when 
they are confronted with something unfamiliar. First, they try to formulate a 
preliminary answer. Second, the answer is treated as a hypothesis and tested. After 
testing, it is either accepted or rejected. Cognitive closure is reached when the 
answer is accepted. 
When people have a high need for cognitive closure, an answer as to what 
an unfamiliar concept entails is reached faster. The difference is to be found in the 
second step towards reaching cognitive closure. When the need for cognitive closure 
is high, people will invest less time in testing whether their initial idea is correct or 
not, compared to when a low need for cognitive closure is experienced. Essentially, 
when the need for cognitive closure is high, people are motived to quickly reach a 
conclusion rather than wait for a fully correct answer. 
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The need for cognitive closure is considered a personal trait. People who 
are high in need for closure tend to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity, whereas people 
who experience a low need for cognitive closure aim to be correct. However, a 
person might experience a difference in need for cognitive closure. In situations 
where drawing the wrong conclusion can be costly, the need for cognitive closure 
might be lower (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993). When testing an answer is 
difficult due to time pressure or lack of resources, people might experience an 
elevated need for closure. 
In the current experiment, we study the effects of need for cognitive closure 
on categorization and attitude extension. We hypothesize that people who 
experience high need for closure will rely more on categorization and attitude 
extension when answering questions about genomics or natural crossing.  
Hypotheses 3a: When a high need for cognitive closure is experienced, 
attitudes about genomics are more dependent on attitudes towards GM. 
Hypotheses 3b: When a high need for cognitive closure is experienced, 
attitudes about natural crossing are more dependent on attitudes towards TB. 
 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 120 students from Wageningen University participated and 
received a nominal five euros in compensation. The experiment had a 2 (context: 
genetic manipulation versus traditional breeding) x 2 (name unfamiliar technology: 
genomics versus natural crossing) design, and participants were randomly 
distributed. 
 
Procedure 
Introduction and manipulation 
On entry, participants were welcomed and randomly assigned to a 
computer. For experimental purposes (see need for closure measurements), they 
were told that they would participate in a series of experiments and asked to sign a 
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consent form informing them that the results would be processed anonymously and 
that they could stop at any time if they wished to do so. The experiment began with 
an introduction presenting a cover story that the aim of the research was to find out 
how people thought about different ways of making new kinds of fruits and 
vegetables. The context manipulation then followed, in which a way of making a 
new cultivar was explained.  
Participants in the traditional breeding context read:  
“In agriculture, new plant varieties are developed. One way to develop a 
new variety is traditional breeding. When traditional breeding is applied, pollen 
from one plant is put on the flower of another. The new plant that will result is a 
crossing of the ‘parents,’ and will share characteristics with both of them. For 
example, a plant bearing many tomatoes and a plant bearing round tomatoes can be 
crossed to produce a plant bearing many round tomatoes.”  
Participants in the genetic manipulation context where presented the 
following text: 
“In agriculture, new plant varieties are developed. One way to develop a 
new variety is genetic manipulation. When genetic manipulation is applied, part of 
the DNA of one plant is put in the DNA of another. From the new DNA, a plant will 
develop containing characteristics of both plants. For example, the DNA of a plant 
bearing many tomatoes can be combined with the DNA of a plant bearing round 
tomatoes to produce a plant bearing many round tomatoes.” 
When the continue button was pressed, an extra line appeared on screen 
presenting the unfamiliar technology. For participants in the genomics context, the 
following text was added: 
“There are more ways of developing new plant varieties. One of them is 
genomics.” 
Participants in the natural crossing context were told:  
“There are more ways of developing new plant varieties. One of them is 
natural crossing.” 
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Attitude measurements 
After the manipulation, participants rated the unfamiliar context technology 
on 14 aspects on a 7-point scale adopted from Van den Heuvel, Renes, Van Trijp, 
Gremmen and van Woerkum (2008). Examples of aspects are the extent to which 
participants believed that the unfamiliar technology was useful (1 = very useless, 7 = 
very useful) and safe (1 = very dangerous, 7 = very safe). In order to test the effects 
on the acceptance of food produced with the technology, the scale was extended 
with three questions about the actions towards a product produced with the 
technology and inquired about the extent to which the participant was willing to buy, 
eat and serve food produced with the unfamiliar technology (1 = absolutely not, 7 = 
no problem with it), resulting in a total of 17 questions (α = .94). Participants were 
instructed to respond by giving their first impression, and to answer even if they did 
not know much about the technology. After the unfamiliar technology, the context 
technology was evaluated (genetic manipulation/traditional breeding) using the same 
questions (α = .96).  
Categorization measurements 
The categorization measurement followed these questions (see figure 3.1) 
(Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). Participants were confronted with seven pictures. 
Each picture contained a line on which two circles where placed, and the distance 
between the circles ranged from full overlap at the middle of the line to the 
maximum possible distance apart on the line. In one circle, the name of the 
unfamiliar context technology was presented, in the other, the name of the context 
technology. For example, participants in the GM/genomics group saw a picture of a 
circle with the name GM and a circle with the name genomics. Participants were 
asked to choose the picture that resembled most the way they felt the two 
technologies where related to each other.  
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Figure 3.1 Measuring the perceived relation between genomics and genetic 
manipulation (see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
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Control variable 
The categorization measurements were followed by an open question, in 
which participants were asked to freely type what they knew about genomics 
(natural crossing). The answers to this question served as a check to determine 
whether or not people where familiar with genomics. 
Need for closure 
After the open question, the need for cognitive closure questions followed. 
The aim was to measure the personality trait ‘need for closure’ and to try to 
minimize the effects of the former questions on the reported need for cognitive 
closure. In an attempt to achieve this, the participants where led to believe that they 
were taking part in a new, independent study. To make this convincing, participants 
were informed that the first study was finished, and they were thanked for their 
participation. The screen was followed by a new screen asking the participants to 
answer another short questionnaire about the way they make decisions. Need for 
cognitive closure was measured using a shortened Dutch version of the 
questionnaire developed and validated by Vermeir (2003). In total, the participants 
answered 25 questions (α = .77). Examples of the questions presented include: “I 
want to know immediately what people mean when they say something,” “Usually, I 
take decisions quickly and with confidence” and “When I go shopping I have 
difficulty deciding what I want” (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). After this 
questionnaire, participants were thanked again, and they received the small reward. 
 
Results 
Control variable 
In the current study, we are interested in the development of emerging 
attitudes. To be able to investigate the development of emerging attitudes towards 
genomics, we needed participants who did not have well-established knowledge 
about, and stable attitudes towards, genomics. We used the responses to the question 
where participants were asked to write what they knew about genomics to check the 
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extent to which they were familiar with the technology. In total, 58 participants were 
subject to the genomics context.  
Of the 58 participants, one participant gave an answer showing knowledge 
about genomics, but the answer also included elements of GM. Because attributes of 
both technologies were used, it was not clear to what extent the difference was 
understood and therefore the participant remained included in the analyses. Of the 
remaining participants, three mentioned aspects of genomics, but expressed doubt 
about what the concept entails. These participants were included because, by 
showing ambiguity, they met the criteria of not having clear knowledge. The 
remaining 54 participant did not show knowledge of genomics, with the result that 
all participants were included in the analyses. 
 
Categorization and attitude extension 
Using the graphical categorization question (figure 3.1), we set out to 
determine the extent to which participants related the unfamiliar technology with the 
familiar technology about which they read an explanation. The expectation was that 
participants would believe genomics to be related to genetic modification and 
different than traditional breeding. When confronted with the name natural crossing, 
we expected participants to believe the concept to be related to traditional breeding 
and to be different than genetic manipulation. A 2 (context) x 2 (name technology) 
ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect, F(1, 116) = 71.63, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.38. Simple effect analyses revealed that, within the traditional breeding context, the 
distance between the context and natural crossing was perceived as smaller, M = 
2.73, SD = 0.83, and the distance from genomics was perceived as larger, M = 4.38, 
SD = 1.43, F(1, 116) = 26.46, p < .001. In the genetic manipulation context, the 
opposite effect was observed. Here, the distance between genomics and the context 
was regarded as smaller, M = 2.69, SD = 0.97, and the distance between natural 
crossing and the context was perceived as larger, M = 4.84, SD = 1.53, F(1, 116) = 
46.76, p < .001. The results thus confirm our expectation. Genomics resulted in a 
strong association with genetic manipulation and not with traditional breeding. The 
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name natural crossing resulted in the technology being closely related to traditional 
breeding and not to genetic manipulation. 
With respect to attitude extension, the hypothesis was that the attitude 
towards familiar technologies would be used to form an initial attitude towards the 
unfamiliar technology. A scatter plot (figure 3.2) revealed the expected patterns, 
showing a clear relation between attitudes to genomics and GM and between natural 
crossing and TB. Linear regression revealed a significant correlation between the 
reported attitudes about genomics and genetic manipulation, B = .73, 95% CI [.62, 
.83], t(27) = 14.16, p < .001, with the attitudes to genetic manipulation predicting a 
large portion of the variance of the reported attitudes about genomics, R2 = .88, F(1, 
27) = 200.54, p < .001. The result was similar for the attitudes about natural crossing 
and traditional breeding, B = .68, 95% CI [.49, .87], t(28) = 7.26, p < .001, R2 = .65, 
F(1, 28) = 52.78, p < .001. Following expectations, the results indicate that the 
attitude towards the unfamiliar technology is derived from the attitude towards the 
familiar technology with which people categorize the technology. There is a strong 
correlation between the attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM, 
and a strong correlation between the attitudes towards natural crossing and the 
attitudes towards TB.  
The scatter plot does not show a relation between the evaluations of 
genomics and TB or natural crossing and GM. Linear regression did not reveal a 
relation between the attitudes about genomics and traditional breeding either, B = 
.18, 95% CI [-.26, .61], t(27) = .83, p = .42, or between attitudes about natural 
crossing and genetic manipulation, B = .07, 95% CI [-.15, .29], t(30) = 64, p = .53. 
These results confirm that the relation between the attitude towards the unfamiliar 
technology and the context technology only exists for the combinations where the 
context is considered appropriate for categorization.  
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Figure 3.2 The relation between the attitudes towards resp. Classical Breeding and 
Genetic Manipulation and the initial attitudes towards resp. Genomics and Natural 
Crossing  
 
Comparison effects 
Whereas attitude extension is concerned about the source of the attitude, 
comparison effect relates the extent to which the attitude extension is influenced by 
the context. With respect to comparison effects, the main question is the extent to 
which the evaluation of the unfamiliar is influenced by the technologies after which 
it is presented. The presumption is that the attitudes towards the familiar technology 
presented in the context (GM or TB, respectively) are stable and have an influence 
on the attitude towards the unfamiliar technology. To exclude the possibility of the 
attitudes towards GM or TB being influenced by the unfamiliar technology, we 
apply an ANOVA to see if there are significant differences in evaluation of GM or 
TB depending on the unfamiliar technology with which it is presented. A 2 (context) 
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x 2 (name technology) ANOVA of the average context scores revealed only a 
significant main effect of context, F(1, 116) = 61.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .35, indicating 
that the evaluation of the familiar technology was not influenced by the unfamiliar 
technology with which it was presented. Genetic manipulation was regarded more 
negatively, M = 4.00, SD = 1.13, than traditional breeding, M = 5.43, SD = 0.80. 
These average evaluations of the familiar technologies enable us to study the 
direction of the comparison effects. 
We expected that, in the conditions where genetic manipulation was 
presented as the context technology, the emerging attitudes about genomics would 
assimilate in the direction of genetic manipulation, and the emerging attitudes about 
natural crossing would contrast away from genetic manipulation. A 2 (context) x 2 
(name technology) ANOVA (see figure 3.3) revealed a main effect due to name, 
F(1, 116) = 84.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. The name genomics caused a more negative 
attitude than the name natural crossing. Also, a significant interaction effect was 
observed, F(1, 116) = 5.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .05, showing that the resulting attitudes 
were influences by the context. Simple effect analysis showed a trend in the 
difference in appreciation for genomics between the different contexts, with 
genomics being regarded as less negative when it was presented in a context with 
traditional breeding, M = 4.30, SD = 0.77, than when it was presented in a genetic 
manipulation context, M = 3.97, SD = 0.96, F(1, 116) = 2.72, p = .10. When these 
attitudes scores are compared to the attitude scores for traditional breeding and 
genetic manipulation, we see that the attitude score of genomics is nearly identical to 
that of genetic manipulation when they are presented together. When genomics was 
presented in combination with traditional breeding, genomics was evaluated more 
favourably than when it was presented in combination with genetic manipulation. As 
traditional breeding is evaluated more favourably than genetic manipulation, we can 
conclude that the evaluation of genomics assimilated towards the evaluation of 
traditional breeding. This leads to a rejection of hypothesis 2a, since we expected a 
contrast effect. Nevertheless, although in a different direction, comparison effects 
did occur. 
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Figure 3.3 The average attitudes towards resp. Genomics and Natural Crossing when 
being presented in combination with resp. Classical Breeding and Genetic 
Manipulation 
 
When the name natural crossing was used, the opposite effect was 
observed, with a better appreciation when the name was presented in the context 
with genetic manipulation, M = 5.60, SD = 0.65, than in the traditional breeding 
context, M = 5.25, SD = 0.73, F(1, 116) = 3.46, p = .065. Genetic manipulation was 
evaluated less favourably than traditional breeding, yet the evaluation of natural 
crossing was higher when it was presented with genetic manipulation than when it is 
presented with traditional breeding. Therefore, confirming hypothesis 2b, we can 
conclude that the evaluation of natural crossing contrasts away from the evaluation 
of genetic manipulation when both technologies are presented together.  
 
Need for closure 
The influence of need for cognitive closure was tested for the groups where 
the attitudes towards the context where expected to determine the attitudes towards 
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the unfamiliar technology. These were the groups that were either presented with the 
combination of GM and genomics or with traditional breeding and natural crossing. 
The expectation was that people with a high need for closure would report more 
equal attitudes between genomics and GM. To test the hypotheses, first the absolute 
difference between the score on the scale measuring attitude towards genomics and 
the score on the scale measuring attitude towards GM was calculated. A linear 
regression that tested the relationship between absolute difference and the need for 
closure did not reveal a relation, B= -.56, 95% CI [-.25, .14], t(27) = .60, p = .56. 
Using the same method, we found no relation between the absolute differences 
between traditional breeding and natural crossing with need for closure, B = -.09, 
95% CI [-.29, .11], t(28) = .90, p = .37. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that need 
for closure had any effect on attitude extension. Both hypotheses stating that need 
for closure has an effect on attitude extension are rejected. 
 
Discussion 
So far, little attention has been given to the effects that a name can have on 
the interpretation of a food production technology. Most research on technologies 
investigates the way people react to a technology after they receive information 
(Bos, Koolstra & Willems, 2009). However, as indicated by the experiences of 
experts working on plant breeding for food, it appears that the beliefs and attitudes 
about a technology may be influenced by the name alone, without additional 
information. In the current paper, we have investigated the effects of a technology’s 
name on emerging attitudes. Building on categorization theory, we expected that the 
emerging attitudes of a new technology and related food products could be predicted 
by identifying attitudes about a familiar technology with a similar name. In addition, 
we expected comparison effects due to the combination of the name given to a 
technology and the presentation context. Further, we investigated the possible 
moderating role of need for cognitive closure. 
The current study has shown that the name of an unfamiliar technology can 
determine the attitude towards the technology. Reported attitudes about genomics 
were virtually identical to the reported attitudes about GM, and the reported attitudes 
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about natural crossing were very close to the reported attitudes about traditional 
breeding. The answers to the open question show that this is not due to knowledge 
about the unfamiliar technology, as the vast majority of respondents indicated that 
they were not familiar with genomics or natural crossing. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the attitudes towards the unfamiliar technologies are formed through 
attitude extension. 
In addition, comparison effects had an influence on the evaluations. The 
evaluations of both genomics and natural crossing were influenced by the 
technology with which they were presented, although in a different direction. 
Genomics was evaluated more favourably when it was presented with traditional 
breeding than when it was presented with genetic manipulation. Natural crossing, on 
the other hand, was evaluated more favourably when it was presented with genetic 
manipulation. Several conclusions can be drawn from the pattern found. 
When we compare the effect of changing the familiar context technology 
with the effects of the name of the technology, it can be concluded that the name 
influences perceptions more than the familiar technology presented in the context. 
Whereas the name natural crossing systematically led to more favourable attitudes 
and more acceptance of food than the name genomics, the differences in evaluations 
caused by the familiar technology caused only minor variations. We can therefore 
conclude that the differences in evaluations are primarily caused by categorization 
and extension, with comparison effects influencing the attitudes only to a small 
extent. 
The results did not support our expectation that people who are naturally 
high in need for cognitive closure would rely more on their attitudes about similar 
technologies to form or report attitude. A probable cause for failure to find the 
relation might be the experimental design. Time and information restraints are 
identified as elements that cause a temporary elevated need for cognitive closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). It is possible that even people who do not normally 
have a personal high need for closure experienced a high need for closure during 
their participation in the experiment. Within the current experimental design, it 
cannot be established to what extent the participants actually experienced an 
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elevated need for closure. The experiment was explicitly designed to prevent a 
carry-over effect and measure people’s personal need for cognitive closure rather 
than a need for closure resulting from the attitude questionnaire. To conclude, more 
research is necessary to determine the extent to which need for closure might have 
an influence on attitude extension. However, we can conclude that when participants 
are answering questions, such as a public perception report, personal need for 
closure might not influence the answers given.  
The results show that genomics is evaluated more favourably when 
presented in a context with traditional breeding. This find was unexpected, since we 
expected that genomics would be evaluated more favourably when presented in 
combination with genetic manipulation. We expected contrast to prevail due to the 
reported confusion between GM and genomics. We presumed that, if GM and 
genomics were regarded as being the same, it would logically follow that the 
comparison between traditional breeding and genomics would lead to contrast. 
However, an important determinant of comparison effects is the ambiguity 
experienced towards the concepts of evaluation (Higgins, 1989). The prevalence of 
assimilation points to the possibility that, even though people report very similar 
attitudes towards GM and genomics, they might experience uncertainty about 
whether they are identical. This uncertainty leaves room for the influence of the 
presentation context to give meaning, rather than to cause comparison. In general, 
we would recommend testing the effects of different familiar technologies that could 
possibly be used to explain the interpretation of an unfamiliar technology. With 
respect to explaining the current genomics case, the result shows that more 
favourable attitudes to genomics might be attained not by explaining its difference 
from GM, but by explaining how it relates to traditional breeding. Unfortunately, 
this might be very difficult to achieve, because people automatically link genomics 
to GM by categorization and tend to bring GM into the discussion even when it is 
not present (Hall, 2010).  
In the experiment, we forced people to give an evaluation about 
technologies with which they were not familiar. The current experiment could be 
criticized for lacking an ‘I don’t know’ option. The reason for not including such a 
Genomics? That’s probably GM 
 
81 
 
response option is that, when someone is confronted with a food produced with an 
unknown technology in real life in a situation that forces an evaluation, there is no 
escape from making the evaluation. For example, someone might be forced to 
choose between a regular and a genomics tomato in the middle of a supermarket. 
This research shows that, in such situations, people can form an evaluation. With all 
participants showing the same strategy, it can be concluded that the evaluation was 
more than just a random guess, different from person to person and therefore 
unpredictable. From the current results, it appears to be a universal strategy that can 
be predicted. 
Critics might argue that people who believe genomics and genetic 
modification to be strongly associated are actually right. There are many features 
that make it viable to cluster the two together, such as using information about genes 
for breeding and issues with intellectual properties. Although these are valid points, 
categorizing the technologies together on the basis of these attributes requires 
knowledge about both. The majority of the respondents explicitly stated that they 
associated them purely by name, and, with the exception of one, no respondent 
demonstrated detailed knowledge. In addition, it has been found that knowledge 
about GM is generally very low (Frewer, Shepherd & Sparks, 1994). More 
importantly, there are a number of attributes that genomics and traditional breeding 
share that makes it viable to categorize them together. The point is that, when people 
do not know anything about a technology, the name will determine the 
categorization, and the name will be the primary element in determining which 
category will be used when there are several potential categories. The category used 
then determines the evaluation of the technology and food produced using that 
technology (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).  
 
Implications 
This research has several implications. First, at the food production 
development stage, experts should understand the full impact that a name can have 
on the acceptance of the technology and the related food. This study shows that a 
name is not a meaningless characteristic. Rather, it is a label which steers 
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interpretations and which is an important – in some cases even the primary – 
element in shaping initial attitudes towards new food products. Experts tend to 
choose names that are only meaningful for people who have the necessary expertise. 
Unfortunately, without this expertise, a name can cause beliefs and attitudes that are 
unexpected or even believed to be improper by experts. Therefore, we recommend 
that experts should focus on developing names that can aid in giving a more proper 
interpretation even if the name will have to be processed without expert knowledge. 
Many experts still adhere to the deficit model and believe that these 
primary attitudes can be corrected with education (Ahteensuu, 2012). Unfortunately, 
often only a small audience will be reached through public communication. Even 
more importantly, a wide variety of research has proved that attitudes – including 
attitudes towards a food production technology (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003) – once 
formed are hard to change. From a psychological perspective, the main problem is 
the presumption that attitudes are the result of evaluations and knowledge rather 
than the other way around. Attitudes act as a perceptual filter that determines which 
information is accepted, processed and remembered. Instead of the attitudes being 
altered by information, people use their feelings towards certain foods to determine 
which information they accept. The result is that attitudes persist, often beyond 
expectations.  
The results have implications also for researchers on food acceptance. 
Researchers should be aware that answers given or attitudes reported might not be 
the result of knowledge about the subject. Although results might appear to be an 
indicator of what people believe about a food production technology, people might 
actually be reporting beliefs or attitudes about a different concept. Results might 
properly reflect answers given, but not the core values behind the answers. An 
answer that shows a rejection of genomics might actually be an answer rejecting 
genetic modification. Even worse, the respondent might actually have supported 
genomics if he/she knew the fundamental difference between the technologies.  
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Conclusion 
In this experiment, we tested the extent to which people are influenced by 
the name of a food production technology alone. The main result is that people 
unanimously use their attitudes about a familiar technology (GM) to formulate 
answers about the unfamiliar technology (genomics). The extent to which these new 
attitudes can affect the interpretation of new information is an important topic for 
further research. If the new attitudes have an effect on the interpretation of new 
information, the consequences of a poorly chosen name might even go beyond the 
current findings. With respect to the current experiment, it can already be concluded 
that a poorly chosen name might damage the successful introduction of a new 
technology or food product and that the name of a new technology deserves careful 
planning. Because of the name alone, consumers might refuse to accept genomics 
and foods produced with the technology because they believe genomics to be similar 
to GM. We can therefore conclude that a poorly chosen name is enough to ruin 
anybody’s appetite. 
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Abstract 
Public opinion is important for the success of a plant breeding practice. Currently, 
the relatively new practice of genomics-accelerated breeding is under development. 
From initial findings in research on consumer acceptance, it appears that people 
experience a strong link between genetic manipulation (GM) and genomics-
accelerated breeding after hearing the name “genomics,” leading to an unfavourable 
evaluation of genomics-accelerated breeding. There are indications that when 
genomics is presented with the purpose of enhancing food production, the negative 
link with GM is perceived more readily than when it is presented for other purposes. 
In the current article, we study the transference of unfavourable attitudes from GM 
to genomics-accelerated breeding. We study, in the Netherlands and Ukraine, the 
role of the presented purpose in creating a perceived link between genomics-
accelerated breeding and GM.  In addition, we study the effect of the presented 
purpose on the attitudes towards both practices when the link is perceived. The 
results show that universally people use their attitudes towards GM to evaluate 
genomics. In a culture where GM is perceived as controversial (Ukraine), more 
favourable attitudes towards both practices can be created by presenting GM in 
relation to biofuel rather than to food.  
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Introduction 
Public opinion is an important element in the success of a plant breeding practice. 
There is no better example than the failed introduction of genetic manipulation 
(GM), reflected in members of the public calling for prohibition of the technology 
and foods produced using it. Currently, genomics-accelerated breeding is being 
developed and applied to the production of new cultivars. Although research on the 
acceptance of genomics-accelerated breeding is still sparse, there are indications that 
it could be rejected by consumers, especially those who object to GM. Genomics-
accelerated breeding is rejected because people link genomics to GM when they 
have to give meaning to the, for them, unfamiliar practice. Therefore, controversies 
relating to GM are threatening the development of genomics-accelerated breeding. 
In the current article, we show that there are indications that different elements in 
communications about the subject influence how people form unfavourable attitudes 
towards genomics-accelerated breeding by using their attitudes towards GM. The 
elements we investigate are the role of the term genomics, the presented purpose of 
the practice and the interaction with the extremity of attitudes towards GM. Using 
experiments, we test the influence of these elements on the emerging attitudes 
towards genomics-accelerated breeding. To test the interaction with the extremity of 
attitudes, the study is carried out in the Netherlands, where attitudes towards GM are 
moderated, and Ukraine, where GM is controversial. 
 
Attitude formation and change 
In the current study, we focus on the emergence of attitudes. Traditionally, 
research on the acceptance of plant breeding practices, especially GM, follows the 
presumptions of the literacy model (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003). The literacy model 
focuses on changing unfavourable attitudes into favourable evaluations. According 
to the model, people’s attitudes are related to the information they have about a 
technology, and providing information would change unfavourable attitudes to 
favourable ones (Ahteensuu, 2012). The model certainly appeals to common sense 
logic and is still adhered to by many technical experts (Ahteensuu, 2012). However, 
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the relation between information and attitudes appears to be more complicated 
(Hansen, Holm, Frewer, Robinson, & Sandøe, 2003). In the field of GM acceptance, 
it has been found that people can have strong attitudes about the subject without 
having any knowledge (Frewer, Shepherd, & Sparks, 1994), and that providing 
information does not alter their convictions (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003). These 
findings undermine the presumed relationship between information and attitudes. 
Although an in-depth review of attitude formation is beyond the scope of this article, 
we give some attention to why information might not be important and create 
awareness about the way communication about genomics-accelerated breeding 
might influence attitudes to become unfavourable. 
Attitudes are important because they guide our decision making 
(Albarracín, Johnson, Zanna, & Kumkale, 2005). People often need to make 
decisions, and therefore form attitudes, in situations where no technical details are 
available to them. For example, people might be confronted with genomics-
accelerated breeding because they are interviewed about their opinions. In such 
situations, people will construct their attitudes by using any information they have 
available, including anything they link with the concept. Attitudes formed when 
required are called constructed attitudes (Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005), 
and they might differ significantly depending on what information is available at the 
time either in the form of knowledge (Michaut, 2004) or present in the situation 
(Kahneman, 2003). These constructed attitudes can turn into crystalized attitudes 
(Fabrigar et-al, 2005) when people remember their evaluations. Importantly, people 
tend to remember their evaluations without remembering their basis (Kanouse, 
1984). Therefore, attitudes formed from a vague notion or from concrete 
information can be equally influential on behaviour. 
Because people remember their attitudes without being aware of what gave 
rise to them, it is important to understand the formation process, because attitudes 
are especially subject to influence during this formation. Technical details that 
experts want to use to influence attitudes often do not play an important role because 
people have to form their attitudes in situations where there are no details currently 
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available. The question that remains is what, if anything, people use to shape their 
attitudes towards genomics-accelerated breeding. 
 
Attitude formation towards plant breeding 
From initial findings and experiences in the field of genomics-accelerated 
breeding, it appears that the name genomics is an important element in the attitude 
formation process. In a report on the public perception of genomics by van Dam and 
de Vriend (2002), the authors report that they suspect that people use their 
knowledge of GM to answer questions about genomics after hearing the name 
genomics. An explanation is that, when people hear the name genomics, they try to 
give meaning to the concept by using knowledge about genetic modification because 
it appears similar in name. The experiences of these authors are confirmed by 
experts working on genomics (Hall, 2010). They notice that people keep bringing up 
GM issues when debating genomics. In a study directly testing these experiences, 
we found that, when people are asked to respond to the name genomics (related to 
food), their evaluations of genomics are nearly identical to evaluations of genetic 
modification. 
These patterns can be explained by categorization theory. According to that 
theory, familiar concepts are organized in people’s minds in categories (Rosch, 
1978; Loken, Barsalou, & Joiner, 2008). The categories are used to give meaning to 
an unfamiliar concept when one is encountered. Meaning is given to an unfamiliar 
concept by placing it in a category with familiar concepts. This is called 
categorization. After categorization, attitudes towards the familiar concepts can be 
extended to the new concept. When people try to give meaning to the genomics 
concept, they categorize the concept with GM and use attitudes towards GM to 
evaluate genomics, a process called attitude extension (Muthukrishnan & Weitz, 
1991). The name genomics (in genomics-accelerated breeding or in other 
combinations) is acting as a conceptual label making people link genomics with 
GM. Therefore, the categorization of genomics with GM causes attitudes towards 
GM to be used to evaluate genomics. 
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Communication can play an important role in determining which category 
will be used depending on the name used in the communication (Herr, 1986; 
Higgins, 1989). When several categories potentially apply, a person evaluating an 
unfamiliar concept is more prone to use a category activated in his/her mind than an 
inactivated category (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). The category used will lead to the 
evaluation of the new concept (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). The idea of having 
competing categories is important in communicating about genomics. The 
technology shares features with both GM and traditional breeding (van den Heuvel, 
2008) and both of these practices can be used to categorize and give meaning to 
genomics. However, the name genomics particularly stresses the technical 
commonalities with the controversial GM technology. The result is that the name 
steers people to form a link with GM exclusively because the name genomics 
activates the GM concept rather than the traditional breeding concept. Promoting a 
link with traditional breeding rather than GM would lead to more favourable 
attitudes. In earlier research, we found that, whereas the name genomics caused 
evaluations similar to those about GM, the fictitious name “natural crossing” caused 
evaluations similar to those about classical breeding (CB). 
 
The role of food in attitude formation towards plant breeding 
Food might be an important element in the categorization of genomics with 
GM. Van Dam and de Vriend (2002) note that they believe GM is especially used to 
evaluate genomics when the topic is about genomics for food. If they are correct, the 
spreading activation model offers an explanation (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
According to that model, people form a link between concepts that are often 
experienced together. Moreover, concepts have a greater chance of springing to 
mind if they are partially activated when linked to a concept that becomes fully 
activated. Because the debate about GM is very often link to food, many people will 
form a link between them, and therefore there is a high chance of people thinking 
about food after hearing about GM. We believe that, when people talk about 
genomics, mentioning genomics partially activates the concept of GM, with the 
mentioning of food activating the concept of GM beyond the threshold, making it 
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spring to mind. When GM is then used for the evaluation of genomics, mentioning 
food will have played an important role in the usage of the GM concept. In the case 
of genomics, both the name and the context of food used to communicate genomics 
are features promoting the categorization of genomics with GM, and to attitudes 
towards GM being used for evaluating genomics.  
In the current article, we follow the most conventional definition provided 
by Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 1), which states that an “Attitude is a psychological 
tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of 
favour or disfavour.” According to this definition, the initial evaluation of genomics 
is an (emerging) attitude. The observation that the evaluation of genomics might 
have been made on the basis of knowledge about GM that does not necessarily apply 
to genomics is irrelevant. The evaluation made by the evaluator is still linked to the 
genomics concept (or entity), determining the attitude towards genomics. 
Food might influence attitudes in another way. There are indications that 
GM is especially controversial when presented with the purpose of food production 
(Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1997; Marris, Wynne, Simmons, & 
Weldon, 2001; Pardo, Midden, & Miller, 2002, for similar effects of the purpose of 
food production on the acceptability of nanotechnology see Gupta, Fischer, & 
Frewer, 2012; Siegrist, Cousin, Kastenholz, & Wiek, 2007; Siegrist, Stampfli, 
Kastenholz, & Keller, 2008; Steenis & Fischer, 2016). That the majority of research 
on the acceptance of GM is in the domain of food production is such an indication. 
Eurobarometer provides more direct support, showing that GM for other purposes 
carries more approval (European Commission, 2010). Where the purpose of food 
production influences attitudes towards GM, there are indications that the 
technology used to produce a food simultaneously influences the perception of that 
food. People tend to appreciate food products less after receiving information that 
the product has been created using GM or genomics than after receiving information 
that it has been produced by more traditional means (van den Heuvel, Renes, 
Gremmen, van Woerkum, & van Trijp, 2008). A probable explanation is that people 
have an intimate relationship with their food (Rozin 1999) and therefore strive to 
cancel any uncertainty about any unexpected effects. In short, the combination of a 
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new technology and food creates a less favourable evaluation of both. To summarize 
the influence of food, mentioning food possibly encourages not only categorization 
and attitude extension from GM, but also extension of a more unfavourable attitude. 
 
Influence of presentation on attitude formation 
The influence of the presentation of a context (the presented purpose) on 
attitudes towards a concept (genomics) shows that attitudes can be flexible. When 
communicating about GM in relation to food, a person might report a negative 
attitude towards GM because of fears. Yet, when this person is asked to report 
attitudes towards GM in the context of energy production (for example, enhancing 
biofuel production through GM), this same person might report favourable attitudes. 
The example shows that, by communicating different features tied to the concept, 
different reactions can be triggered. Because such reactions can develop into a more 
crystalized attitude when the evaluation is repeated, the way a concept is approached 
in communications about it can influence this attitude formation. 
Attitudes are flexible because they are structures of different connected 
attitude features (Fabrigar et-al, 2005). Each of these features adds to the overall 
evaluation of a concept. In the GM case, uncertainty about the effects on food safety 
is one feature, and the ability to produce more biofuel is another. When an attitude is 
being retrieved or formed, the attitude will assimilate towards the evaluations of 
features emphasized by the context (Fabrigar et-al, 2005). When uncertainties are 
highlighted by mentioning food, the overall attitude towards GM becomes less 
favourable. 
Proof that attitudes towards GM are susceptible to this mechanism is 
provided in a report on the relation between attitudes and biofuel production 
(Wegener & Kelly, 2008). The authors found that up to 71% of respondents thought 
it a good idea to use GM for biofuel production. Communicating genomics in 
relation to biofuel production might therefore lead to more favourable initial 
attitudes because people might not so readily link genomics and GM and, even if 
they do, attitudes towards GM will be more favourable. 
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To summarize, attitude formation can be influenced by the way 
communications make people think about related concepts. GM is evaluated less 
favourably than CB. Attitude extension to genomics from GM will therefore lead to 
less favourable attitudes than attitude extension from CB. Promoting the linking of 
genomics with CB rather than GM will lead to a more favourable initial attitude 
when attitude extension prevails. In addition, if genomics is linked to GM, more 
favourable initial attitudes can be created by communicating it in association with a 
purpose other than food production. 
 
Differences in attitude extremity 
There are large cultural differences in attitudes towards GM (European 
Commission, 2010). We expect these differences to result in different attitudes 
towards genomics after attitude extension. Moreover, such differences can have an 
impact on attempts to influence attitude extension. When attitude extension is being 
influenced by focusing on an attitude element, it is important that the element 
influences the overall attitude within the culture. For example, if within a culture 
there are no worries about food safety, changing the context of presentation to avoid 
food-related issues will not influence the overall attitude. 
To study cultural differences, we carried out the same study in the 
Netherlands and in Ukraine to test the influence of food-related concerns. In 
previous research, we found that attitudes towards GM in the Netherlands were near 
neutral on average and without any extreme variations. This supports Gutteling’s 
(2002) finding that there is a variety of differing views on GM in the Netherlands, 
but they do not reach the point of controversy. In Eurobarometer, special interest is 
taken in attitudes relating to food. The results show that, in the Netherlands, 39% of 
respondents say that they do not have a problem with GM in food; this is the largest 
group within the EU (European Commission, 2010). We take these combined results 
as an indication that GM for food purposes is not controversial in the Netherlands. 
With food-related concerns not generally being important, alterations in the 
presented purpose of genomics might not cause large changes in attitudes towards it 
in the Netherlands. 
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In countries where worries about food safety are more salient, talking about 
biofuel instead of food might have a greater positive influence on emerging 
attitudes. To test the possible effects, we carried out our experiment in Ukraine in 
addition to the Netherlands. We selected Ukraine because it has a different culture 
than the Netherlands and there were indications that GM for food was a highly 
controversial topic there. At the time of data collection, the Ukrainian government 
was preparing strict food labelling laws. The laws required all food products to be 
labelled either “GM” or “GM free.” Even food products with no connection to GM, 
for example salt, had to be labelled, and many food retailers told suppliers that they 
would not accept food without a “GM free” label (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service, 2010). Although some of these laws have been reversed, the developments, 
and especially food retailers’ demand for GM-free-labelled food, show that GM for 
food was highly controversial at the time of our data collection. Therefore, attitudes 
resulting from attitude extension from GM to genomics might be influenced strongly 
by presenting genomics in the context of food rather than in the context of biofuel.  
 
Current research 
In the current research, we test the effects of presenting genomics in 
combination with different known technologies, GM and CB, and for different 
purposes, food or biofuel production. The aim is to study the attitudes caused by the 
name genomics alone. Therefore, no information about genomics is provided, and 
we test participants with little or no background knowledge of genomics. 
We expect that mentioning food purposes will result in a more similar 
evaluation between genomics and GM, and in a less similar evaluation between 
genomics and CB. We expect that, when the presented purpose of the GM is biofuel 
production, the evaluation of GM will be more favourable and, therefore, the 
evaluation of genomics will be more favourable. 
To test the influence of different evaluations linked to particular attitude 
elements, we run two separate experiments in the Netherlands and in Ukraine. We 
expect that mentioning biofuel rather than food will cause more favourable attitudes 
towards GM, and therefore towards genomics, in Ukraine especially. By comparing 
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the results, we can determine the extent to which attitudes linked to food influence 
the overall emerging attitude.  
 
 
Netherlands study 
Method 
Participants 
A company was hired to recruit participants and to administer the study. 
The company used a database with volunteers who were invited to participate in the 
study by email. The emails were distributed so as to reach a representative 
stratification with respect to education and income of the adult population in the 
Netherlands. In the email, invitees were told that the aim of the study was to record 
their opinion about different agricultural techniques and that they had a chance of 
winning a hotel night in return for their participation. Further, the email presented a 
hyperlink leading to the experiment. By clicking on the link, the email receiver 
could join. The recruitment yielded 139 participants. 
The experiment had a 2 (context: “genetic manipulation” versus “traditional 
breeding”) x 2 (purpose: “biofuel” versus “food”) design, and participants were 
randomly distributed. 
 
Procedure 
Introduction and manipulation 
After clicking the hyperlink, the participants were redirected by computer 
to one of the conditions. First, the participants were asked to agree to a form of 
consent, explaining to them that the results would be processed anonymously and 
that they could stop at any time they wished. The experiment began by presenting a 
cover story explaining that aim of the research was to find out how people thought 
about different ways of making new cultivars for agricultural purposes. The cover 
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story was followed by manipulation presenting two different purposes for 
agriculture: biofuel production and food production. 
Participants in the biofuel group read: 
“There is a limited supply of fossil fuels. Biofuels provide an alternative 
that can replace fossil fuels. Different agricultural techniques can help produce more 
biofuels. You are now going the read about one of these.” 
Participants in the food group read: 
“We eat food every day. This food is produced by agriculture. Every day, 
people are trying to enhance the production of food using different agricultural 
techniques. You are now going to read about one of these techniques.” 
The application manipulation was followed by the context manipulation, 
which explained a way of making a new cultivar.  
Participants in the traditional breeding for food context read:  
“A way to develop a new variety is traditional breeding. When traditional 
breeding is applied, a plant’s pollen is put on the flower of another plant. The new 
plant that results is a cross of the “parents” and will share characteristics with both 
of them. For example, a plant bearing many tomatoes and a plant bearing round 
tomatoes can be crossed to produce a plant bearing many round tomatoes.” 
For participants in the biofuel group, the last sentence read: 
“For example, a sunflower that grows fast and a sunflower that produces a 
high amount of oil can be crossed to make a flower that produces a high amount of 
oil quickly after seeding.”  
Participants in the genetic manipulation context where presented the 
following text: 
“A way to develop a new variety is genetic manipulation. When genetic 
manipulation is applied, a part of a plant’s DNA is put in the DNA of another plant. 
From the new DNA, a plant will develop containing characteristics of both plants. 
For example, the DNA of a plant bearing many tomatoes can be combined with the 
DNA of a plant bearing round tomatoes to produce a plant bearing many round 
tomatoes.” 
For participants in the biofuel group, the last sentence read: 
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“For example, the DNA of a sunflower that grows fast can be combined 
with the DNA of a sunflower that produces a high amount of oil to make a flower 
that produces a lot of oil quickly after seeding.” 
After the participants pressed the continue button, an extra line appeared 
presenting the unfamiliar technology. For participants in the genomics context, the 
following text was added: 
“There are more ways of developing new plant varieties. One of them is 
genomics.” 
Attitude measurements 
After the manipulation, participants rated genomics on a selection of nine 
aspects on a 7-point scale taken from van den Heuvel, Renes, Van Trijp, Gemmen, 
& van Woerkum (2008). Examples of aspects are: the extent to which participants 
believed that genomics was useful (1 = not at all useful, 7 = very useful) and safe (1 
= very dangerous, 7 = very safe). This scale was extended with two question about 
behaviour towards a product produced with the technology and inquired about the 
extent to which the participant was willing to eat food produced (use biofuel 
produced) with genomics (1 = absolutely not, 7 = no problem with it), resulting in a 
total of 10 questions (α = .94). Participants were instructed to respond giving their 
first impression, and answer even if they did not know much about genomics. After 
genomics, the context technology was evaluated (genetic manipulation/traditional 
breeding) with the same questions (α = .96).  
Categorization measurements 
Following these questions, the categorization measurement followed (see 
Figure 3.1). Participants were confronted with seven pictures. Each picture 
contained a line on which two circles where placed, and the distance between the 
circles ranged from full overlap at the middle of the line to the maximum possible 
distance apart on the line. In one circle, genomics was presented, in the other the 
name of the context technology. For example, participants in the GM group saw a 
picture of a circle with the name GM and a circle with the name genomics. 
Participants were asked to choose the picture that resembled most the way they felt 
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the two technologies where related to each other (cf., Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 
1992).  
Control variable 
The categorization measurements were followed by an open question, 
asking about the extent to which the participant was familiar with genomics (1 = 
unfamiliar, 2 = heard about genomics, 3 = very familiar). The answers to this 
question served as a manipulation check to determine whether or not people where 
familiar with genomics. 
 
Results 
Control variables 
In the current study, we investigated the development of emerging attitudes 
towards genomics. To be able to do this, we needed participants who were generally 
unfamiliar with genomics. Eight participants who stated that they were very familiar 
with genomics were excluded. After removing the respondents, 131 participants 
remained. 
 
Categorization and attitude extension 
Using the graphical categorization question (Figure 3.1), we determined the 
extent to which participants perceived genomics to be similar to the familiar 
technology about which they read an explanation during the manipulation. A 2 
(context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of context, 
F(1, 127) = 4.86, p < .05. Independent of the purpose presented in the context, 
genomics is seen as more closely related to GM, M = 3.25, SD = 1.60, than to M = 
3.90, SD = 1.61.  
With respect to attitude extension, the hypothesis was that people used their 
attitude towards the context technologies to form an initial attitude towards 
genomics. A scatter plot (Figure 4.1) revealed a clear relation between the attitudes 
towards genomics and GM for both purposes of GM. Within the GM for food group, 
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linear regression revealed a significant correlation between the reported attitudes 
about genomics and GM, B = .52, 95% CI [.28, .77], t(25) = 4.36, p < .001, with the 
attitudes towards GM predicting a large portion of the variance of the reported 
attitudes about genomics, R2 = .43, F(1, 25) = 18.98, p < .001. The result was similar 
for the GM for biofuel group, B = .71, 95% CI [.52, .90], t(32) = 7.66, p < .001, R2 = 
.65, F(1, 32) = 58.65, p < .001. Following expectations, the results indicate that the 
attitude towards genomics is in line with the attitude towards GM. The results are 
similar for both presented purposes of GM. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
changing the purpose does not affect the attitude extension. 
 
Figure 4.1 The relation between the attitudes towards, respectively, classical 
breeding or genetic manipulation and genomics for different purposes in the 
Netherlands 
 
The scatter plot appears to show a weak correlation between the evaluations 
of genomics and CB for both purposes. Linear regression revealed a significant 
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relation between the attitudes about genomics and CB for food purposes, B = .33, 
95% CI [.03, .63], t(31) = 2.27, p < .05, R2 = .14, F(31) = 5.14, p < .05 and the 
attitudes about genomics and CB for biofuel, B = .50, 95% CI [.17, .82], t(35) = 
3.12, p < .01, R2 = .22, F(1, 35) = 9.75, p < 01. These results show that presentation 
does influence perception about genomics. However, the influences are rather weak.  
 
Comparison effects 
The results show that the attitudes towards CB can influence the emerging 
attitudes towards genomics to a small extent. The questions now are whether there is 
a difference between the attitudes towards GM and CB, because of both the nature 
of the technology and the purpose in the manipulation, and whether the difference is 
carried over to the emerging attitudes. A 2 (context) x 2 (name technology) ANOVA 
was used to see whether there was a difference between the context technologies. 
The ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of context technology, F(1, 
127) = 60.33, p < .001. GM was regarded less favourably, M = 3.85, SD = 1.16, than 
CB, M = 5.32, SD = 1.05.  
A 2 (context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA was carried out to see whether the 
difference in attitudes between CB and GM resulted in a difference in attitudes 
towards genomics. The analyses did not reveal any significant effects. It can 
therefore be concluded that the influence of the favourable attitudes towards CB did 
not influence the evaluation of genomics enough to create a difference in the 
emerging attitudes between the technologies. The average evaluation of genomics 
was near neutral, M = 4.26, SD = .98. 
 
Discussion 
We argued two possible ways in which the evaluation of genomics might 
be influenced through communication. The first way was the promotion of the link 
between genomics and either CB or GM. The second was to use the influence of the 
purpose of GM on the evaluation of GM when genomics was linked with GM. We 
begin by discussing the first way. We tried to promote the linking of genomics to 
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CB by not mentioning GM in the introduction, to prevent GM from springing to 
mind by avoiding the topic of food. Using a question that measured the perceived 
similarity between each presented technology to the respondent, we found that the 
people exposed to genomics and GM grouped the two technologies presented to 
them more closely together than the people exposed to genomics and CB. Not 
mentioning either GM or food did not result in respondents believing CB and 
genomics were equally close to each other compared to GM and genomics. In 
conclusion, the name genomics always leads to linking with GM and prevents 
linking with CB. 
The results of the attitude extension test confirm the pattern. Attitudes 
towards genomics and GM correlated highly. The presence of CB in the 
manipulation had only little effect on the attitudes towards genomics, independent of 
the purpose. Due to the between-group design of the experiment, we were not able 
to directly test whether the respondents in the CB groups used their attitudes towards 
GM to evaluate genomics, which previous research found that people did. An 
indication that people use their attitudes nevertheless is provided by comparing the 
CB respondents’ attitude scores towards genomics with the others’ attitude scores 
towards GM. The score are very similar, indicating that all respondents used their 
attitudes towards GM to evaluate genomics. 
The second way to possibly influence attitudes towards genomics (after 
attitude extension) was to change the evaluation of GM. By presenting GM in 
association with biofuel production, we expected more favourable attitudes towards 
GM compared to when it was presented for food production. However, the results 
show that the presented purpose did not change the evaluation of GM. Therefore, the 
subsequent attitude extension did not result in any differences in the evaluation of 
genomics. 
The current results show that, among the respondents, the evaluation of GM 
in the Netherlands was neutral. This serves as an explanation as to why changing the 
purpose of GM from food to biofuel did not result in a significant difference in the 
evaluation of GM. We expect that, among cultures where GM is evaluated less 
favourably, changing the purpose might result in more favourable attitudes. In the 
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Netherlands study, we did not find any influence of the presentation context on 
attitudes towards genomics. A possible explanation might be the neutral evaluation 
of GM in the country. We test this hypothesis by repeating the study in a culture 
where GM is met with more resistance. 
 
 
Ukrainian study 
Method 
For the Ukrainian study, a native research agency was hired. The research 
agency translated the questionnaires, and the translation was subsequently checked 
by a native Ukrainian speaker in the Netherlands. The agency recruited participants 
using its own database and was requested to create a representative sample with 
respect to education and income of the adult Ukrainian population. Participants were 
invited to join the study by email. The recruitment yielded 408 participants. The 
study was administrated using the internet. The procedure and questionnaires were 
identical to the first study, using the same attitude measurement for genomics (α = 
.91) and the context technology (α = .96), categorization measurement and 
manipulation check. 
 
Results 
Control variables 
In total, four participants stated that they were very familiar with genomics. 
These participants were excluded from the analyses. After removing the participants, 
404 participants remained. 
 
Categorization and attitude extension 
We used a 2 (context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA to see whether the context 
and purpose had an effect on the strength of linking genomics with the context 
technology. The ANOVA revealed a main effect due to context, showing that 
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genomics was seen to be more closely related to GM than to CB, F(1, 400) = 50.62, 
p < .001.    
With respect to attitude extension, the hypothesis was that people use their 
attitude of the context technology to form an initial attitude towards genomics. A 
scatter plot (Figure 4.2) revealed a clear relation between participants’ attitudes 
towards genomics and GM for both purposes of GM. Within the GM for food group, 
linear regression revealed a significant relation between the reported attitudes about 
genomics and GM, B = .88, 95% CI [.76, 1.01], t(108) = 13.81, p < .001, with the 
attitudes towards GM predicting a large proportion of the variance in the attitudes 
towards genomics, R2 = .64, F(108) = 190.58, p < .001. The results were similar in 
the GM for biofuel group, B = .77, 95% [.66, .77], t(92) = 13.96, p < .001, R2 = .68, 
F(92) = 194.80, p < .001. 
The scatter plot revealed no clear linear pattern for either purpose for CB. 
Although linear regression revealed a significant correlation between participants’ 
reported attitudes towards CB and genomics when CB was applied to biofuel, B = 
.35, 95% CI [.13, .57], t(101) = 3.12, p < .01, the correlation was weak, R2 = .09, 
F(101) = 9.72, p < .01. When CB was presented as a means of food production, 
there was no correlation between the attitudes about CB and genomics, B = .04, 95% 
CI [-.18, .25], t(95) = .34, p = ns. 
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Figure 4.2 The relation between attitudes towards, respectively, classical breeding 
and genetic manipulation and genomics for different purposes in Ukraine 
 
Comparison effects. 
We expected that, when GM was considered controversial, changing the 
context from food to biofuel would lead to more favourable evaluations. A 2 
(context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA revealed an interaction effect, F(1, 400) = 17.2, p < 
.001. The interaction effect was caused by a difference in evaluation of GM caused 
by the purpose, F(1, 400) = 17.9, p < .001, with GM for biofuel being evaluated 
more favourably, M = 3.52, SD = 1.34, than GM for food, M = 2.81, SD = 1.28. CB 
was evaluated the same, independent of its purpose, F(1,400) = 2.70, p = ns.  These 
results show that presenting GM as a means of biofuel production results in more 
favourable evaluations of GM compared to GM being presented as a means of food 
production. In addition, the 2 (context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA revealed a main 
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effect of context, F(1, 400) = 391.6, p < .001. CB was evaluated more favourably, M 
= 5.57, SD = 1.13, than GM, M = 3.1, SD = 1.35.  
We used a 2 (context) x 2 (purpose) ANOVA to see whether the differences 
in evaluations of CB and GM resulted in different evaluations of genomics. The 
ANOVA revealed only a main effect for purpose, F(1,400) = 11.1, p < .001. 
Genomics for biofuel was perceived more favourably, M = 3.94, SD = 1.29, than 
genomics for food, M = 3.48, SD = 1.33, making the latter evaluation less favourable 
than that in the Netherlands (M = 4.28, SD = 0.96). 
 
Discussion 
In the Netherlands, it was found that people link genomics with GM, and 
that changing the purpose of GM from food to biofuel did not influence the 
perceived relation. In Ukraine, we observed the same result. Genomics is perceived 
to be closely related to GM, whereas people do not report a strong link between 
genomics and CB. 
The attitude extension measurements show that attitudes towards genomics 
are mainly shaped by attitudes towards GM and weakly influenced by attitudes 
towards CB in the context of biofuels. When the presented purpose of the 
technologies was food, there was no longer a relationship between the attitudes 
towards CB and the attitudes towards genomics. The latter finding is in line with 
findings that more extreme unfavourable attitudes are more easily generalized 
(Shook, Fazio, & Eiser, 2007). 
Although the attitudes towards genomics correlated highly with the 
attitudes towards GM, the attitudes towards genomics were less unfavourable than 
the attitudes towards GM. A possible explanation is that people feel reluctant to 
fully extend rejection towards an unfamiliar concept when they feel uncertain about 
being correct. Even so, the attitudes towards GM remained the primary predictor of 
the attitudes towards genomics. 
The ANOVA testing the comparison effects shows that genomics is 
evaluated more favourably when it is presented in combination with biofuel than 
with food. There are two possible explanations. Because the attitudes towards 
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genomics are always the result of the attitudes towards GM, the difference could be 
caused by the different evaluations of GM caused by the presented purpose. Another 
contributory influence could be that, when genomics is presented after biofuels, the 
attitudes towards CB have an effect on the attitudes towards genomics. The results 
from the ANOVA point to both explanations interacting. In the GM for biofuel 
group, attitudes towards genomics are slightly higher compared to the GM for food 
group. This can be attributed to the difference in evaluation of GM between 
purposes. The attitudes towards genomics in the CB for biofuel group were even 
higher, supporting the possible explanation of the influence of the favourable 
attitudes towards CB. 
 
 
General discussion 
In previous research, we confirmed the experience of other experts that, 
even though genomics shares elements with CB and GM, people universally use 
their attitudes towards GM to evaluate genomics. The use of the attitudes towards 
GM to respond to genomics is caused by the similarity in name. An important 
element in the study was that genomics was presented as a solution for creating new 
foods efficiently. The food purpose might be an important element in the process of 
activating knowledge and attitudes towards GM to judge genomics. In the current 
study, we studied the extent to which the presented purpose of genomics (food or 
biofuel production) contributed to the perceived link between genomics and a 
familiar technology (respectively, GM or CB) and the subsequent usage of 
knowledge and attitudes relating to the familiar technologies to evaluate genomics. 
To study the influence of differences in the intensity of the controversy about GM, 
the study was conducted in the Netherlands and Ukraine.  
In both the Netherlands and Ukraine, reported attitudes towards genomics 
correlated highly with reported attitudes towards GM. We did not find an exception 
caused by either the familiar technology presented in combination or the presented 
purpose of the familiar technology. Using a picture with circles representing the 
technologies, we were able to more directly test the perceived link between the 
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technologies. Although van Dam and de Vriend (2002) expressed the belief that 
people confused genomics with GM more often in a food context, the current results 
show that people link genomics with GM independent of the presented purpose. It 
does not appear that spreading activation made the concept of GM more accessible. 
We can therefor conclude that variations in the context do not influence the 
perceived link between genomics and GM. The effect of the perceived link between 
genomics and GM is shown in the evaluation of genomics, which is very similar to 
the GM evaluations of the majority of participants. Therefore, we can conclude that 
people universally believe genomics and GM to be very similar. 
The relation between genomics and CB is more complicated. Neither in the 
Netherlands nor in Ukraine did we find people that paired genomics and CB. 
Nevertheless, attitudes did cause minor variations in the reported attitudes towards 
genomics. In the Netherlands, attitudes towards genomics were influenced by 
attitudes towards CB independent of the presented purpose. In Ukraine, the purpose 
did make a difference. Attitudes towards CB did influence attitudes towards 
genomics when the presented purpose was the production of biofuel. When CB was 
presented as useful for food production, the attitudes towards CB did not influence 
the attitudes towards genomics. A possible explanation is that the strong feelings 
towards GM when applied to food overrode the subtle influence of attitudes towards 
CB on the formation of attitudes towards genomics. Further research is necessary to 
draw conclusions on the role of extreme attitudes and context influences. 
The weak influence of CB on attitudes appears to be at variance with 
Ferguson and Bargh’s (2004) idea that, when more categories apply, the category 
that is used for categorization will be the source for evaluation. The results point to 
more categories influencing the emerging attitude. However, when the evaluation of 
CB did influence the evaluation of genomics, the effects were small. Although there 
was some influence, the influence did not lead to a significant difference in the 
evaluation of genomics. Therefore, the idea that a name can cause a particular 
attitude because people choose a certain category over another remains a useful way 
to approach categorization effects in practice. 
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In a recent study in the Netherlands, as already stated, we found that the 
average attitude towards GM is near neutral. The presented purpose of GM did not 
influence average attitudes, and we did not register a significant difference 
depending on whether the presented purpose was the production of biofuels or the 
production of food. In Ukraine, the overall attitudes towards GM were unfavourable. 
Here, the presented purpose did make an important difference, with GM for food 
being evaluated less favourably than GM for biofuel. The different attitudes are the 
result of the flexible nature of attitudes. In conclusion, when GM is controversial, 
changing the presented purpose from food to biofuel will result in more favourable 
attitudes. These more favourable attitudes towards GM will result in more 
favourable attitudes towards genomics. 
Although there are differences between the Netherlands and Ukraine and 
the presented purpose, the dominant factor in attitude formation towards genomics 
was the link with GM. Any differences in the evaluation of genomics can be 
attributed to differences in the evaluation of GM. 
 
Implications for communicating genomics-accelerated breeding 
The results show the importance of the positioning of genomics-accelerated 
breeding. Because of the name genomics, people tend to use their attitudes towards 
GM to evaluate genomics-accelerated breeding. Because people tend to remember 
their evaluations and not the reason why they made them, attitudes can be very 
influential and harm the acceptance of products created with genomics-accelerated 
breeding and the development of the practice. The current findings show that, when 
the name genomics is used, institutions explaining genomics can, at least partially, 
prevent controversies by avoiding examples involving food. This, however, will 
often be very difficult to achieve. 
The name genomics makes it very difficult to avoid attitudes towards GM 
being used to evaluate genomics. In previous research, we found that a name 
causing a link with CB caused more favourable evaluations. In the current 
experiments, we did not find any element that caused genomics to be regarded as 
close to CB. It is recommend that the name be changed before the technology 
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reaches consumers. A new name could prevent controversies that arise due to beliefs 
founded on the idea that genomics means GM. 
It is recommended that the selection of such a name should be carried out 
internationally. Although people universally link genomics with GM, there were 
differences between cultures on the effects of genomics. The differences were 
caused by different risk perceptions. Therefore, it is recommended to test the new 
name in different markets.
  
  
 
The elephant in the room: How a technology’s name affects 
its interpretation 
 
Based on: Boersma, R., Poortvliet, M.P., & Gremmen, B. (Under revision). The 
elephant in the room: How a technology’s name affects its interpretation. 
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Abstract 
In the current work, using experiments, we investigate the role of the name of a 
technology on the informed evaluation of that technology. We argue that a name can 
influence interpretations by activating cognitive structures. Using genomics 
accelerated breeding as a case, we show that the name “genomics” makes people 
evaluate related information as similar to genetic modification. Replacing the name 
“genomics” with “natural crossing” causes evaluations similar to those for 
traditional breeding. The results show that a name can have a strong influence on 
public attitudes, and we call for more consideration in choosing a name for a 
technology. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, science communication has become an important part of the 
introduction of different applications of genomics in society (Bos, Koolstra & 
Willems, 2010; Pin & Gutteling, 2008; Mogendorff, et al., 2015). We have chosen 
genomics because public knowledge about this subject is still very limited (Sturgis, 
Brunton-Smith & Fife-Schaw, 2010). In addition, the name “genomics” influences 
people’s perception of the technology, according to reports of scientists 
communicating about it. According to these reports, people spontaneously believe 
that genomics is the same as genetic modification (GM) (Van Dam & De Vriend, 
2002; Hall, 2010) and are hard to convince otherwise (Hall, 2010), even though the 
technology is in many ways similar to traditional breeding (Van der Heuvel, 2008). 
Within science communication and related fields, there has been some 
attention focusing on what resources people might use when they lack appropriate or 
specific knowledge to evaluate a technology (Bucchi, 2008). Several alternatives 
have been proposed, including general scientific knowledge (Scheufele & 
Lewenstein, 2005), risk perception relating to other technologies (Bredahl, Grunert 
& Frewer, 1998), and existing attitudes (Grunert, Bredahl & Scholderer, 2003). 
Although these alternatives can substitute specific knowledge when a person is 
making an initial evaluation, something more is needed to explain how the 
evaluation is reached when the person does not have any specific knowledge about 
what he/she is evaluating. What remains unclear is what exactly will determine 
which particular knowledge, risks, or values are believed to be applicable and used 
in the evaluation. For example, will a person use attitudes towards biotechnology or 
towards asbestos to evaluate nanotechnology for food purposes?  
An important feature of a technology is its name. Indeed, in several reports 
described below, indications can be found that for certain technologies the name of 
the technology plays an important role in its evaluation by the public. From these 
reports, a pattern emerges: to respond to an unfamiliar technology, people use a 
technology with which they are familiar and which appears related in name. This 
behaviour has been most notably observed in the fields of nanotechnology and 
genomics accelerated breeding, where researchers indicate that people confuse their 
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technology with another, assumingly similar, technology because of the name, and 
that controversies are transferred even though they might not apply. With respect to 
nanotechnology, several authors have mentioned that people tend to link 
nanotechnology with asbestos, a dangerous nanoparticle, and subsequently reject 
nanotechnology in general (including safe variants) and related applications (Currall, 
et al., 2006; Macoubrie, 2008; Kampers, 2009). In the field of genomics, it has been 
reported that people believe that genomics is equal to genetic modification, which is 
regarded as controversial by many, making the evaluation of genomics unfavourable 
because of controversies that apply to GM (Van Dam & De Vriend, 2002; Hall, 
2010). The reports point to people asking themselves “What is this technology?” and 
using the name to form an answer that is not necessarily right.  
In the current paper, we test the influence of expectations caused by the 
name of a technology in interaction with information provided about the technology. 
More generally, we argue that a name can determine which cognitive structures 
present in a person’s mind will be used for evaluations. In addition, we assert that 
pre-existing cognitive structures serve as a basis for further interpretation and 
learning, and that this provides an explanation for the stability of existing attitudes 
when new information is presented. Using the relatively new practice of genomics 
accelerated breeding as a case, we study in an experimental setting the influence of 
the name of a technology, in combination with information provided about the 
technology, on the evaluation of the technology. 
 
The case of genomics 
As mentioned, experts report that people tend to believe that genomics 
equals GM (Van Dam & De Vriend, 2002; Hall, 2010) and use their evaluations of 
GM to evaluate genomics. The transfer of controversies from GM to genomics is 
particularly ironic, since genomics is often considered an uncontroversial and safe 
alternative to GM (Tester & Langridge, 2010). Genomics entails the studies of the 
function of the complete set of genes in a cell. When genomics is applied in plant 
breeding, traditional breeding is used to create new food products through natural 
sexual reproduction, whereas the use of GM in plant breeding involves the artificial 
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recombination of genes. Compared with other methods, using traditional breeding to 
create new cultivars is far from controversial. The difference between genomics and 
traditional breeding lies in the fact that genomics is applied after reproduction to 
check whether particulate genes are present. From the perspective of reproduction 
and related risks, genomics is better understood when people apply their feelings 
and beliefs about traditional breeding rather than about GM. Because of the 
similarity of the name, people actually link genomics with GM when trying to give 
meaning to genomics. It is clear that, with all the controversies surrounding GM, the 
link between GM and genomics can potentially harm the development of genomics 
and the acceptance of any new genomics-assisted food products when they reach the 
consumer. 
However, a name stressing the naturalness of the breeding practice might 
have the opposite effect. Research shows that natural (food) products are regarded as 
healthier, safer to consume and less risky for the environment to produce (Van 
Haperen, Gremmen & Jacobs, 2012; Rozin et al, 2004), which is the opposite of 
perceptions of GM (De Liver, Van der Pligt & Wigboldus 2005; Frewer, Howard & 
Shepherd, 1995; Wunderlich & Gatto, 2015). An important factor is the belief that 
‘tampering’ by humans can introduce new risks and ‘untampered’ ‘natural’ contrast 
as being safe (see Rozin er al, 2004). Avoiding ‘genetic tampering’ and preventing 
(perceived) related risks is precisely one of the prominent reasons to apply 
Genomics. 
 
Lay evaluations and knowledge development 
For experts working on genomics, the rejection of genomics for reasons 
that apply to GM may appear surprising (Hall, 2010; see also Van Dam & De 
Vriend, 2002. However, it becomes understandable if account is taken both of the 
large number of technical innovations with which people are confronted and of the 
knowledge necessary to make evaluations using technical details. In an investigation 
on the public perception of genomics, respondents claimed that it took too much 
time to understand the complex material (Dijkstra & Gutteling, 2012). In such 
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situations, people have to fall back on cognitive shortcuts to make decisions and 
evaluations (Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). 
The combination of two important psychological mechanisms, priming and 
categorization, may provide such a shortcut. In the current article, we define 
priming as the activation of particular knowledge at the expense of alternative 
knowledge (Higgins, 1996). A name plays an important role in the activation of 
knowledge (Rosch, 1975). When experts communicate with one another using the 
name genomics, similar concepts are activated within their various minds. However, 
to activate that particular knowledge, the knowledge has to be present (Higgins, 
1996). Although this might appear to go without saying, it is easily overlooked when 
experts create names that end up being used to communicate to the public, who do 
not have the knowledge to be activated. In such cases, the question is what will 
happen in the absence of the targeted knowledge structures.  
A possible scenario is described in categorization theory, which describes a 
mechanism by which people give meaning to concepts with which they are 
unfamiliar. According to categorization theory, human knowledge is organized in 
categories of similar concepts (Rosch, 1978). New concepts with which people are 
unfamiliar can be interpreted by placing them in a category of familiar concepts that 
appear to be similar in some way to the unfamiliar concept (Loken, Barsalou & 
Joiner, 2008) – a process called categorization. Categories are depicted by a name, a 
conceptual label (Rosch, 1975; Rosch, et al., 1976). When people are confronted 
with an intangible concept of which only the name as a salient feature can be 
processed, a person can give meaning to that concept by searching for known 
(categories of) concepts that appear similar in name. As GM is generally familiar, 
the search for concepts that appear similar to genomics is prone to lead to thinking 
about GM, making the name genomics a prime for GM. 
An important question that remains unanswered is whether people, when 
they have no information at all about what they are considering, will categorize it 
just on the basis of its name. Although from a rational perspective it might make 
sense to hold off making the initial categorization when there is no information or 
specific knowledge to justify a categorization, there are several indications that 
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people might actually do the opposite. In situations where no information is 
available, people prefer a quick answer to the question of what a concept entails 
rather than an accurate answer (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993), especially in 
noisy daily-life situations where decisions are required (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996), such as while shopping for food in a supermarket.  
In the literature, two possible explanations for this behaviour can be found. 
First, categorization can provide the basis for decision making through attitude 
extension (Muthukrishnan & Weitz, 1991). When attitude extension occurs, attitudes 
about the known concept are transferred to the new concept, whereby the attitudes 
towards the familiar concept can be used to make decisions about the unfamiliar 
concept. Second, when people know nothing to very little, categorization provides a 
frame of interpretation, whereby categorization can act as a first step in acquiring 
more information. In the words of Rosch (1975, p. 252), “to categorize a stimulus is 
to consider it.” Thus, categorization itself can be considered a form of 
understanding. To summarize, issues relating to a lack of knowledge can be solved 
by categorization, and a lack of knowledge can, therefore, enhance the need to 
categorize. In addition, the initial evaluation and the initial understanding are linked 
through the category used for categorization. 
When categorization occurs, previously activated categories have a greater 
chance of being used than inactivated categories (Herr, 1986; Higgins, 1996; 
Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Therefore, if a category is primed by a name (such 
as GM by genomics), the primed category is prone to be used rather than 
appropriate alternatives. In addition, when information about a technology is 
provided, activated categories will influence the processing of information 
(Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Someone processing information will stop using 
activated categories if they do not apply, but categories will continue to be used as 
long as they are deemed applicable (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).  It is difficult to see 
that a category does not apply when only little is information is known (or 
understood), making it improbable that people will search for an alternative one. In 
addition, expectations play an important role in what information is noticed, valued, 
and remembered (Herr, 1986; Higgins, 1996).  
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These mechanisms make it difficult for laypeople to realize when they are 
using concepts that are unsuitable to make an evaluation, especially when they are 
dealing with complex and ambiguous technologies. Therefore, the process of 
understanding a complex technology is not the result of learning the isolated facts; 
rather, it results from how the facts relate to present and activated knowledge, 
whereby a name can determine the eventual “shape” of understanding by activating 
present knowledge. When knowledge develops with new information, it will do so 
in terms of the initially activated cognitive structures and related attitudes; this 
explains why initial ideas and attitudes are very difficult to change. 
 
Current research 
In the current research, we experimentally test the influence of the name of 
a technology on the interpretation of information about that technology, using 
genomics as a case. We test the expectation that the name genomics will lead to 
biased processing of information, resulting in evaluations of the unfamiliar 
genomics shifting towards the evaluation of GM because of the name. In contrast, 
we expect a name that emphasizes the relation with traditional breeding to cause 
evaluations to shift towards evaluations of traditional breeding. 
The main interest in the paper is the impact of the name on the informed 
evaluation of the technology. Therefore, we compare the evaluation of genomics, 
called either genomics or natural crossing, with evaluations of more familiar 
agricultural techniques: GM or traditional breeding. In addition, we aim at making 
the first experiment as little an intervention as possible. A challenge is that, when 
information is provided during an experiment, the research itself acts as an 
intervention. In many studies on perceptions about a technology, this is problematic 
since, after receiving information, the participants are no longer representative of the 
public, of whom the majority do not receive any information. Because we are 
interested in the reaction to information, this is not necessarily a problem. However, 
there are two possible pitfalls. The first is providing information that a person would 
normally not encounter. We aimed at approximating the information that can be 
easily found by non-experts and people without access to academic sources such as 
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journals. Using easily accessible information is particularly important because 
research in the field of genomics has proved that people’s motivation to search for 
information is minimal (Bos, Koolstra, & Willems, 2009). Surprisingly, we found 
that only very little publicly accessible information is available about genomics in 
general, or about genomics and plant breeding in particular. Representative of the 
lack of information is the website everything about DNA (www.allesoverdna.nl), 
created by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI). The website offers a 
dictionary of DNA-related terms, but, strikingly, there is no explanation included for 
the term genomics; neither is an explanation provided anywhere else, or on the 
websites of any of the still active genomics centres linked to the NGI. These 
findings, in combination with the finding that people search for only little 
information, show that experiment participants may be provided with too much 
information. However, we did find one website, www.plantgenomesecrets.org, to be 
a easily accessible source of information about genomics for agriculture. The 
information provided therein formed the basis of the information used in the 
experiment, both in context and amount.  
The second pitfall is that, because of the artificial situation created, 
respondents might be able to pay attention to details that, due to distractions in 
everyday-life situations, would usually escape them. To prevent this from 
happening, distractions (cognitive load) can be introduced during experiments to 
approximate a more everyday-life situation. 
Using experiments, we test the way the name genomics influences an 
informed evaluation. We do so by asking respondents to evaluate genomics after 
reading a short description of the technology. Using a between-respondents design, 
genomics is called either genomics or natural crossing. In addition, respondents are 
asked to read about and evaluate either GM or traditional breeding. By doing so, we 
can compare the evaluations of these with the evaluation of genomics, and see to 
what extent the evaluations are similar.  
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited and the study was administered by ThesisTools, 
a company specialized in web-based surveys. The company used a database with 
volunteers who were invited to participate in the study by email. The emails were 
distributed to reach a representative stratification with respect to the education, age, 
and sex of the adult population in the Netherlands. In the email, invitees were told 
that the aim of the study was to record their opinion about different agricultural 
techniques and that they had a chance of winning 25 euro for their participation. 
Further, the email presented a hyperlink leading to the experiment. By clicking on 
the link, the email recipient could join. 
The experiment had a 2 (context: genetic manipulation or traditional 
breeding) x 2 (name technology: genomics or natural crossing) design, and 
participants were randomly distributed. In total, 218 (103 men) people participated. 
The average age was 50.8 years and all educational levels were represented. In 
attempt to create larger differences in evaluations, the more controversial sounding 
name “genetic manipulation” was used during the experiment rather than friendlier 
sounding “genetic modification”. 
 
Procedure 
Introduction and manipulation. 
After clicking the hyperlink, the participant was randomly redirected to one 
of the conditions. First, the participant was asked to agree to a form of consent, 
which explained that the results would be processed anonymously and that he/she 
could stop at any moment he/she wished. To induce cognitive load, the participants 
were instructed to remember an eight digit number without taking any notes, which 
they had to reproduce after finishing the questionnaire. After the cognitive load was 
induced, a cover story explaining the aim of the research was presented. The story 
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stated that the goal of the questionnaire was to study how people felt about different 
ways of making new cultivars for food purposes. The cover story was followed by a 
manipulation that presented a short explanation of either GM or traditional breeding.  
Participants in the traditional breeding context condition read:  
“In agriculture, new plant varieties are developed. A way to develop a new 
variety is traditional breeding. When traditional breeding is applied, pollen of one 
plant is put on the flower of another. The new plant that will result is a crossing of 
the ‘parents’ and will share characteristics with both of them. For example, a plant 
bearing many tomatoes and a plant bearing round tomatoes can be crossed to 
produce a plant bearing many round tomatoes.”  
Participants in the GM context condition where presented the following 
text: 
“In agriculture, new plant varieties are developed. A way to develop a new 
variety is genetic manipulation. When genetic manipulation is applied, part of the 
DNA of one plant is put in the DNA of another. From the new DNA, a plant will 
develop containing characteristics of both plants. For example, the DNA of a plant 
bearing many tomatoes can be combined with the DNA of a plant bearing round 
tomatoes to produce a plant bearing many round tomatoes.” 
Then the name for the technology was manipulated. For participants in the 
genomics name condition, the explanation was followed by the text: 
 “There are more ways of developing new plant varieties. One of them is 
Genomics.” 
Participants in the natural crossing name condition read:  
“There are more ways of developing new plant varieties. One of them is 
Natural Crossing.” 
After the participant pressed the continue button, a short explanation about 
genomics was presented, making it possible to compare the explanations. We tried 
to give a balanced explanation of genomics in terms of characteristics promoting the 
categorization with either GM or traditional breeding. For participants in the natural 
crossing condition, the name genomics was replaced with natural crossing. The 
remainder of the explanation was identical. 
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“When Genomics (Natural Crossing) is applied, knowledge about the 
genetic material of the plant is used. After two plants which both have their own 
favourable traits have been crossed, the DNA of the new plant is checked for the 
presence of the genes responsible for the traits. Afterwards, plants that are 
considered suitable can be used to further develop the new cultivar.” 
Attitude measurements. 
After the manipulation, participants rated the unfamiliar context technology 
on fourteen aspects on a 7-point scale adopted from Van den Heuvel et al. (2008), 
which is a combination from several pre-existing scales that measure technology 
attitudes (Batra & Ahtola, 1991), product attitudes (Toncar & Munch, 2001) and 
consumer beliefs (Van den Heuvel, et al. 2007). Examples of aspects included the 
extent to which participants believed that the unfamiliar technology was useful (1 = 
very useless, 7 = very useful) and safe (1 = very dangerous, 7 = very safe). In order 
to test the effects on the acceptance of food produced with the technology, the scale 
was extended with three questions about participants’ putative actions in relation to 
a product produced with the technology and about the extent to which each 
participant would be willing to buy, eat and serve food produced with the unfamiliar 
technology (1 = totally not, 7 = having no problem with), resulting in a total of 17 
questions (α = .98) (see Appendix for the entire scale). After the unfamiliar 
technology, the context technology was evaluated (GM/ traditional breeding) using 
the same questions (α = .99).  
 A dilemma with the current research is that not necessarily all 
participants were unfamiliar with genomics. Previous research, however, showed 
that the wider public is still unfamiliar with genomics (Dijkstra & Gutteling, 2012; 
Sturgis, Brunton-Smith & Fife-Schaw, 2010).  The familiarity measurement of 
Chapter 3, which was taken in a similar context as the current study, also showed a 
low familiarity on genomics. Measuring respondents’ knowledge on forehand might 
give clues about genomics that would influence their first impressions, where post-
measurement knowledge might be influenced by experiences obtained during the 
experiment. Therefore, the decision was made not to measure respondents’ 
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individual familiarity but approach the unfamiliarity at a group level, resulting in all 
responses being included even though it might attenuate the sensitivity.  
 
Results 
We investigated the relationship between attitudes towards a familiar 
technology (GM or traditional breeding) and attitudes towards genomics (called 
genomics or natural crossing) using two statistical procedures. First, we used an 
ANOVA to examine the effects of the name used to describe genomics in 
combination with the familiar technology on the average evaluation. The results 
show the extent to which average attitudes are influenced by the name in 
combination with the context. Second, we performed linear regression between the 
attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes towards the familiar technology. The 
results show the extent to which participants use their attitude towards the familiar 
technology to shape their attitude towards the presented unfamiliar technology 
directly. 
 
Comparison effects. 
Following categorization theory and the principle of using activated 
knowledge to understand new information, we expected attitudes towards genomics 
to be similar to attitudes towards GM, and attitudes towards natural crossing to be 
similar to attitudes towards traditional breeding. To determine the similarity, we first 
examined the observed attitudes towards GM and towards traditional breeding, 
respectively. Because respondents could compare genomics with the familiar 
technology, it is possible that the evaluation of, respectively, GM or traditional 
breeding were influenced by the name, genomics. To investigate this, we carried out 
a 2 (context) x 2 (name technology) ANOVA on the attitudes towards the familiar 
technology. The ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of the evaluation 
of the context technology, F(1, 214) = 96.05, p < .001, indicating that the evaluation 
of the familiar technology was not influenced by the name used to describe 
genomics. GM was regarded more negatively, M = 3.60, SD = 1.45, than traditional 
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breeding, M = 5.29, SD = 1.04. These average evaluations of the familiar 
technologies enable us to study the direction of the comparison effects (for an 
overview of all the averages and standard deviations see Table 5.1). 
We expected attitudes towards genomics when called genomics to be 
similar to the attitudes towards GM, and attitudes towards genomics when called 
natural crossing to be similar to the attitudes towards traditional breeding. A 2 
(context) x 2 (name technology) ANOVA revealed only a main effect due to the 
name, F(1, 214) = 39.33, p < .001. The name genomics caused a more negative 
attitude, M = 4.04, SD = 1.42, than the name natural crossing, M = 5.21, SD = 1.23 
(for an overview of all the averages and standard deviations see Table 5.2).  
The results show that changing the name used in the explanation of 
genomics has a significant impact on attitudes towards the technology. When we 
compare the attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM, we can see 
that they are very similar, and the same is true for the attitudes towards natural 
crossing and the attitudes towards traditional breeding. Thereby, the results point to 
attitudes towards genomics being dependent on the association created by the name 
of the technology. To test the pattern directly, we carried out a linear regression to 
see if attitude extension occurred. 
 
Categorization and attitude extension. 
With respect to attitude extension, the hypothesis was that the attitude 
towards a familiar technology would be used to form an initial attitude towards the 
unfamiliar technology. A scatter plot (Figure 5.1) shows a clear relation between the 
attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM.  
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Figure 5.1: The relation between the evaluation of the familiar technology and the 
new technology under cognitive load (Study 1) 
 
A less clear pattern appears between natural crossing and traditional 
breeding. Although there is a linear relation, the pattern displays more variance. 
Linear regression revealed a significant correlation between the reported attitudes 
towards genomics and towards GM, B = .74, 95% CI [.58, .90], t(56) = 9.29, p < 
.001, with the attitudes towards GM predicting a large portion of the variance in the 
reported attitudes towards genomics, R2 = .61, F(1, 56) = 86.24, p < .001. When 
genomics is called genomics, there is a strong correlation between the attitudes 
towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM. No relation was found between the 
attitudes towards natural crossing and the attitudes towards traditional breeding, B = 
.35, 95% CI [-.05, .75], t(41) = 1.76, p = ns.  
The scatter plot does not show a relation between the evaluations of 
genomics and traditional breeding or of natural crossing and GM. Linear regression 
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did not reveal a relation between the attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes 
towards traditional breeding either, B = .221, 95% CI [-.17, .62], t(58) = .1.13, p = 
ns, nor between the attitudes towards natural crossing and the attitudes towards GM, 
B = .014, 95% CI [-.17, .20], t(55) = .12, p = ns. These results confirm that the 
relation between the attitudes towards the unfamiliar technology and towards the 
context technology only exists for the combinations where the similarity in name 
creates the impression that the context is considered appropriate for categorization.  
 
Discussion 
In the introduction, we argued that a familiar plant breeding technology 
would be used to interpret and evaluate an unfamiliar technology if the name of the 
unfamiliar technology activated knowledge about a familiar technology. The results 
unambiguously show this to be true for genomics. The results show that the name 
genomics causes average attitudes towards genomics to be similar to attitudes 
towards GM, and linear regressions show a direct relation between the two.  
The results also show that the average evaluation of natural crossing is 
similar to the average evaluation of traditional breeding. However, despite this and 
the scatterplot indicating a relation between the attitudes towards natural crossing 
and traditional breeding, linear regression failed to show a direct correlation between 
them. A possible explanation is that people generally have a favourable impression 
of traditional breeding and natural crossing, resulting in the majority of the scores to 
be located in a small part of the spectrum. This results in a ceiling effect, making 
regression analyses less sensitive, and, hence, the lack of a significant result may be 
caused by the distribution of the data (Cramer & Howitt, 2005, p.21). It is therefore 
difficult to determine whether or not a relation exists on the basis of the current 
results. 
In addition to attitudes towards genomics and towards GM being very 
similar on average, the regression analyses show that the attitudes towards genomics 
are the direct result of the attitudes towards GM. When we compare the relationship 
between the attitudes towards genomics and GM and the attitudes towards genomics 
when called natural crossing and GM, we find that a change in the name completely 
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undermines the perceived relationship. Even though all participants in the related 
experimental groups received the exact same description of both GM and genomics, 
a relation between the two was perceived only when genomics was called genomics. 
Using the name natural crossing instead of genomics caused the association between 
genomics and GM to disappear and resulted in more favourable evaluations. 
Possibly the induced cognitive load had more impact than expected. It is 
possible that people were too busy remembering the numbers with which they were 
presented and therefore were unable to pay attention to important yet subtle details 
even less than could be expected in daily-life situations. To investigate the impact of 
the cognitive load, we administered a second study without a memory task was 
administered. The results show the extent to which the name influences an 
evaluation even when it is possible to pay attention without distractions. 
 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design 
For the second study, the same materials and sampling method were used. 
The procedure was modified by removing the cognitive load induction. The study 
was administered concurrently with the first, preventing participant to join both 
studies. The change resulted in the manipulation being presented immediately after 
participants gave their informed consent; this was followed by the measurement of 
attitudes towards the unfamiliar technology (α = .98) and towards the familiar 
technology (α = .99). With the cognitive load induction removed, participants were 
no longer required to reproduce a pre-given number at the end of the questionnaire. 
In total, 228 (111 men) people participated. The average age was 54.2 years 
with a comparable distribution among educational levels as Study 1. 
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Results 
Comparison effects. 
Similar to the previous study, we first examined attitudes towards, 
respectively, GM and traditional breeding. In line with Study 1, a 2 (context) x 2 
(name technology) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of the context technology, 
F(1, 224) = 94.55, p < .001, showing that the name of genomics did not have an 
effect on the evaluations of the familiar technology. Comparable to the first study, 
GM was evaluated less favourably, M = 3.60, SD = 1.56, than traditional breeding, 
M = 5.26, SD = .97 (for an overview see Table 5.1). 
In line with the analytic procedure of Study 1, we carried out a 2 (context) x 
2 (name technology) ANOVA to determine the influence of the name used in the 
explanation of genomics in combination with the context technology on the 
evaluation of genomics. The ANOVA yielded only a main effect of the name, F(1, 
224) = 39.33, p < .001. When the name genomics was used, evaluation were less 
favourable, M = 4.20, SD = 1.46, than when natural crossing was used, M = 5.00, SD 
= 1.33 (for an overview see Table 5.2). 
 
Categorization and attitude extension. 
We expected the attitudes towards genomics to originate from the attitudes 
towards GM and the attitudes towards natural crossing to be guided by the attitudes 
towards traditional breeding. The scatter plot (Figure 5.2) shows a clear pattern 
between attitudes towards genomics and attitudes towards GM, and a less clear 
pattern between natural crossing and traditional breeding. Linear regression revealed 
a significant correlation between the attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes 
towards GM, B = .65, 95% CI [.46, .85], t(53) = 6.75, p < .001, with the attitudes 
towards GM predicting a large portion of the variance in the reported attitudes 
towards genomics, R2 = .46, F(1, 53) = 45.50, p < .001. The results confirm that 
attitudes towards GM were used to evaluate genomics. Similar to Study 1, no 
significant relation was found between the attitudes towards natural crossing and the 
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attitudes towards traditional breeding, B = .23, 95% CI [-.17, .63], t(62) = 1.16, p = 
ns.  
 
Figure 5.2: The relation between the evaluation of the familiar technology and the 
new technology without cognitive load (Study 2) 
 
Different to Study 1, a significant relation was found between the attitudes 
towards genomics and the attitudes towards traditional breeding, B = .40, 95% CI 
[.08, .71], t(55) = 2.54, p < .05, with attitudes towards traditional breeding predicting 
a small portion of the variance in attitudes towards natural crossing, R2 = .11, F(1, 
55) = 6.42, p < .05. The relation between natural crossing and GM also proved 
significant, B = .33, 95% CI [.11, .55], t(50) = 2.94, p < .01, with the attitudes 
towards GM predicting a small portion of the variance in attitudes towards natural 
crossing, R2 = .15, F(1, 50) = 8.63, p < .01. The results show that the attitudes 
towards the context technology influenced the evaluation of genomics even when 
the name did not encourage categorization. 
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Discussion 
In Study 2, we removed the distraction procedure included in the first study 
to investigate its impact. The averages of evaluations of genomics (independent of 
the name used) approximate those of GM. Linear regression revealed a direct 
correlation between GM and genomics similar to Study 1, showing that the attitudes 
towards GM determine those to genomics also when people are able to pay more 
attention. 
The observed pattern of evaluations of natural crossing is also similar to 
Study 1. The averages of natural crossing are closer to traditional breeding than GM. 
Yet, no direct correlation between natural crossing and traditional breeding is 
revealed by linear regression. The scatterplot indicates that the concentration of 
results might have caused a ceiling effect similar to Study 1. 
Notably different to Study 1, linear regressions revealed positive 
correlations in both cases were the names were countervailing. To be precise, a more 
(un)favourable evaluation of the context results in a more (un)favourable evaluation 
of the technology. The ability of respondents to pay more attention to the 
descriptions of both the context and the new technology and to increasingly notice 
similarities can explain these findings.  
To summarize, even in cases where people can pay attention and study the 
material presented, the bias remains. The name natural crossing causes more 
favourable evaluations than the name genomics. However, the ability to pay more 
attention does result in the information describing the context technology to 
influence evaluations in situations where a name does not encourage categorization.  
In the current paper, we argue that the name of a technology activates 
cognitive structures used for both the interpretation and the evaluation of the 
information. In Studies 1 and 2, the name was presented before any explanation 
about the technology. A possible explanation for the findings is that the name steers 
people to pay selective attention to information that fits their expectations. Although 
the particular finding of selective attention can be considered important in itself, the 
mechanism we propose goes beyond causing selective attention while a person is 
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exposed to the information and lasts during the processing of the information when a 
person is trying to understand the technology. Therefore, and even though we do not 
exclude selective attention being an element of the mechanism we propose, the 
effects should remain to a large extent even if a person is not influenced to pay 
selective attention to provided information. To be able to draw more robust 
conclusions, we repeated the study, but reversed the order of presentation of the 
name and the information. The aim is to investigate whether the influence does 
indeed persist without selective attention. 
 
 
Study 3 
Method 
Participants and design 
Study 3 followed the same procedure used in Study 2 with one 
modification: the manipulation was changed in such a way that the name genomics 
was presented after the explanation for genomics. To be exact, first the explanation 
of GM or TB was presented. The sentence introducing genomics, which followed 
the explanation, was replaced with: 
“There is yet another method of developing new plant varieties.” 
In line with Studies 1 and 2, the text expanded with an explanation about 
genomics after the participant pressed the continue button. However, the name for 
the practice was avoided until the end of the information. The exact text presented 
was: 
“When this method is applied, knowledge about the genetic material of the 
plant is used. After two plants that both have their own favourable traits have been 
crossed, the DNA of the new plant is checked for the presence of the genes 
responsible for the traits. Afterwards, plants that are considered suitable can be used 
to further develop the new cultivar. 
This method is called Genomics (Natural Crossing).” 
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After the manipulation, participants were asked to evaluate the unfamiliar 
technology (α = .98) followed by the familiar technology (α = .99). 
Study 3 was administered concurrently with the Study 1 and 2 to prevent 
duplicate respondents. In total, 226 (103 men) people participated. The average age 
was 52.0 years and the distribution among educational levels was comparable to 
Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Results 
Comparison effects. 
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, we first examined the attitudes towards, 
respectively, GM and TB. A 2 (context) x 2 (name technology) ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of the context technology, F(1, 222) = 94.21, p < .001. Comparable to 
Study 1and 2, GM was evaluated less favourably, M = 3.72, SD = 1.56, than TB, M 
= 5.44, SD = 1.09. In addition, we found an interaction effect that bordered 
significance, F(1, 222) = 3.86, p = .05. The interaction effect was caused by a less 
favourable evaluation of GM when it was presented with natural crossing, M = 3.40, 
SD = 1.56, than when it was presented with genomics, M = 4.06, SD = 1.52. The 
results point to GM being compared to the context technology, meaning that 
participants did not finish their evaluation before reading about the unfamiliar 
technology. The evaluation of TB was not influenced by the name genomics (for an 
overview see Table 5.1). 
We carried out a 2 (context) x 2 (name technology) ANOVA to determine 
the influence of the name used in the explanation for genomics in combination with 
the context technology on the evaluation of genomics. The ANOVA yielded a main 
effect of name, F(1, 222) = 17.97, p < .001. When genomics was called genomics, 
evaluations were less favourable, M = 4.21, SD = 1.37, than when the technology 
was called natural crossing, M = 4.98, SD = 1.40. Different to Studies 1 and 2, we 
additionally found a main effect of context, F(1, 222) = 5.00, p < .05, indicating that 
the average evaluation between genomics called genomics and genomics called 
natural crossing was more favourable when presented after the explanation of GM, 
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M = 4.82, SD = 1.37, than when it was presented after TB, M = 4.41, SD = 1.47. The 
results show that, when the description of genomics is presented after the description 
of GM, genomics is evaluated more favourably (for an overview see Table 5.2). 
However, similar to Studies 1 and 2, genomics is evaluated less favourably than 
natural crossing.  
 
Categorization and attitude extension. 
We expected the attitudes towards genomics to be guided by the attitudes 
towards GM and the attitudes towards natural crossing to be guided by the attitudes 
towards TB. The scatter plot (Figure 5.3) shows a clear pattern between the attitudes 
towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM, and a less clear pattern between 
natural crossing and TB. Linear regression revealed a strongly significant correlation 
between the attitudes towards genomics and the attitudes towards GM, B = .79, 95% 
CI [.70, .89], t(52) = 16.22, p < .001, with the attitudes towards GM predicting a 
large portion of the variance in the reported attitudes towards genomics, R2 = .84, 
F(1, 52) = 263.23, p < .001. The results confirm that the attitudes towards GM were 
used to evaluate genomics. Different to Study 1 and 2, a significant relation was 
found between the attitudes towards natural crossing and the attitudes towards TB, B 
= .49, 95% CI [.20, .79], t(58) = 3.35, p < .01, R2 = .16, F(1, 58) = 11.24, p < .01. 
The relation between natural crossing and GM proved significant, B = .22, 
95% CI [.00, .45], t(54) = 2.01, p < .05, with the attitudes towards GM predicting a 
small portion of the variance in the reported attitudes towards natural crossing, R2 = 
.07, F(1, 54) = 4.03, p < .05. The relation between the attitudes towards genomics 
and the attitudes towards TB did not reach significance, B = .27, 95% CI [-.10, .65], 
t(54) = 1.46, p = ns, with the attitudes towards TB not predicting any of the variance 
in the reported attitudes towards genomics.  
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Figure 5.3: The relation between the evaluation of the familiar technology and the 
new technology after prolonged presentation of the name 
 
Discussion 
In Study 3, by presenting the name after the information, we aimed at 
investigating the effects of the name beyond causing selective attention during 
reading. We again found that the name genomics led to a less favourable evaluation 
than the name natural crossing. The evaluations of both genomics and natural 
crossing are very similar to those found in Studies 1 and 2. We can therefore argue 
that the results of Studies 1 and 2 cannot be fully ascribed to selective attention. 
A limitation in the current design is that the name used for genomics was 
still presented in direct combination with the information. The possibility cannot be 
excluded that participants still read the name first. However, contrary to Study 1 and 
2, we have found that the name used to describe genomics has an influence on the 
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evaluation of GM and a main effect of context on the evaluation of genomics. We 
believe that the two findings are related and that the results follow a pattern that can 
be explained by the inclusion/exclusion model (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). According 
to the model, evaluations of different concepts presented successively can either 
influence each other or not, depending on whether a person has closed off the 
evaluation of the first concept before moving on to the next. In the previous 
procedures, a concrete, different plant breeding method was announced, whereas in 
the current procedure it was mentioned only that other plant breeding methods 
existed. In the current results, the influence of the name used for genomics on the 
evaluation of the context points to people finishing the evaluations of both the 
familiar and the unfamiliar technology simultaneously. The presence of this order 
effect, which we have not observed before, indicates that people did indeed judge 
the information in a different order than in Studies 1 and 2 because of the change in 
the time at which the name was presented.   
Although there are some differences because of the order effect, the 
resulting evaluations of genomics and natural crossing are very similar to those 
found in Studies 1 and 2, confirming the importance of the name used to describe a 
technology once again, and this time beyond the stage of reading information and 
during processing of the information. Therefore, the results show that the perception 
of a technology can be influenced by the activation of related cognitive structures 
through a mere name. 
 
 
General discussion 
The results of the experiments provide strong evidence that the name that is 
given to a technology can determine the evaluation of that technology, even in the 
presence of information about the technology. The results show that, after people 
have formed an impression about what a technology entails because of its name, this 
impression colours the interpretation of information, rather than information 
influencing the impression. We therefore conclude that the name plays a key role in 
the technology evaluation process. 
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In the current paper, we used the relatively new technology genomics as a 
case and followed up on reports that people confused genomics with GM. We 
argued that people use knowledge relating to GM because the term genomics is 
meaningless to them. We hypothesized that people try to give meaning to the term 
meaningless term genomics by categorizing the concept and that, if they believe that 
they have found an appropriate familiar concept for categorization, they transfer 
their attitudes towards the familiar category to the new concept. Comparing the 
studies shows that people evaluate genomics by applying their attitudes towards GM 
after categorizing them together.  
The current results are less clear about the relation between natural crossing 
and traditional breeding. The average evaluations resulting from the name natural 
crossing approximate those of traditional breeding and are also more favourable than 
those resulting from the name genomics. However, the results showed no direct 
relation between the evaluations of natural crossing and traditional breeding in 
Study 1 and 2, which was probably caused by a ceiling effect. Support for this 
notion is provided by the results of Study 3, in which a direct relation was revealed.  
A notable difference to Study 1 is the presence of an influence of the 
information on the attitudes towards genomics in Study 2. As mentioned, the 
possibility to notice the commonalities between the descriptions of the context and 
genomics due to a lack of distraction can explain the presence of the influence. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the evaluations are still very close to those of the 
context technology; despite the observed influence of traditional breeding, the 
overall average attitude of genomics is closer to those of genetic modification. The 
same pattern can be observed in the case of natural crossing, which is evaluated 
similar to traditional breeding despite being influenced by the evaluations of GM. 
As such, it appears that both the initial categorization and the description of the 
context are influencing the evaluation at the same time, but in opposite direction. 
Both the average values of the evaluations and the amount of explained variance 
found using linear regressions indicate that the initial categorization sets a standard 
which is slightly influenced by noted commonalities. Study 3 showed that a name 
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can also impact the evaluation of context technologies. The evaluation of genomics 
is, however, still primarily determined by the name used to describe the technology. 
The results provide an answer to the question of what happens when people 
are confronted with a name that is meant to activate knowledge that is not present. 
Rather than passively doing nothing, or searching for the information, people try to 
give meaning to the concept by using knowledge that is already present. In other 
words, when a name targets non-existent structures, alternative structures become 
activated. Thanks to the alternative structures, the information provided can still be 
processed, but this can result in a different shape of understanding and attitudes than 
experts might have expected. 
 
Conclusion 
The results support the idea that people can form attitudes by using general 
scientific knowledge, risk perception, or existing attitudes. At the same time, they 
show that using these alternatives to detailed study can be not much more than a 
transfer of attitudes from known or familiar technologies to a new technology. The 
current chapter adds to previous findings that this process even occurs when 
information is provided that highlights unique features of this new technology. 
Although the transference of attitudes can be the result of a lack of cognitive effort, 
it is not necessarily the case. As mentioned in the introduction, the expectations and 
activated cognitive structures influence the processing of information, including 
what is noticed and remembered. Therefore, the process of copying can result from 
not being able to see the differences because of a lack of knowledge. By 
acknowledging the role of a name in interpreting new information, scientists can 
prevent people from drawing conclusions or forming attitudes that do not 
necessarily apply. 
The current results show the necessity for experts to take into account the 
effects a name can have on the public. Because the public have a fundamentally 
different frame of reference than experts, a name can trigger unexpected reactions. 
We argue that science communication can benefit when experts develop their 
language not based on their own perspective, but on actively explored associations 
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that people have, so that when the name goes public (for example when the 
technologies are introduced into society or consortia are being formed), names that 
create more appropriate associations can be used. If this approach is taken, people 
can get the right idea from their own frame of reference, without the need of 
extensive knowledge. 
The effects of a name are not only overlooked by experts. Since the 
publication of the report The public understanding of science (Bodmer, 1985), there 
has been an ever-growing interest in scientific circles about the way people evaluate 
technologies (Gregory & Lock, 2008; Gupta, Fischer & Frewer, 2012). 
Unfortunately, in the field of science communication, there has also been hardly any 
direct attention has been paid to the role that a name can have. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first research to systematically investigate the influence of the 
name of a technology on the evaluation of information. Although the role of a name 
is sometimes mentioned as possibly having an influence, it is often merely a remark 
that the name caused some issues due to confusion or misunderstanding (for 
example, Ingold & Kurttila, 2000; Macoubrie, 2008). Moreover, many of the 
experiences about the public “not getting the name” are not even making it into the 
literature because studies are about the larger themes, such as the democratic 
position of the public in the development of new technologies. 
An unrecognized problem is that a name is not just a source of 
misunderstanding; it is a conceptual label playing an important role in the shaping of 
evaluations and knowledge relating to the technology and the larger issues 
surrounding them. Naming is framing. Often, the name appears to be the elephant in 
the room. Understanding that the elephant is there can prevent many problems. 
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 Study 11  Study 21  Study 31,2 
 Natural 
Crossing 
Genomics  Natural 
Crossing 
Genomics  Natural 
Crossing 
Genomics 
TB 5.43 
(1.15) 
5.18 (.96)  5.20 
(.89) 
5.32 
(1.10) 
 5.45 
(1.18) 
5.43 
(1.01) 
GM 3.50 
(1.42) 
3.71 
(1.48) 
 3.65 
(1.49) 
3.55 
(1.64) 
 3.39 
(1.56) 
4.06 
(1.51) 
Table 5.1: Average evaluations of the context technology (resp. Traditional 
Breeding, TB, or Genetic Manipulation, GM) depending on the name used for 
genomics, standard deviation between parentheses; 1 main effect of technology, p < 
.001; 2 interaction effect, p = .05 
 
 Study 11  Study 21  Study 31,2 
 TB GM  TB GM  TB GM 
Natural 
Crossing 
 
5.0 
(1.50) 
5.35 
(.97) 
 4.76 
(1.34) 
5.31 
(1.27) 
 4.76 
(1.44) 
5.23 
(1.32) 
Genomics 4.03 
(1.45) 
4.04 
(1.39) 
 4.25 
(1.35) 
4.14 
(1.58) 
 4.04 
(1.41) 
4.39 
(1.31) 
Table 5.2: Average evaluations of Genomics depending on the name and context 
technology used in explanation (resp. Traditional Breeding, TB, or Genetic 
Manipulation, GM), standard deviation between parentheses; 1 main effect of the 
name used for genomics, p < .001; 2 main effect of context, p < .05 
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Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the influence of the name of a 
technology on perceptions and attitudes about it. The research was pursued from a 
cognitive psychological perspective; it was designed to ascertain what happens in 
people’s minds when they lack the relevant theoretical knowledge to interpret a 
scientific concept by its name in a way deemed to be correct by experts who are 
using it. The influence of a name on the psychological process of making sense of a 
complex scientific construct was explored in a literature study and a series of 
experiments using genomics (in relation to plant breeding) as a case.  
The series of studies was largely motivated by assertions from genomics 
experts that, in their view, people were not able to understand what genomics was 
(see for example Van Dam & De Vriend, 2002; Hall, 2010), even in direct 
conversations where experts were explaining the subject. It was reported that people 
started using aspects that apply exclusively to genetic modification (GM) to evaluate 
the unfamiliar genomics when confronted with its name, often leading to an 
unfavourable evaluation based on aspects that are actually unrelated to the 
technology. In addition, in discussions about genomics, people started to talk about 
GM instead. It was, therefore, postulated that, in the minds of the public, genomics 
was genetic manipulation. Abstract scientific names that cause confusion in 
communicating complex scientific concepts are not limited to genomics; similar 
confusions have been reported in relation to other technical and scientific names (see 
Chapter 1). 
The way people replace genomics with GM illustrates how novel 
innovations can be at risk of being rejected by controversies that arise because 
people extrapolate from a familiar technology to the new one, even when the 
controversial aspects are not present in the novel innovation. It also shows the 
pivotal impact a name can have on the formation of (not necessarily correct) 
understandings and attitudes. A name can therefore be an important factor 
determining the degree of successful adoption of related innovations and policies 
through the understandings and attitudes that it shapes. Because of the omnipresence 
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of names in communication, science communication can benefit significantly from 
understanding the influence of a name. 
The goal of this dissertation was to address the gap in research on the role 
of a name in the formation of understanding of a novel technology. Particularly, the 
aim was to shed light on the public’s formation of evaluations and understanding of 
scientific constructs that are difficult to comprehend. The approach is rooted in 
cognitive psychology, where especially categorization theory provides a promising 
approach to comprehend the formation of knowledge and understanding and, 
subsequently, evaluations. To investigate how people form an understanding of 
scientific constructs (genomics particularly) and how the understanding can be 
influenced by a name, a literature study and three interrelated empirical studies were 
carried out. The aim of the empirical studies was to systematically test the influence 
of factors claimed to be responsible for shaping understanding and attitudes in 
interaction with the name one step at the time. The results of these studies shed light 
on the role of the name in the evaluation and understanding of a technology by 
members of the public. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the main findings of the studies. Then, I 
discuss the theoretical implications of the findings, followed by the practical 
implications.  
 
Summary of the results 
In Chapter 2, the aim of the literature study was to discover how initial 
understanding and attitudes are formed in a situation where a person does not have 
any knowledge about the topic at hand. In addition, we were interested in the role 
played by the name of a technology in this process. Central to the foundation of the 
public understanding of science approach in science communication is experts’ 
assumption that unfavourable attitudes can be countered by providing knowledge, an 
assumption that remains popular today (Ahteensuu, 2012; Bauer, 2016). Educating 
the public, however, has proved ineffective in creating more favourable public 
attitudes (Bauer, Allum, & Miller, 2007). Another view that remains popular among 
experts is that people remain ignorant (or unknowledgeable) because they are too 
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passive or too lazy to take an interest in science (Ahteensuu, 2012; Bucchi, 2008). 
However, with all the innovations in modern-day life, there is just too much to know 
in both quantity and complexity; the time necessary to investigate everything in a 
scientifically sound manner outweighs many times the time available (as postulated 
by Simon, 1979; for the effects of information being too much and too complicated 
in relation to public education on genomics see Dijkstra & Gutteling, 2012; 
Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). Therefore, in order to function in daily life, people 
are often forced to evaluate without knowledge or information being present. One 
efficient way to do so is by relying on categorization. By placing an unfamiliar 
concept in a category of familiar concepts, present knowledge about the familiar 
concepts can be used to evaluate the unfamiliar concept. 
Categorization is also important in situations where information is 
provided, as it is an important part in learning. New information is interpreted by 
using present and activated knowledge structures. Therefore, when a name activates 
a category structure, the activated category structure can determine the shape of the 
understanding reached. This mechanism can lead to unexpected results when experts 
communicate with names that represent complex cognitive structures to laypersons, 
who use elementary models for understanding. Experts’ and laypeople’s cognitive 
structures are incompatible in the sense that laypeople’s basic structures do not 
facilitate the comprehension of messages from experts who are using an extended 
network of categories, because laypeople are forced to use single examples and 
isolated categories to interpret complex information. 
In Chapter 3, the aim was to investigate the effects of the name of a 
technology on uninformed evaluations and decisions. The proposed categorization 
mechanisms were systematically tested in an experiment using genomics as a case. 
The results showed that participants used categorization to reach evaluations and 
that the name of the technology was used as the basis for the categorization. In 
addition, the results showed that the unfamiliar concepts were evaluated by applying 
the pre-existing attitudes linked to the category used for categorization in a sort of 
copy-and-paste fashion. The result showed that genomics was evaluated similarly to 
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GM, whereas a fictional breeding method called natural crossing was evaluated 
similarly to traditional breeding. 
An additional aim was to investigate the extent to which personal 
differences might lead to people quickly reaching decisions and evaluations based 
on categorization. According to theory on the need for closure, the need for closure 
is a personal trait; some people experience a stable high need for closure and want to 
draw conclusions quickly, whereas others experience an avoidance of closure and 
postpone their evaluation until they have the opportunity to study matters further so 
as to prevent inappropriate conclusions. The results showed, however, that, against 
expectations, attitudes towards the unfamiliar concepts were nearly identical to the 
attitudes towards the associated familiar concept uniformly and independent of a 
personal need for closure. According to the literature, people who would normally 
avoid closure draw quick conclusions nonetheless when their preference for more 
information cannot be satisfied due to a (situational) lack of it (Kruglanski, Webster, 
& Klem, 1993). With respondents showing different preferences in collecting 
information before making a decision, the results provide proof that people can turn 
to category-related attitudes when they are forced to evaluate without information 
even when they prefer to reach informed evaluations. 
In Chapter 4, the aim was to examine the influence of risk perception 
relating to food on evaluation and categorization. Previous research indicates that 
GM is perceived as risky and unfavourable, especially when applied to food. The 
results showed that, in a culture where GM was perceived as controversial, changing 
the purpose from food to biofuel resulted in more favourable evaluations of GM, 
which, in turn, resulted in more favourable evaluations of genomics. However, the 
effect was absent in the Netherlands, where the average evaluation of GM is neither 
favourable nor unfavourable, and therefore less controversial. Another effect of 
perceived risk found in the literature is that risk leads to more perceived similarity. 
Yet, the results do not indicate a stronger categorization by people with higher risk 
perceptions. The explanation can be found in the fact that the correlation between 
the attitudes was very high in the first place. The finding fits the idea that the 
categorization is realized using the name alone, rather than specific technical details 
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(which had to be present in the mind of the evaluator) that become more important 
under threat.  
In Chapter 5, the purpose was to investigate the influence of activated 
knowledge on the evaluation of provided information. From the finding in Chapter 2 
that categorization provides the basis of learning, it was assumed that, through 
categorization, the name can have an important impact on learning by determining 
what information is being noticed, and how it is interpreted and evaluated. The 
results showed that, when information about genomics was provided, the name used 
for the technology was still the primary predictor of the evaluations; the presented 
information did not influence the results to a practical, meaningful extent. Therefore, 
the results show that the information provided is interpreted using already present 
knowledge, rather than altering the knowledge and that, therefore, a name can have a 
long-lasting impact even when learning can potentially take place. 
The results of the different chapters are combined and represented in Figure 
6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 Schema of the research, which is interpreted as follows. (1) The name of 
a technology determines its initial categorization (Chapter 3). (2) Contrary to 
popular belief among experts, understanding is not based on technical information 
(Chapter 5). Rather, categorization and information interact the other way around: 
categorization of the concept provides a frame of interpretation for the information 
provided (Chapters 2 and 5). (3) Evaluation is reached by attitude extension 
(Chapters 3, 4, and 5). (4) Attitudes, however, are malleable and depend on risk 
perceptions about the purpose of the technology rather than the technology itself 
(Chapter 4).  
 
Name Evaluation
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Theoretical implications 
The central topic of the current dissertation is how laypeople are influenced 
by the name of a scientific concept that they are trying to understand and evaluate. 
Therefore, the primary theoretical implications relate to the role played by a name in 
science communication. The research shows that the name of an unfamiliar 
innovation can activate present cognitive structures. These structures provide a 
frame of reference for reaching evaluations and interpreting information. This 
framing effect is discussed first. It is easy to state that acting on a name without any 
further information is irrational. However, Simon’s (1955, 1979) theory of bounded 
rationality provides an alternative view: the strategy of acting on a name can be 
considered a rational strategy when other sources of information are absent or too 
complex. In such situations, the name acts as a heuristic. This view is discussed 
second. Theoretical implications in relation to other fields of research that 
contributed most predominantly to this dissertation – consumer behaviour and social 
prejudice – are discussed last. 
 
Evaluations: Naming is framing 
The results of this dissertation show that the name of a technology can 
determine evaluations of the technology to a large extent. To our knowledge, the 
results provide the first empirical evidence that the name of a technology can play an 
important role in the formation of understandings and attitudes towards that 
technology. In addition, the current research is to our knowledge the first to attempt 
to establish a working theory on how the name influences these understanding and 
attitudes. To date, the attention paid to a name was mostly limited to showing that 
the name caused misunderstanding or was a more philosophical retrospective 
reflection on the contribution that a name might have made to the formation of 
public attitudes. An example of the latter is the elaboration on the name genetic 
engineering, which came under suspicion of adding to the controversy (see for 
example Hansen, 2010). This research adds to these reflections in that it provides 
proof that certain names can trigger an evaluation process. Moreover, the findings 
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also show that a name can trigger an almost universal strategy of reaching a 
conclusion; almost all participants tried to form a sort of understanding about 
genomics by categorizing it with GM. Although the process will not always be the 
same as in the case of genomics, the results do show that a name can be tested to see 
whether there are any patterns that can potentially cause issues in misguided 
evaluations or confusion. 
The current results fit previous findings that people with low expertise do 
not base evaluations on technical knowledge but use alternatives instead. In the case 
of genomics, laypeople have stated that there is just too much to know and that it 
would take too much time and effort to reach the required level of knowledge 
(Dijkstra & Gutteling, 2012; see also Bos, Koolstra, & Willems, 2009). According 
to Scheufele and Lewenstein, (2005), an alternative to using directly related 
knowledge is to use, among other things, knowledge and risks related to other 
technologies. In addition, Van Giesen and colleagues argue that people can search 
for aspects pointing to familiar concepts, so-called reference points, to use related 
cognitions to evaluate an unfamiliar technology (Van Giesen, Fischer, Van Dijk, & 
Van Trijp, 2015; Van Giesen, Fischer, & Van Trijp, 2016). The current work 
contributes to these findings in two ways. First, it shows how the process of using 
other technologies can take shape; existing attitudes shift from a familiar technology 
to the new unfamiliar one when people can categorize the latter with the first. 
Second, the findings show that a name can act as a strong reference point and can 
play a crucial role in determining which more familiar technologies will be used for 
categorization.  
The categorization not only determines initial cognitions and evaluations, 
but also impacts the subsequent development of cognitions. The results in Chapter 5 
show that the name had more impact on the following evaluations than the technical 
description provided. Genomics can be regarded as a form of breeding in between a 
traditional method and GM (Van den Heuvel, Renes, Gremmen, Van Woerkum, & 
Van Trijp, 2008, see also Chapter 1). A technical description of genomics therefore 
contains elements of both, and, through priming, a name can determine the elements 
noticed. This finding illustrates that the way knowledge develops can be determined 
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by the name used to describe a scientific concept and also which fact people will 
remember and possibly use in voicing their opinion. 
A number of authors show that people can evaluate a technology on ethical 
rather than technical grounds (Sparks, Shepherd, & Frewer, 1994; Frewer & 
Shepherd, 1995; Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 1997; Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 
2004). The current findings show, however, that these more ethical concerns can be 
related to other technologies rather than to the technology at hand. Thus, the results 
demonstrate that guessing about what a technology is can be combined with 
elaborate thinking (see also Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). This can result in 
a well elaborated and articulate evaluation on ethical grounds after finding an 
answer (not necessarily correct) to the question: What is this technology? In these 
cases, the evaluations can be unrelated to the central topic and actually be related to 
other topics. 
An answer to the question of what a technology entails, any answer, can 
help people move on to thinking or making decisions without elaborate research. 
This process shows similarities with heuristic decision making in Simon’s (1955, 
1979) theory of bounded rationality, a view that is now explored in more detail. 
 
The name as a heuristic 
The results show that people solve their lack of information about genomics 
by categorizing it with GM when they have to make decisions. From this 
perspective, it can be argued that the name of the technology is used as a heuristic to 
make decisions and reach evaluations. This research is inspired, as already stated, by 
experts’ observation that people confuse genomics with GM. The term confusion 
has an unfavourable connotation when used by experts, and acting on it borders on 
irrationality. Confusion at the very least appears to triggers the deficit type of 
thinking that education should be used to correct people suffering from it. The 
perspective of a name as a heuristic, however, provides a focus on people’s intent 
when names are used to give meaning and on their rationale for doing so. To 
elaborate, it is necessary to further explore the nature of heuristics. 
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Nowadays, the term heuristic has become somewhat of a container concept 
that is often used when people are affected by cues when making decisions (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008).9 The view that a name acts as a heuristic is most appropriate if 
heuristics is approached in the same way as Simon does, who introduced the term in 
research on human judgement and decision making. Until then, it was argued that a 
judgement was rational only when all related information was used, or at least a 
voluminous amount (Simon, 1955), and carefully deliberated; judgments reached by 
other means were irrational. Simon argued that, in everyday-life situations, people 
are often unable to collect and process all the information because they are bounded 
                                                          
9 The use of the term heuristic has evolved strongly since its introduction into human 
decision making. Simon marks the beginning of heuristics use in human decision 
making, after it had begun to play a role in mathematics and artificial intelligence. 
As stated, Simon (1979) argued that heuristics is used to limit information search 
and is part of rational yet efficient decision making. Simon (1979) defined irrational 
decision making as based on affect or emotion. Since its introduction by Simon, 
heuristics theory has been further developed by others. Notable subsequent research 
on heuristics includes Kahneman and Tversky’s work (see Kahneman, 2011, for an 
overview of their work) and dual process theories of persuasion, such as the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM). 
However, such research often takes a fundamentally different approach to heuristics 
(Albar & Jetter, 2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). In Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work, heuristics can be defined best as limits in human information processing 
rather than limiting information search and often focuses on errors in judgement 
(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). They illustrate heuristics often by presenting all 
relevant information in their experiments; the extensiveness of information search is 
not the issue. For example, they show how people do not apply probabilities 
presented to them when making judgements (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) and act 
differently when possible consequences are framed as loss versus gain (Khaneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In this approach, visual illusions 
caused by drawings (which contain all information about the drawing itself) are 
heuristics also (Kahneman, 2011, p. 100). Dual process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999) stipulate that people can process presented information in two different ways, 
either consciously thinking about a message or processing it with less cognitive 
attention, relying on cues and heuristics instead. Feelings and emotions play an 
important role in heuristic processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). See also affect 
heuristics for a mixture of heuristics and affect (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2007). Although Simon distances heuristics from emotions (see Simon, 
1997, p. 319), they are closely related in other approaches. The focus of the current 
research is the more cognitive process of sense making and making decisions 
without extensive information. Consequently, and to avoid confusion about the 
current nature of heuristics, Simon’s approach to heuristics is followed. 
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by, among other things, time constraints (Simon, 1979). The consequence of this, 
however, is not that people are irrational. Instead, humans are considered to have a 
rationality that is bounded (Simon, 1990). To cope with our inability to collect and 
process all (theoretically available) information, we use heuristics: effective decision 
rules using a subset of related information to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.10 So, 
within a Simonian approach, heuristics are tools to be rational (even though we fail 
to meet the impossible standard of traditional rationality) (see Simon, 1990).  
The present research shows that people reached judgments about genomics 
by categorizing it with GM. Thus, the categorization process is used as a heuristic to 
reach an evaluation. This also means that the process is rational in nature according 
to the bounded rationality perspective. However, evaluating a completely unfamiliar 
concept (through categorization) raises the question of whether the qualification of 
the process as rational can still be maintained. There are two ways of approaching 
such a question. First, it can be argued that, in such cases, judgements are the result 
of a very bounded rationality. With the theory of bounded rationality not describing 
any particular requirements on the concept of heuristics, the answer would therefore 
simply be yes. Another perspective, which possibly offers more potential for 
bridging the gap between the public and experts, argues that people employing such 
a strategy are trying to achieve a rational judgement in a situation where there is no 
information other than the name. People are therefore not so much rational in the 
sense of reaching a certain standard of correct beliefs but rather in their intent and 
behaviour (see also Simon, 1955, 1956). 
Approaching the name as a heuristic and therefore a rational strategy can 
help prevent viewing the public as lazy. It also creates the opportunity to look at 
how the results of using heuristics can result in more appropriate judgements and 
beliefs by providing alternative input; in this case the name. Thus, treating the name 
as a possible heuristic fortifies the idea that understandings can benefit from a 
                                                          
10 In Simon’s approach, people limit their information search until a satisfactory 
decision can be made. In a related view, this is presented in the cognitive miser 
model, in which it is assumed that people will only spend the minimal amount of 
effort required to reach an evaluation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; see also Orbell & 
Dawes, 1991; applied to science communication, Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005) 
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different name, while stressing the rationality of using the name to reach 
evaluations. 
 
Potential advances in science communication from other fields 
The process of categorization is an important aspect of reaching evaluative 
decisions and of the name acting as a heuristic. The effect of categorization on 
perceptions is also an important theme in other disciplines; and categorization is an 
important theme in both marketing and consumer behaviour and research on social 
prejudice. Paying more attention to findings in these disciplines can help to further 
enhance understandings of public perceptions about technologies of important 
interest to science communication. I now discuss the contribution that these fields 
can make to science communication in more detail, and, when applicable, the 
contribution of the current research in return to marketing and consumer behaviour 
and categorization theory. 
In an important way, marketing and consumer behaviour research may be 
considered an antonym to public understanding with respect to understanding. The 
public understanding of science approach, as a subtheme of science communication, 
has developed from the perspective that the public’s ignorance is blocking support 
(including consumption) for science and technologies (see Bodmer, 1985). To 
counter the lack of support, public understanding should be enhanced to correct 
unfavourable evaluations. In marketing and consumer behaviour, the aim is to 
enhance public understanding to improve marketing activity (for example, Wright, 
2006, p. 49, argues that “detailed information and a deep understanding of the needs 
and wants of the customer … coupled with the ability to offer correct benefits, is the 
basis for consumer satisfaction”). From this perspective, it can be argued that the 
public understanding of science approach tries to correct ignorance to enhance 
consumption or other forms of support, whereas the marketing and consumer 
behaviour approach tries to enhance consumption by understanding the customer 
including his/her ignorance.  
The deficit model finds it roots in the hypothesis by experts that there is an 
important relationship between knowledge and evaluations, sometimes called the 
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rationalist approach (Bauer, 2009; Wynne, 1993). In the rationalist approach, 
rational attitudes are based on scientific facts and information (Bauer, 2009). 
Therefore, the rationalist approach leads to certain blind spots in research. Factors 
shaping perceptions and behaviours that are deemed irrational are ignored, such as 
perceptions derived from a name. However, in marketing and consumer behaviour, 
naming is an important topic. In marketing, it is recognized that a name can play an 
important role in the meaning given to a product and the attitude formation towards 
the product by transference of attitudes from a category to which the product 
belongs (see for example Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994, Loken, Barsalou, & Joiner, 
2008; Rangaswamy, Burke, & Oliva, 1993).  
The results of the current research show that insights from marketing and 
consumer behaviour in relation to categorization and attitude formation can also be 
relevant for attitude formation relating to topics pursued in science communication. 
Therefore, a deeper interest on the part of science communication in marketing and 
consumer behaviour research could augment the insights into public understanding 
and attitude formation, especially in areas where rationality (in its traditional view 
and related to being educated and collecting all the facts) does not play a role in 
understanding and evaluations. 
This research adds to marketing and consumer behaviour in showing that 
the use of categories in forming an understanding and evaluation also applies to 
intangible concepts. In marketing and consumer behaviour, the effects of 
categorization are related to either physical objects (for example, how is a new type 
of product, such as a rapid electric bike, categorized, as a fast bike or a thin electrical 
moped?) (for a review see Loken et al., 2008) or brands and brand extensions (to 
what extent is a particular product seen as a typical member of the brand family, and 
to what extent do favourable brand attitudes extend to a particular product? See 
Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994). Although brands are intangible in themselves, they are 
typically represented by a logo and their product family. The current research shows 
that the mechanisms of categorization and attitude extension can even prevail with 
completely abstract concepts. 
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Studies on social prejudice form another field of research related to 
categorization theory. In fact, the best way to describe the process by which the 
evaluations towards genomics were reached is by the term prejudice. Prejudice, the 
name coming from ‘pre-judgment’, is now virtually exclusively used for social 
prejudice. Yet, when we look at the mechanism behind social prejudice and the 
mechanism found in this dissertation, the process of reaching evaluations is the 
same. Social prejudice deals with social categorization (the perceived group 
membership) of an individual in a social category (for example, race), resulting in a 
prejudice using the attitudes and beliefs relating to the social category (see Allport, 
1954). In this research, a similar process was found, with unfamiliar technologies 
being categorized in a conceptual category, to be evaluated on beliefs and attitudes 
towards that category. Because of the similarities, social prejudice theory may 
enhance the understanding of how people reach an evaluation of technologies.  
 
Practical implications 
The results show that the name of a technology can have an important 
influence on its evaluation. The effects of a name can occur at different levels of 
intensity of public science communication, ranging from the public being merely 
exposed to a name, through interpreting responses about a technology, to interactive 
discussions with the public. The pivotal influence on public opinions resulting from 
exposure to a name is discussed first, followed by the importance of realizing that a 
name can determine reactions in debates with the public. How categorization theory 
can be used to change perceptions about the technical nature in direct debates is 
discussed thereafter.  
Oftentimes, the current work has been misinterpreted as a marketing ploy to 
propel acceptance of genomics by avoiding controversies surrounding GM rather 
than studies to enhance insight into the formation of emerging perceptions and 
attitudes. These concerns are addressed in concluding remarks about the practical 
limitations, not only to emphasize the goal of understanding the formation of 
perceptions and attitudes, but to also show potential side-effects that can be regarded 
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as unfavourable when the aim is merely to get genomics accepted without question 
or debate.  
 
Attention to the name 
First and foremost, the results show that it is important to pay attention to 
the name. According to Dancygier and Sweetser (2014), a name is given to a 
conceptual structure when it is used recurrently by the users of the name. This 
means not only that scientists are at the forefront of shaping names as they are the 
ones who need to refer to the conceptual structures first, but also that the names that 
they create refer to their conceptual structures. As this dissertation shows, when 
people lack the appropriate conceptual structures, other structures are activated by 
the name, making it miss its purpose. Selecting a ‘public’ name instead of using a 
name used and understood only by experts can prevent this from happening.  
To make the process of selecting a name as successful as possible, it is 
beneficial to realize that a name is not an arbitrary label; rather, it should be treated 
as a tool to activate knowledge structures between people that are communicating. 
In addition, an expert’s view of a subject is fundamentally different from the view of 
someone lacking expertise, with the emphasis on different. Experts tend to assume 
that their knowledge is more developed and that they can approximate the position 
of laypeople by using less of their knowledge (Mogendorff, Te Molder, Gremmen, 
& Van Woerkum, 2012). However, knowledge development is not only about more 
knowledge, it is also about reorganizing knowledge. Therefore, it has a different 
shape and is not necessarily easily transformed back into a lay perspective. It is 
actually very difficult to understand how someone with less knowledge understands. 
Lastly, it is important to realize that the difference in knowledge cannot be taken 
away with minor public education. Even if it could, reaching everyone would be 
impossible, and most people will therefore be forced to interpret information and 
make decisions using their far less developed cognitive structures.  
Because experts and the public may be too far apart, it is recommended to 
pursue the development of a name with the aid of social scientists. Most 
importantly, it should be done in interaction with the public, so that their world view 
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can be taken into account. In effect, selecting a name can best be approached as an 
act of co-creation between experts and the public. It is recommended that first a 
group of participants should work on exploring and finding associations that can 
work and to subsequently test these with a new group of participants.  
This advice is especially important when it is realized that there will be 
very limited if any contact with the public. Feedback from the public will therefore 
be minimal, just as opportunities to explain. However, realizing the way people base 
their perception on a name is also helpful when public responses do reach 
stakeholders and stakeholders are trying to interpret these responses. 
 
Interpreting public responses 
In the debate relating to genomics, it is important to realize that many 
opinions might result from the idea that genomics is GM. Consequently, objections 
to it and support for it might actually not be related to genomics itself. Given the 
controversial nature of GM, this means that genomics might be rejected by many 
even though they might actually support the technology on (unknown) technical 
grounds, or vice versa. The same is true for other innovations where perceptions 
about associated technologies might influence judgements. Realizing that 
associations with other controversial technologies might be the cause of 
controversies about the new innovation can make a difference in many (types of) 
decisions, such as politicians deciding to invest in research, farmers deciding to 
reject or adopt cultivars for production, and environmental organizations deciding to 
discourage or promote support.  
In interpreting public responses, it is necessary to keep in mind how people 
make sense of unfamiliar concepts. In particular, when responses appear to make no 
sense, experts might find themselves tempted to just dismiss them as 
misunderstandings or ignorance. In such cases, trying to understand how the 
responses came about might be a more fruitful strategy for both understanding the 
responses and preventing similar confusion in the future. From the findings, it is 
recommended, first of all, to explicitly remind oneself that people will often have 
very limited theoretical knowledge and follow a path other than seeking education to 
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form perceptions. Then, investigating whether the public responses can be explained 
as based on concepts that appear similar in any way (for example, form, shape, or 
name) to the one being communicated about can prove insightful for discovering 
how people shape their opinions. Investigating the extent to which the confusion 
might have been inadvertently encouraged by one’s own way of communicating 
might be a beneficial step towards preventing further confusion by changing, for 
example, the name or even correcting perceptions when public interaction does take 
place. 
How to possibly correct misperceptions is briefly discussed next, but it 
must be stressed that it is imperative for the current advice to be implemented for the 
right reasons and executed with great sensitivity. The advice given should not be 
used as a way to delegitimize concerns just to enhance reported public support and 
make it appear stronger (see also section Concluding remarks about the practical 
implications, later in this chapter). Quite apart from its questionable morality, it is 
strongly advised not to delegitimize public concerns, because doing so may have 
negative effects on future public support for the innovation and even science and 
technology in general. Delegitimizing concerns backfires and does considerable 
harm in the long run; a lack of public trust in the willingness of the scientific 
community to accept public concerns is often quoted as a cause of, or a significant 
contributor to, the controversies relating to science and technology (Bauer, 2009, 
2016; Bauer et al., 2007; Brunk, 2006), and the feeling of not being taken seriously 
is an important factor (Wynne, 1996, 2001; Irwin & Michael, 2003; see also Irwin, 
2001 on appreciation for being taken seriously). In fact, trust, or a lack thereof, in 
the scientific community can even serve as an alternative to knowledge for judging a 
technology (Siegrist, 2000; Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005; Sjöberg, 2001).  
 
Interventions when public interaction does take place 
Categorization theory and Piaget’s related theory on genetic epistemology 
can help correct misunderstandings in situations where direct contact and debate do 
take place. According to Piaget’s theory of genetic epistemology, people assimilate 
new concepts without changing their knowledge structure. People will continue to 
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use this organization of knowledge until they run into trouble, at which point they 
reorganize their knowledge (Piaget & Cook, 1952). Consequently, it is 
recommended to explain theoretical concepts targeting these conflicts. People can be 
forced to reconsider their initial categorization if information is provided that 
conflicts with their knowledge structure. 
Forcing others to change their knowledge structure can be difficult. People 
especially notice and appreciate information fitting their expectations. To notice 
information that is in conflict with one’s expectations, one needs to pay careful 
attention; and people will still be prone to try to confirm their initial categorization 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Michaut, 2004). Personal relevance is an important aspect 
that can help motivate people to pay the attention required (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
Therefore, providing information that is in conflict with a person’s ideas is more 
effective if the topic’s personal relevance to the person is stressed. 
A complicating factor in trying to change perceptions is that, as mentioned 
earlier, people use category-based information to judge a scientific concept 
especially when they lack detailed theoretical knowledge. Therefore, it might be 
very difficult to provide conflicting theoretical information, even in public 
interactions. 
 
Concluding remarks about the practical implications 
As stated in Chapter 1, the development of the subtheme, public 
understanding of science, has been marked by a power struggle between experts and 
the public. In this struggle, experts have often tried to correct wrong attitudes and 
disqualify unfavourable opinions as misguided or ignorant (Ahteensuu, 2012; 
Bucchi, 2008; Wynne, 2005). Some aspects of the recommendations show 
similarities with claims that the public are not able to make correct evaluations. 
Consequently, the current research has caused debate about the extent to which it 
supports the view that the public are not able to understand properly, and the 
proposal to use meaningful names has been interpreted as a marketing ploy with no 
other purpose than to prevent controversies in several debates. This, however, is not 
the case. 
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The notion that the public misunderstand goes beyond the traditional view 
that they are ignorant and too lazy to take an interest, as described by Bucchi (2008). 
First and foremost, the idea that the public can possibly misunderstand is rooted in 
the idea that there is a knowledge gap between the public and experts. Rather than 
calling for the exclusion of the public, the advice is to try to bridge the gap and 
prevent misunderstandings by finding meaningful associations. 
Second, the advice given is not about preventing controversies or rejection; 
rather, it is about promoting a correct imagination of what a concept might be. The 
aim is to achieve a form of communication that makes the public realize the unique 
aspects of scientific constructs. Certainly, this might prevent certain controversies, 
yet leave room for others. To use the example of this dissertation, people treat 
genomics and GM as being the same thing. Although this indicates that genomics 
would be evaluated more favourably if it were not associated with GM (based on the 
finding that natural crossing causes more favourable attitudes), other potentially 
controversial aspects could also be salient. By not recognizing the unique features of 
genomics, people also do not recognize the unique threats of genomics. For 
example, the ability to read DNA in detail can have severe impacts on how we live 
our lives. Plant genomics can propel human genomics given that the investment in 
technologies can be used for both, making them both more affordable and reachable. 
Therefore, plant genomics might contribute to developments that are deemed 
unethical by many, such as a eugenics society and genetic screening by insurance 
companies. If the difference between GM and genomics is made clear, the public 
might be able to make better decision about a broader set of consequences. Thus, 
finding meaningful names is not about blinding the public from important issues; 
rather, it is about enhancing the chances that they will realize the unique benefits 
and risks of the subject. 
 
Limitations and further research 
The aim of the current dissertation was to explore the influence of a name 
on the interpretation of the technology it represents. To my knowledge, the research 
is one of the first of its kind and has several limitations. First and foremost, the 
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research was inspired by reports by scientists working on genomics noting confusion 
with GM. Consequently, its findings are primarily about the categorization of 
genomics with GM because of the name similarity. Exposing respondents to other 
plant breeding practices (GM and traditional breeding, respectively) made it possible 
to determine the commonalities of their evaluations with those for genomics. 
Consequences of this explicit mental activation of these plant breeding practices are 
discussed next. This section concludes by focusing on limitations resulting from the 
attention paid to attitudes in their initial stage and recommendations for further 
research. 
 
Categorizations of other technologies 
Genomics and GM share not only similarities in name, but also many 
technological similarities. Although there is an important defining difference 
between the technologies with respect to artificial recombination, which is the key in 
many controversies surrounding GM, the approaches do share many of the theories 
and practices behind them. This is especially important with respect to the finding 
reported in Chapter 5 that providing information does not influence the evaluation 
strategy. The resulting question relates to the extent to which genomics is too similar 
to GM to make people notice the difference, and whether technologies that are 
further apart will be categorized together based on the name. 
Part of the answer can be found in the results. First of all, as already 
mentioned, reports exist that nanotechnology suffers from associations with asbestos 
(Kampers, 2009). In addition, the results show that the name natural crossing can 
trigger categorization with traditional breeding, even though these names are not as 
similar as genomics and GM. Consequently, the current research provides initial 
proof that categorization can prevail even if the names are phonetically different but 
do represent a common notion. Moreover, when natural crossing was described in 
Chapter 5 with the characteristics of genomics but paired with traditional breeding, 
the attitudes towards traditional breeding where the main predictor of attitudes 
towards natural crossing, showing that the commonalities between genomics and 
GM might have only a limited influence on the process of attitude extension.  
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Nevertheless, with the attention on genomics, it is clear that the direct proof 
of the effects of a technological name is especially related to that topic. It can 
therefore be recommended to expand the research to other technologies. The subject 
of nanotechnology, in particular, seems a suitable candidate because of reports by 
scientists that a similar process appears to be at work. In addition, it would be 
especially interesting for future research to focus on categorization based on 
associations that do not appear to be similar in name but, rather, similar in the 
feelings and images created by a name, such as was done in this research with 
natural crossing and traditional breeding. Studying in what way categorization 
operates based on these associations would be particularly interesting not only 
because most technologies do not share a very similar name but also because people 
oftentimes only act on these broader associations. 
 
Spontaneous formation of associations 
With respect to the central topic of genomics, a limitation in the current 
research is that the presentation of genomics was combined with the presentation of 
a familiar technology. The research was designed to confirm or disprove beliefs that 
people treated genomics and GM as similar concepts and used their ideas about GM 
to evaluate genomics, as reported by experts. To investigate this, respondents in the 
related conditions were asked about their opinions on GM after they had read about 
it, for two reasons. First, it was necessary to evaluate both of these practices to be 
able to establish whether people did indeed treat them as similar. Second, the goal 
was to activate existing cognition on GM in order to see how that would be 
transferred to genomics. Consequently, the research was especially designed to 
investigate the overlap between attitudes. This was achieved, however, at the 
expense of being able to investigate how spontaneously the association with GM 
was formed. 
The approach followed provides proof that people spontaneously categorize 
genomics with GM nevertheless. The evidence can be found in the experimental 
conditions where people were confronted with the name genomics in combination 
with a description of traditional breeding. In these conditions, the attitude towards 
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genomics was similar to the attitudes to both genomics and GM in other 
experimental conditions. In these conditions, the name GM was not mentioned, nor 
was any information about GM provided. As GM was not part of the procedure, it 
cannot be proved directly that the attitudes are still based on attitudes towards GM. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that people use their attitudes towards GM to 
evaluate genomics. The genomics evaluation pattern shows similar results in 
averages and range for respondents in the condition where genomics was paired with 
traditional breeding and in the condition where genomics was paired with GM. In 
future research, this could be investigated more directly by using more qualitative 
research investigating arguments behind the attitudes towards genomics and GM, 
measured at different sessions to prevent respondents from noticing the relation. 
Whether or not people spontaneously judge genomics based on their ideas about GM 
can then be determined more directly by looking at the similarities between 
arguments. 
In this research, we explored the effect of the name genomics by comparing 
it with the name effect of the possible alternative name natural crossing. This name 
was selected with the idea in mind that it emphasized a key difference between GM 
and genomics. However, it is important to note that the name was selected from a 
methodological perspective rather than from the perspective of a proper alternative 
that could be used in practice. The fact that the name natural crossing succeeded in 
showing that people used categorization using a name to evaluate an unfamiliar 
technology does not automatically mean that it would also serve as a proper 
alternative for the name genomics in communications about the technology. For 
example, the current research did not investigate the extent to which people would 
object to using the name natural crossing to label (a technology with the 
technological attributes that the technology now known as) genomics (for example 
because of the previously mentioned possible contribution to a genomics society). 
Therefore, the previous advice to investigate the effects of a name still stands in the 
case of genomics.  
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Subsequent attitude development 
Another limitation of the research can be found in relation to the attention 
to a person’s initial evaluation. The main question answered by the research is: 
Where do the initial attitudes come from? An interesting question is what the effect 
of the name is on the development of attitudes. Previous research has shown that 
generally the valence of attitudes towards food production technologies remains 
unaffected when information about the risks and benefits is provided (Fischer, Van 
Dijk, de Jonge, Rowe, & Frewer, 2013; Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 1998; Lusk et 
al., 2004; Scholderer & Frewer, 2003; Van Dijk, Fischer, De Jonge, Rowe, & 
Frewer, 2012). On the basis of these findings, the unfavourable initial attitudes 
towards genomics will be very difficult to change even when information is 
provided. However, the emphasis of the abovementioned research is on the 
persuasive influence of risk and benefit information rather than on information about 
the technical nature of the technologies. In the case of genomics, interventions could 
especially target assumptions about its relation to GM in attempts to establish re-
categorization. A study in which focus groups actively debated a technological 
description provided about genomics showed that three out of four groups 
eventually concluded that genomics was closely related to traditional breeding even 
though they initially judged it to be similar to GM (Van den Heuvel et al., 2008). 
These findings show great similarity to the case where organic farmers changed their 
view after debating with experts and that perceptions about what genomics entails 
(especially in relation to GM) can be changed. It would be interesting to see whether 
such categorization also means that attitudes are reconstructed. If so, it can make the 
difference between choosing to inform the public about differences from GM and 
choosing to inform them about the risks and benefits. Although the wider public will 
probably never engage in such intimate meeting with experts, such insights could 
prove beneficial especially in dealings with stakeholders where there is time to 
provide information.  
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Conclusions 
The aim of the dissertation was to gain insights into how and why people 
quickly formed perceptions that were difficult to change about a technology after 
being exposed to its name. On the premise that man is a rational actor, this kind of 
behaviour seems irrational, especially to experts who use their theoretic knowledge 
to judge a technology. A view commonly held by experts is that these kinds of 
irrational beliefs should be corrected through education, and not taken seriously 
when important decisions are being made about the development of a technology. 
Experts appear to underestimate the impact of their knowledge on their 
daily decision making regarding the subject of their expertise. Non-experts have to 
reach quick and non-educated conclusions to function in the modern world; it is 
impossible to allocate the time and effort to reach the level of expert in all 
technological innovations encountered. Instead of getting detailed related knowledge 
through education, people need to reach evaluations and conclusions quickly and 
efficiently. One way of doing so is by categorizing new unfamiliar concepts with 
familiar ones and using knowledge about the latter to make decisions about the first. 
The reason why a name has such a strong impact on the formation of perceptions is 
that it influences the categorization process. As many technological and scientific 
concepts are completely intangible, the name will often be the most pronounced 
aspect to be used for the categorization process.  
An important question addressed in this dissertation is whether a name 
alone would indeed convince people enough to make an evaluation. The results 
show that it does. Instead of reaching random or neutral evaluations about genomics 
after reading only the name without any further technical information, people 
virtually universally judged this unfamiliar technology using their perceptions about 
GM after categorizing them together. An alternative hypothetical name stressing the 
more traditional aspects of genomics breeding (natural crossing) caused 
categorization with the more favourably evaluated breeding practice traditional 
breeding, leading to more favourable evaluations. Noticeably, these patterns 
remained intact after provision of the exact same technical information in 
combination with these names; genomics was evaluated as similar to GM, and 
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natural crossing was still evaluated as similar to traditional breeding. Therefore, the 
results show not only that a name is enough to trigger a response, but also that 
providing technical information does not necessarily prevent people from using the 
name to reach an evaluation. In all likelihood, people use their activated categories 
to interpret the information given. In other words, the name acts as a frame. 
These findings show how important it is to carefully consider the name of a 
technology. A name can have a pivotal effect on the public’s perception through the 
way it gives meaning to otherwise completely abstract concepts. Much of the public 
education about science and technology attempts to influence perceptions by 
providing information. However, once perceptions are activated through a name, 
these perceptions can actually be used to interpret provided information. Although 
this does not mean that it impossible to change perceptions, it does make it very hard 
to do so. Thinking ahead about what effects a name can have on perceptions of a 
technology and selecting a name that creates the right impressions can be of 
immense importance in getting the right idea across, more quickly and efficiently. 
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Summary 
There has been a growing divide between the scientific community and the 
public. A prominent example of a conflict is the use of Genetic Modification in food 
products, which led to widespread criticism and a de-facto embargo on products 
created using GM. In response to the public’s criticism scientists started public 
outreaches. Initially these outreaches were aimed at educating the public and later 
evolved to asking opinions or offering chances to participate to representatives of 
the public. Whatever the form of the outreach, communication between scientists 
and the public intensified and members of the public have to respond to scientific 
names and terminology they might not understand. 
The lack of knowledge about what a name might represent can have far-
fetching consequences. A good example is an attempt by genomics scientists to 
work together with ecological farmers in trying to develop an alternative to GM. 
Although genomics can provide an alternative to GM for developing new cultivars 
which circumvents the main objections, the farmers were rejecting cooperation 
because they inferred that genomics was GM. The scientists reaching out were not 
only surprised by how quick such inferences were made, but also about how difficult 
it was to change the resulting perceptions. Similar issues of people drawing incorrect 
inferences about what a name represents have been reported with other scientific 
names, including nanotechnology, global warming, and genetic manipulation.  
To date, science communication has paid only very limited attention to the 
effects of scientific language on the impressions by the public. A possible reason is 
that scientists themselves are largely unaware of how their technical knowledge both 
enables them to understand scientific language and ask the appropriate questions in 
attempts to form an understanding. In addition, scientists often still believe that if 
these kinds of confusions take form, they can be corrected with explanation or 
education. In everyday life, however, people take split second decisions using 
quickly formed impressions, and the kind of education that can correct public 
misunderstandings is actually very rare. In addition, if people develop their 
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knowledge, what they remember, learn and understand is often largely based on 
their expectations. A name can therefore have a determining effect not only on 
quickly formed impressions, but also on more educated ideas. 
The effects of difficult to understand names are not limited to public 
communication. Although misunderstandings are especially noticed during contact, 
they might even have a bigger impact in situations where there is no contact at all. 
For example, people might choose to avoid consumer products because of a name 
triggering unfavourable associations. 
The aim of the current dissertation is to systematically investigate the 
influence of a name on the interpretation and evaluation of a science or technology. 
It focuses on how people make sense of what a name means and on the subsequent 
formation of attitudes that occurs when people are confronted with a scientific 
concept unfamiliar to them. The development of genomics applied to plant breeding 
is used as case to study the effects of a name on emerging attitudes and 
understandings. 
The research is experimental in nature and in the tradition of cognitive 
psychology, a sub-discipline of social psychology. Cognitive psychology research 
predominantly entails experiments that attempt to discover what happens in people’s 
minds when they process information, making it a suitable approach to investigate 
how people deal with scientific concepts with which they are unfamiliar. Central to 
cognitive approaches is the notion that people actively process information (such as 
a name) and that differences in processing can result in differences in outcomes. 
 
Results 
In Chapter 2, the aim of the literature study was to discover how initial 
understanding and attitudes are formed in a situation where a person does not have 
any knowledge about the topic at hand. Categorization theory describes a process 
where people place an unfamiliar concept in a category of familiar concepts, which 
enables them to evaluate the unfamiliar concept by using present knowledge about 
the familiar concepts. This strategy is simultaneously a way of learning new 
information and a powerful way of quickly drawing conclusion when knowledge is 
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lacking. It therefor explains both how people are able form their opinions quickly 
and why they are so hard to change. 
In Chapter 3, the aim was to investigate the effects of the name of a 
technology on uninformed evaluations and decisions using an experiment. The 
results showed that participants used categorization to reach evaluations and that the 
name of the technology was used as the basis for the categorization. In addition, the 
results showed that the unfamiliar concepts were evaluated by applying the pre-
existing attitudes linked to the category used for categorization in a sort of copy-
and-paste fashion. The result showed that genomics was evaluated similarly to GM, 
whereas a fictional breeding method called natural crossing was evaluated similarly 
to traditional breeding. 
An additional aim was to investigate the extent to which personal 
differences might lead to people quickly reaching decisions and evaluations based 
on categorization. According to theory on need for closure, some people experience 
a stable high need for closure and want to draw conclusions quickly. Others 
experience an avoidance of closure and postpone their evaluation until they have the 
opportunity to study matters further so as to prevent inappropriate conclusions. The 
results showed, however, that a personal need for closure was unrelated to how 
quickly people used their associations to reach a conclusion. This can be explained 
through the fact that someone can prefer conclusions over further elaborate thinking 
when there is too little information to justify the latter. 
In Chapter 4, the aim was to examine the influence of risk perception 
relating to food on evaluation and categorization. Previous research indicates that 
GM is perceived as risky and unfavourable, especially when applied to food. The 
results showed that, in a culture (Ukraine) where GM was perceived as 
controversial, changing the purpose from food to biofuel resulted in more favourable 
evaluations of GM, which, in turn, resulted in more favourable evaluations of 
genomics. However, the effect was absent in the Netherlands, where the average 
evaluation of GM is neither favourable nor unfavourable, and therefore less 
controversial. Another effect of perceived risk found in the literature is that risk 
leads to more perceived similarity. Yet, the results do not indicate a stronger 
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categorization by people with higher risk perceptions. The explanation can be found 
in the fact that the correlation between the attitudes was very high in the first place. 
The finding fits the idea that the categorization is realized using the name alone, 
rather than specific technical details (which had to be present in the mind of the 
evaluator) that become more important under threat.  
In Chapter 5, the purpose was to investigate the influence of activated 
knowledge on the evaluation of provided information. From the finding in Chapter 2 
that categorization provides the basis of learning, it was assumed that, through 
categorization, the name can have an important impact on learning by determining 
what information is being noticed, and how it is interpreted and evaluated. The 
results showed that, when information about genomics was provided, the name used 
for the technology was still the primary predictor of the evaluations; the presented 
information did not influence the results to a practical, meaningful extent. Therefore, 
the results show that the information provided is interpreted using already present 
knowledge, rather than altering the knowledge and that, therefore, a name can have a 
long-lasting impact even when learning can potentially take place. 
 
Conclusions 
All results show that the name used to describe genomics has a significant 
impact on how the technology is perceived and evaluated. Virtually unaffected by 
whether the technology is used for the production of food or biofuel or additional 
information, people use activated associations to evaluate genomics. The dominating 
pattern of how the perception of the technology is perceived fits that predicted by 
categorization theory. When the name used is prone to activating associations with 
GM, the evaluations are less favourable than when the name used is steering people 
to using their associations with the more positively considered traditional breeding. 
These findings show how important it is to carefully consider the name of a 
technology. A name can have a pivotal effect on the public’s perception through the 
way it gives meaning to otherwise completely abstract concepts. In numerous cases, 
people only have these perceptions to act on. In other cases, additional information 
is provided. However, in situations like these the name still has a strong influence 
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because of the way perceptions are used to interpret the provided information. 
Although this does not mean that it impossible to change perceptions, it does make it 
very hard to do so. A well-chosen name can be a very practical tool in getting the 
right idea across. 
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Samenvatting 
Er is een groeiende kloof tussen wetenschap en samenleving. Een goed 
voorbeeld is het conflict tussen verschillende groepen over het gebruik van 
genetische modificatie (GM) in voedselproducten. De wijdverspreide kritiek leidde 
tot een de-facto embargo op producten die gemaakt zijn met GM. We wetenschap 
reageerde met publiekscampagnes op de kritiek uit de samenleving op 
wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen. In de beginfase waren deze campagnes gericht 
op het onderwijzen van het publiek. Later kwamen daar initiatieven bij waarin het 
publiek om meningen werden gevraagd of kansen werd geboden om een bijdrage te 
leveren aan wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen. Welke vorm het contact tussen 
wetenschap en de samenleving ook aannam, communicatie tussen wetenschappers 
en het publiek intensiveerde en mensen zonder uitgebreide en specialistische 
wetenschappelijke kennis moeten een reactie zien te formuleren op specialistische 
wetenschappelijke namen en termen die zij niet altijd volledig begrepen. 
Het gebrek aan kennis over wat een naam vertegenwoordigt kan 
verstrekkende gevolgen hebben. Een goed voorbeeld is een initiatief van genomics-
wetenschappers om samen te werken met biologische boeren om een alternatief voor 
GM te ontwikkelen. Terwijl genomics een alternatief voor GM kan bieden bij het 
ontwikkelen van nieuwe gewassen, wilde de boeren niet samenwerken met de 
genomics-wetenschappers omdat zij dachten dat genomics en GM het zelfde 
betekende. De wetenschappers die de samenwerking zochten waren niet alleen 
verbaasd over hoe snel de boeren tot dit idee waren gekomen, maar over hoe 
moeilijk het was om ze er weer van af te krijgen. Bij het communiceren over onder 
andere nanotechnologie, de opwarming van de aarde en genetische manipulatie 
rapporteren wetenschappers soortgelijke problemen waarbij mensen snel incorrecte 
ideeën vormden over de aard van een technologie of wetenschap. 
In de wetenschapscommunicatie is tot nu toe zeer weinig aandacht besteed 
aan de effecten van wetenschappelijke termen op de indrukken en beeldvorming van 
het publiek. Een mogelijke reden is dat wetenschappers zich niet realiseren in welke 
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mate hun technische kennis ze in staat stelt om zowel wetenschappelijke taal te 
begrijpen als de juiste vragen te stellen wanneer ze zelf een nieuw wetenschappelijk 
concept proberen te begrijpen. Daarnaast geloven veel exacte wetenschappers nog 
steeds dat misverstanden te corrigeren zijn door middel van uitleg en onderwijs. 
Echter, in het dagelijks leven maken mensen continue snelle beslissing op basis van 
oppervlakkige indrukken en het type publieke onderwijs dat nodig is om 
misverstanden te corrigeren is zeer zeldzaam. Daarnaast beïnvloeden verwachting in 
belangrijke mate hoe individuele kennis ontwikkelt; wat iemand onthoudt, en op 
welke manier iemand iets interpreteert en begrijpt hangt voor een groot deel af van 
de verwachting die deze persoon heeft. Hierdoor beïnvloedt een naam niet alleen 
eerste indrukken maar ook ideeën gevormd op basis van verkregen informatie. 
De gevolgen van moeilijk te begrijpen namen zijn niet beperkt tot publieke 
communicatiecampagnes. Hoewel misverstanden vooral worden opgemerkt wanneer 
er contact is tussen het publiek en wetenschappers zijn de gevolgen wellicht nog 
groter wanneer er helemaal geen directe communicatie is. Bijvoorbeeld, 
consumenten kunnen producten vermijden omdat de naam ervan ongunstige 
associaties oproept. 
Het doel van het huidige onderzoek is om de invloed van een naam op de 
interpretatie en evaluatie van wetenschappelijke concepten te onderzoeken. De 
centrale vraag is hoe mensen een voor hen onbekende wetenschappelijke naam 
proberen te begrijpen en wat voor invloed dit proces heeft op de daarop volgende 
evaluatie van het concept. Op plantveredeling toegepaste genomics wordt gebruikt 
als een casus om onderzoek te doen naar de invloeden van een naam op de 
ontwikkeling van begrip en oordelen. 
De centrale vraag wordt onderzocht vanuit de cognitieve psychologie en het 
onderzoek is experimenteel van opzet. Cognitieve psychologisch onderzoek is 
hoofdzakelijk experimenteel en heeft doorgaans het doel te onderzoeken op welke 
manier mensen informatie verwerken, wat het een geschikte theoretische benadring 
maakt voor het onderzoeken op welke manier mensen omgaan met 
wetenschappelijke concepten waar ze niet bekend mee zijn. Een belangrijk element 
van deze cognitieve benadering is de assumptie dat mensen actief bezig zijn met het 
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verwerken van informatie (zoals een naam) en dat verschillende 
verwerkingsstrategieën kunnen leiden tot verschillen in resultaten. 
 
Onderzoeksresultaten 
In Hoofdstuk 2 was het doel van een literatuuronderzoek het beantwoorden 
van de vraag hoe mensen tot duiding en tot evaluatie komen in een situatie waar zij 
geen kennis hebben over het centrale onderwerp. Categorisatie Theorie beschrijft 
een mentaal proces waarbij een onbekend concept in een groep van bekende 
concepten wordt geplaatst, wat iemand in staat stelt om het onbekende te duiden en 
te evalueren op basis van de bekende concepten in de groep. Mensen gebruiken deze 
strategie veelvuldig. Zij leren daarmee nieuwe informatie en kunnen om snel 
conclusies te trekken wanneer direct gerelateerde kennis ontbreekt. Het verklaart 
daarmee hoe mensen snel tot een oordeel komen, bovendien blijkt dit oordeel 
moeilijk te veranderen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 was het doel om door middel van een experiment te 
onderzoeken welke effecten een wetenschappelijke naam heeft op ongeïnformeerde 
evaluaties en beslissingen. De resultaten toonden dat deelnemers inderdaad 
categorisatie gebruikten om tot een oordeel te komen en dat de naam van de 
technologie de basis voor de categorisatie vormde. Daarnaast lieten de resultaten 
zien dat de onbekende technologie werd beoordeeld door het oordeel van de 
bekende categorie-genoten over te nemen en op het nieuwe concept ‘te plakken’. De 
resultaten toonden dat genomics hetzelfde werd beoordeeld als GM, terwijl de 
fictieve naam ‘natuurlijk kruizen’ leidde tot een beoordeling die gelijk was aan 
traditionele veredeling. 
Een ander doel was om te onderzoeken in welke mate persoonlijke 
verschillen een rol spelen in het snel trekken van conclusies. Volgens de ‘Need for 
Closure’- Theorie hebben sommige mensen een sterke behoefte om snel tot een 
oordeel te komen. Anderen hebben juist de behoefte om hun oordeel uit te stellen tot 
ze kans hebben gehad om een onderwerp beter te bestuderen in een poging om 
onjuiste conclusies te voorkomen. De resultaten toonden echter dat mate van ‘need 
for closure’ geen invloed had op de manier waarop mensen hun associaties 
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gebruikten om tot een oordeel te komen. Een verklaring voor deze bevinding is dat 
iedereen genoodzaakt is om zo nu en dan snel een oordeel te vormen en het gebruik 
van een mentaal proces van categorisatie daarbij universeel is.  
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 4 was te onderzoeken in welke mate aan voedsel 
gerelateerde risicopercepties een rol spelen bij categorisatie en evaluatie. Eerder 
onderzoek wijst erop dat GM vooral als risicovol en ongunstig wordt beoordeeld 
wanneer de technologie wordt gebruikt voor het vervaardigen van voedsel. De 
resultaten van het huidige onderzoek tonen dat in een cultuur waar GM als 
controversieel werd beschouwd (Oekraïne) het een positief effect had op de 
beoordeling ervan wanneer de technologie werd gepresenteerd als een middel voor 
het maken van biobrandstof in plaats van voedsel, wat ook resulteerde in positievere 
beoordelingen voor genomics. Dit effect ontbrak echter in Nederland waar GM als 
minder controversieel werd ervaren en gemiddeld als neutraal werd beoordeeld. Een 
ander gevolg genoemd in de literatuur is dat concepten als meer gelijkend worden 
beoordeeld wanneer er een hoger risico wordt ervaren. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 
4 lieten echter niet zien dat de oordelen van GM en genomics meer op elkaar leken 
wanneer er meer risico werd ervaren. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat relatie tussen 
attitudes van de gebruikte bekende technologie en de onbekende technologie toch al 
heel erg hoog was. Dit biedt extra ondersteuning voor de gedachte dat de 
technologieën in dezelfde categorie werden geplaatst op basis van alleen gelijkheid 
in naam in plaats van specifieke technische eigenschappen (die bij de beoordelaar 
bekend zouden moeten zijn geweest) die afhankelijke van het ervaren risico gehalte 
een wisselende rol van belang kunnen spelen. 
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 5 was het onderzoeken van de invloed van 
geactiveerde kennis op de evaluatie van gepresenteerde informatie. Op basis van het 
idee dat categorisatie de basis kan zijn van leren, zoals gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 
2, werd verwacht dat de naam van de technologie een belangrijke invloed kan 
hebben op het leerproces. De categorisatie zou kunnen beïnvloeden welke informatie 
wordt opgemerkt, maar ook hoe de informatie wordt geïnterpreteerd en geëvalueerd. 
De resultaten toonden dat wanneer informatie over genomics werd gepresenteerd de 
gebruikte naam de belangrijkste voorspeller voor de resulterende evaluatie was; de 
 190 
 
gepresenteerde informatie had geen betekenisvolle invloed. De resultaten lieten zien 
dat de gepresenteerde informatie werd geïnterpreteerd met behulp van geactiveerde 
kennis, in plaats van dat de geactiveerde kennis werd bijgesteld door de 
gepresenteerde informatie. Dit toont aan dat de invloed van de naam een blijvende 
invloed kan hebben zelfs wanneer er wel aandacht is voor verdere informatie. 
 
Conclusies 
Alle resultaten toonden dat de naam gebruikt om genomics te omschrijven 
een significante invloed heeft op hoe de technologie werd ervaren en geëvalueerd. 
Mensen gebruikten geactiveerde associaties om genomics te beoordelen en dit bleek 
onafhankelijk van of het werd gepresenteerd als een toepassing voor het produceren 
van voedsel of biobrandstoffen. Het patroon van evaluaties past bij een proces van 
categorisatie om tot een oordeel te komen. Wanneer een naam categorisatie met GM 
uitlokt zijn de evaluaties minder positief dan wanneer een naam wordt gebruikt dat 
stuurt naar categorisatie met traditionele veredeling. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat het belangrijk is om goed over een naam van 
een technologie na te denken. De gekozen naam kan bepalend zijn voor de 
percepties die ontstaan in de samenleving door de manier waarop mensen het 
gebruiken om betekenis te geven aan de concepten waar ze mee geconfronteerd 
worden. In veel gevallen zullen mensen slechts hun associaties hebben wanneer ze 
keuzes moeten maken. Daarnaast zullen de gevormde associaties bepalen op welke 
manier informatie wordt geïnterpreteerd wanneer deze wel beschikbaar is. Hoewel 
dit niet betekent dat percepties nooit kunnen veranderen, zorgt het er wel voor dat 
het heel moeilijk is om verandering te bereiken. Een zorgvuldig gekozen naam kan 
een effectief hulpmiddel zijn om het juiste idee snel en efficiënt over te brengen. 
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